Title: Complexities of Multi-Organisational Error Management
1Complexities of Multi-Organisational Error
Management
- John Dobson, Simon Lock, Dave Martin, Ian
Sommerville - University of Lancaster
2Consequential responsibility
- In general, responsibilities can be recast as
responsibilities for some goal - Who gets the blame if a goal is not reached
- Always associated with an organisation/role/person
not an automated system
3Causal responsibility
- Causal responsibility can be considered as the
responsibility for doing something -
- This can generally be recast as the
responsibility for enacting some process
(possibly not explicitly defined) - Consequential responsibilities always have
associated causal responsibilities (although the
responsibles may be different)
4Causal responsibility
- Two types of causal responsibility
- Responsibility to enact the process in normal
situations - Responsibility to deal with exceptions
5Consequential responsibility failures
- Failure to assign consequential responsibility
(to a role) - Failure to identify (adequate) evidence of
discharge of responsibility - Misunderstanding of consequential responsibility
- Failure to translate consequential to causal
responsibility - Conflicts of interest
6Causal responsibility failures
- Responsibility misunderstanding
- Lack of competence
- Lack of time
- Lack of resources
- Unassigned responsibility
- Conflicts of interest
7Summary Responsibility models
- Consequential responsibility is a relation
between a role/agent and a goal - Causal responsibility is a relation between a
role/agent and a process - There are processes of creation associated with
evidence. Each process has an implicit goal
(Successfully Do It) hence a responsible - Processes also have causal responsibles who are
responsible for enacting the process - One or more responsibles may be assigned a
responsibility
8Shared responsibility
- Shared consequential responsibility for some goal
is common in multi-organisational systems - A possible source of error is when this
responsibility crosses organisational boundaries - This is particularly true when the responsibility
involves the prevention of failure
9Life cycle and Responsibilities
- In preparation for mapping out the
responsibilities implicated in a failure, it is
useful to start by looking at the major
life-cycle phases of an operational system as a
way of distinguishing different responsibilities
10Operational System Life-cycle Phases
- There are four major phases (defined by
processes) in the life cycle of an operational
system - procurement
- operation
- maintenance
- decommissioning
- It is easier to deal with particular faults in
particular ways at particular points in the
life-cycle
11- Procurement includes making assessments of the
risks and consequences of operational failures - Operation includes monitoring errors and
following plans for recovering from the errors so
as to prevent them from giving rise to failures -
- Maintenance includes taking retrospective action
to prevent subsequent occurrences of
fault-error-failure chains -
- Decommissioning includes ensuring that
documentation concerning the (in)accuracy of the
failure mode assumptions and (un)successful ways
discovered of managing failures is preserved for
posterity
12Dependability Responsibilities
- The previous analysis leads to the following
articulation of overall responsibilities
The positioning in this model of (intra- and
inter-) organisational boundaries is key to
effective error recovery.
13Organisational Boundaries (1)
- If maintenance responsibilities are in a
different enterprise from the operation
responsibilities, - where exactly does the boundary lie?
14Organisational Boundaries (2)
- all the monitoring can be contracted out, but the
operator is then dependent on another
organisation for critical management information
there are a number of possible organisational
failure associated with such a critical dependence
15Organisational Boundaries (3)
- in practice, maintenance will include at least
some monitoring
16Organisational Boundaries (4)
- shared responsibilities require good
communications channels and some way of resolving
conflicts in priorities, because this model is
equivalent to the following
17Organisational Boundaries (5)
18Example of cross-organisational responsibilities
- For example, recovery planning in the
infrastructural enterprise might assume the
existence of certain recovery mechanisms and
procedures in the operational enterprise. But
whose responsibility is it to determine whether
these exist and if necessary ensure that they do
and are appropriate? Whose policy it it?
19Working Across Organisational Boundaries In The
UK Railways
- When safety relies on inter-organisational
coordination of work we need to consider the
nature of the relationship between the
organisations - Structure (trains and rolling stock operated and
managed by the train companies) and
infrastructure (rail network and signalling
operated and managed by Railtrack) - Relationship provider consumer/customer?
- For operation Railtrack provided and managed a
working infrastructure on which train journeys
are scheduled and re-scheduled dynamically - But what of the relationship for safety
- Nature of delegation, monitoring, enforcement or
ideal of simple cooperation? - How well are safety procedures specified across
boundaries? - Control for safety strategy distributed across
organisations - No systematic coordination of safety work,
reliance on some document flows (e.g. SPAD
reports) and other ad hoc interventions (e.g.
letters and phones calls by management) - Creates problems in sticking to a schedule or
achieving agreed upon analyses and solutions to
safety problems - Open-ness and concealment lack of transparency
of organisational workings creates the problem of
working out how safety procedures
inter-link/achieving a coherent strategy - Who has responsibility for managing the
interactions between the organisations?
20Interactions between Organisations
- The split between operation (trains) and
infrastructure (signals) means that some errors
arise from inadequate co-ordination between the
two enterprises, particularly if there are faults
in each enterprise which interact, or if the
major phases in the two organisations are poorly
synchronised. - "(Railtrack) did not inherit, and does not
have, the overarching role of BR. Its undertaking
was and remains markedly narrower. Nonetheless
there is a widespread perception of Railtrack as
the successor to BR, particularly as respects
driving of trains, responsibility for drivers and
responsibility for the design of trains.
Railtrack is not an inheritor of those and other
functions and they fall outwith Railtrack's
proper province today. Professor Uff QC
recognised this on his report on the Southall
accident when he made several recommendations for
standards to be developed by ATOC. Furthermore,
Railtrack does not presently have full power to
set standards which it considers to be desirable
or appropriate, for example, where the costs of
implementation would exceed the achievable safety
benefit. Despite these matters, Railtrack is
widely but erroneously seen to be responsible for
ensuring safety on the whole railway network and
to have the power to do so."
21Dependability cases
- Dependability cases are justifications for a
belief that a certain level of dependability has
been achieved - They include
- Claims - a statement of some thing. It might be
thought of as the achievement of a goal - Evidence - information to back up that statement
- Arguments - arguments why the evidence backs up
the statement
22Proposal
- Associate consequential and causal responsibility
information with dependability cases - Documents and makes explicit who is responsible
for what - Reveals unassigned responsibilities
- Provides a basis for responsibility discussions
- Clearly relates responsibility to dependability
23What next?
- Modelling the responsibility (rather than the
allocation of responsibilities) - Description, Competences, Resources required,
Constraints, Etc. - Modelling responsibility sharing (transfer,
delegation, inter-organisational)