Good Will, Duty, and the Categorical Imperative

1
Jacques Louis David, The Oath of the Horatii, 1784
2
Good Will, Duty, and the Categorical Imperative
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
3
KANT AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY

• Modern philosophy begins with René Descartes
  (1596-1650).
• However, Kant is regarded by many as the greatest
  of all the modern philosophers.
• Indeed, with Plato and Aristotle, Kant is often
  considered to be one of the three greatest
  philosophers.
• Kant made great contributions in epistemology,
  metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics.
• The Critique of Pure Reason widely regarded as a
  masterpiece, and the greatest single work in
  philosophy since the Greeks, perhaps since
  Aristotles Metaphysics.

4
MAN, NATURE, AND RATIONALITY

• Kant notes that everything in nature works
  according to laws. However, humans differ from
  other parts of nature in that humans alone can
  according to principles.
• Thus, Kant recognizes the rationality of human
  beings.
• Humans are rational in having a conception of
  laws, or principles.
• Our rationality enables us to understand the
  correctness of moral laws such as keep your
  promises, and to know the difference between
  right and wrong.

5
FREE AGENCY

• Human beings are also free agents, that is, we
  have free will, or can freely choose between
  options, including moral options. That is, we
  can freely choose to do right or wrong.
• Because of our rationality, we can understand the
  difference between right and wrong. And, because
  of our rationality, we can understand moral laws
  which it is our duty to accept as binding.
• Our freedom to choose means then that we are
  capable of freely acting on this knowledge. That
  is we can freely choose to do what is proper.

6
REASON AND AGENCY

• Knowing how to act morally requires reason. Thus
  we must be able to deduce and understand the
  principles of correct moral behavior.
• Having understood what is the right thing to do,
  we then act in a morally correct way when we
  freely choose to act according to the moral law
  which reason has recognized to be correct.
• Kant calls our ability to act according to
  principles, or our capacity to use our free will
  to do the right thing, practical reason.
• Thus, for Kant, the will puts to use or practice
  the principles of reason insofar as they concern
  moral behavior.

7
RATIONALITY AND DESIRE

• Kant recognizes that people are not only rational
  agents but we also have desires and appetites.
• However, as a rational agent, a person can choose
  to do what is right in spite of the influence of
  desires and appetites.
• When desires and appetites, or what Kant calls
  subjective conditions, would lead a person not
  to do the morally correct thing, or when morality
  and desire conflict, the moral person acts
  according to reason to do the right thing, in
  spite of the influences of their desires and
  appetites.

8
MORAL WORTH

• For Kant, a person of moral worth does the right
  thing, and does so in spite of the influence of
  desire and appetite which may lead her to do the
  wrong thing.
• And, for Kant, moral worth is the most important
  attribute which a person can have.
• Moral worth is more important and more admirable
  than such talents of the mind as intelligence,
  wit, and judgment and is more important than
  such qualities of temperament as courage,
  resolution, and perseverance.
• For Kant, these gifts of nature - intelligence,
  courage, and so forth - may also become bad and
  mischievous if the will which is to make use of
  them is not good.

9
GOOD WILL I

• As seen, Kant recognizes that such things as
  intelligence and talent are good and valuable,
  but he thinks that moral worth has absolute
  value, and is more important than anything else
  which we might admire in a person.
• We have also seen that, for Kant, we are
  obligated by reason to follow objective moral
  laws even though we may not do so because of the
  influence of subjective conditions, or desires
  and appetites, on the will.
• A persons will to do the right thing, the thing
  which reason can identify as the morally correct
  thing to do, is a good will, and one which does
  not is not thoroughly good.

10
GOOD WILL II

• A person of moral worth is a person of good will
  in freely choosing to do the morally correct
  thing whether or not she is under the influence
  of desire to do otherwise.
• And Kant says that Nothing can possibly be
  conceived in the world, or even out of it, which
  can be called good without qualification, except
  a Good Will.
• Again, things like intelligence, talent, courage,
  and diligence are good, but if they are not
  backed by good character or a good will, then
  they can be put to bad use by a bad person. For
  instance, Hitler.

11
GOOD WILL III

• A good will is necessary to make sure that what
  Kant calls gifts of fortune, such as wealth and
  power, do not lead us astray as moral beings.
• Even things which are thought to be good in many
  respects, such as self-control and calm
  deliberation, have no intrinsic unconditional
  value, but always presuppose a good will.
• Not only are such things not absolutely good, as
  a good will is, but they can be put to bad use if
  not backed by a good will. Thus we may admire
  qualities such as self-control and calm
  deliberation, but, if not backed by a good will
  they may become extremely bad. For instance,
  Kant says that the coolness of a villain makes
  him far more dangerous than he would have been
  had he lacked the self-control and calm
  deliberation that coolness implies.

12
GOOD WILL IV

• For Kant, a good will is not good because of what
  it brings about or helps to bring about, but
  because it is good in itself.
• A good will, considered by itself as it is in
  itself, is much more admirable than anything
  which it brings about.
• For instance, the good will which brings about
  happiness is much more deserving of respect than
  is the happiness which it produces.

13
GOOD WILL V

• Even if a good will accomplishes nothing, it is
  still to be admired as something which has its
  whole value in itself.
• So whether a good will is useful in producing
  results or not, it is still of the utmost
  goodness in itself.
• The value of a good will then lies entirely in
  itself and not in what it produces.

14
GOOD WILL VI

• For Kant, a good will is good not because of
  what it performs or effects, but is good in
  itself.
• Because the value of a good will lies entirely
  within itself, it is still good whether it
  results in anything which is either a good or a
  bad effect of it.
• The good will then has its whole value in
  itself, and its usefulness or fruitlessness can
  neither add to nor take away anything from this
  value.

15
MORALITY AND CONSEQUENCES I

• Kant says that the moral worth of an action does
  not lie in the effect expected from it, nor in
  any principle of action which requires to borrow
  its motive from this expected effect.
• Thus, unlike any consequentialist theory, Kant
  says that it is incorrect to look for the moral
  worth of an action in its effects.
• The reason for this is that expected effects of
  actions, such as improving ones own condition,
  as in egoism, or increasing the happiness of
  everyone likely to be effected by the action, as
  in utilitarianism, Kant says could have been
  brought about by other causes.
• And, if that were the case, then there would
  have been no need of the will of a rational
  being.

16
MORALITY AND CONSEQUENCES II

• Recall that, for Kant, it is in this will alone
  that the supreme and unconditional good can be
  found.
• And if that is where the supreme and
  unconditional good is to be found, then it is not
  to be found in the consequences of an action,
  whether those consequences mean a better life for
  oneself, as in egoism, or in a better life for
  everyone affected by the action, as in
  utilitarianism.
• To that end, Kant says The pre-eminent good
  which we call moral can therefore consist in
  nothing else than the conception of law in
  itself, which certainly is possible only in a
  rational being, in so far as this conception, and
  not the expected effect, determines the will.
  (His italics.)

17
MORALITY AND CONSEQUENCES III

• Thus, for Kant, the moral person does what is
  right because it is right, and does not do right
  because he or she is considering the likely
  effects of doing right for himself or for anyone
  likely to be effected by the action.
• For Kant, the goodness of a good will is a good
  which is already present in the person who acts
  accordingly that is, a person who acts according
  to moral law, and we have not to wait for it to
  appear first in the result.
• The goodness of an act is not then judged by its
  consequences, as in a consequentialist theory,
  but is due to a good will, or willing to do the
  right thing because it is the right thing to do.

18
MORAL MOTIVES

• For Kant it is the moral person who is to be
  respected and revered. However, you are not an
  intrinsically moral person if, although you do
  the right thing, you do so for the wrong reason.
• For instance, you may keep a promise, not ought
  of knowing that it is the right thing to do, and
  acting on that knowledge, but because you
  perceive it to be to your benefit to do so.
• A moral person is motivated to do the right thing
  because he recognizes that it is the right thing
  to do, and so acts out of principle.

19
MORALITY IS UNIVERSAL

• According to Kant, you dont act correctly for a
  subjective reason, such as pleasure or happiness,
  if you are a moral person. Rather, you act out
  of principle.
• This means recognizing an objective right which
  applies to everyone.
• What is morally right for one person is morally
  right for everyone, which is what is meant by
  saying that morality is universal.

20
DUTY I

• That morality is universal and objective, rather
  than local, historical, and subjective, means
  that every rational agent has an obligation to do
  what is right.
• Thus it is your duty to do what is morally right
  as an objective matter.
• Kants ethics is called deontological. The word
  deontology comes from the Greek words deon for
  duty and logos for science. Thus deontology
  would be the science of duty.

21
DUTY II

• A deontological theory of ethics stresses a
  persons duty to do the morally correct thing
  regardless of consequences.
• For deontological ethics, some acts are morally
  obligatory whether their consequences are good or
  bad for human beings.
• Because of lack of consideration of consequences,
  a deontological theory is nonconsequentialist.
• The deontologist will typically hold that his
  moral standards are higher than those of the
  consequentialist.

22
IMPERATIVES

• An imperative is a command that I act in a
  certain fashion.
• Kant talks of two kinds of imperative, or two
  kinds of command (of reason), namely,
  hypothetical or categorical.
• A hypothetical imperative concerns an action
  which is good only as a means to something
  else. (His italics.) A categorical imperative
  concerns an action which is conceived of as good
  in itself. (His italics.)

23
HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVE I

• A hypothetical imperative is conditional.
• That is, it depends on certain things, and
  concerns what needs to be done in order to attain
  an objective.
• An imperative (a command of reason to act in a
  certain way) is hypothetical when it concerns an
  action which is good only as a means to something
  else.

24
HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVE II

• For instance, if you want to begin collecting
  art, then your ability to collect good art will
  be dependent or conditional on your ability to
  recognize good art.
• It is therefore imperative that you learn
  something about art so that you can tell the good
  from the bad. And the hypothetical command of
  reason in this case would be If you want to
  build a good collection of art (the hypothetical)
  then learn about art (the imperative).
• Thus learning about art is good, but it is
  hypothetical because it is a means to something
  else, namely acquiring a good collection.

25
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE I

• Kant says that There is but one categorical
  imperative, namely this Act only on that maxim
  whereby thou canst at the same time will that it
  should become a universal law. (His italics.)
• (A maxim is a principle of conduct, such as keep
  your promises.)
• Kant also puts the categorical imperative this
  way Act as if the maxim of thy action were to
  become a universal law of nature. (His
  italics.)
• He further states the categorical imperative when
  he says I am never to act otherwise than so that
  I could also will that my maxim should become a
  universal law. (His italics.)

26
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE II

• A categorical imperative is unconditional -
  categorical means absolute, unqualified, or
  unconditional.
• Kants categorical imperative is objectively
  necessary.
• It concerns the necessity of a correct moral
  action itself without reference to any
  consequence of the action.

27
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE III

• According to Kant, all moral laws, or what he
  calls imperatives of duty, such as keep your
  promises, tell the truth, and repay your debts,
  can be deduced from this one imperative
  namely, the categorical imperative act only on
  that maxim whereby you can will that it should
  become a universal law.
• Kant thinks that the categorical imperative is a
  general law to which particular moral laws, such
  as those just cited, must conform.

28
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE IV

• We have seen that Kant thinks that the goodness
  of an act does not lie in its effects, but in the
  conception of the moral law according to which
  all rational agents should act, and so Kant is
  not a utilitarian or consequentialist.
• In addition, Kant says that the conception of the
  correct moral law will and must determine the
  will, or tell us what is the correct moral
  action, and he says that this correct moral law
  pertains to everyone.
• If we look to moral law for correct moral
  behavior, and not to the effects of actions, then
  we must ask what kind of law it is to which we
  are to look for morality.
• The answer, for Kant, is the categorical
  imperative, the general law from which, and
  according to which particular moral laws can be
  tested.

29
TESTING MORAL LAWS I

• To test a moral act one can ask What would
  happen if everyone did this? Or, Would it be
  okay for anyone to do this in the same or similar
  circumstances? (Cf. Thomas Nagel.)
• If what I am about to do is morally correct then,
  for Kant, it would be morally correct for
  everyone to do the same thing in the same
  circumstances.
• If an action is morally correct then it is
  universalizable, that is, it is good for
  everyone, everywhere, everywhen.

30
TESTING MORAL LAWS II

• For Kant, a particular moral principle can be
  tested by asking if a rule pertaining to behavior
  which goes against the principle can be
  universalized.
• And he says If not, then it must be rejected .
  . . because it cannot enter as a principle into a
  possible universal legislation cannot be a
  moral law applicable to everyone.
• Thus a test of a maxim or moral law such as keep
  your promises is to ask if a principle
  pertaining to conduct which would break the law,
  such as it is okay to make a promise which you
  dont intend to keep, could be universalized.

31
TEST 1 MAKING FALSE PROMISES I

• Could the rule it is okay to break a promise,
  or it is okay to make a false promise be
  universalized?
• If so, that is, if it would be okay for everyone
  to make promises which they dont intend to keep,
  then making false promises would fit the
  categorical imperative and so would be morally
  acceptable.
• But can making false promises be universalized?
  To answer this we must ask what would happen, or
  what the consequences would be, of everyone
  making promises which they do not intend to keep.

32
TEST 1 MAKING FALSE PROMISES II

• Kants answer is that promises would cease to
  mean anything. Thus we could never count on the
  promise of another, or could never be sure that a
  promise was serious and will be kept if it is
  okay to make a false promise is a moral
  principle.
• Accordingly, the maxim it is okay to make a
  false promise, as soon as it should be made a
  universal law, would necessarily destroy itself.
• Notice that there is no hypothetical which
  precedes the statement of the moral law keep
  your promises, such as if you want to be
  well-liked or if you want to have a good
  reputation then keep your promises.

33
PRUDENCE AND DUTY I

• If we looked at promise keeping as a hypothetical
  imperative which says If you want to be liked,
  then keep your promises, then it might be
  thought to be prudent to keep your promises given
  that objective.
• Hypothetical imperatives, such as, if you want a
  good grade, then study hard, are said to be
  prudential.
• However, since a law which says that it is okay
  to break promises cannot be universalized,
  keeping promises is unconditional, and, as such,
  is something which we have a duty to do.
• The categorical imperative is moral then rather
  than prudential.

34
PRUDENCE AND DUTY II

• Kant grants that it may in some cases be prudent
  for a person to break a promise, but the moral
  question is whether it can ever be right?
• Whether or not something is prudent depends on
  its consequences. And Kant does not base
  morality on the consequences of acts, at least
  not after the consequences of considering the
  possible universalization of a law, such as
  making false promises, which would test a law
  such as keep your promises, has been considered
  and rejected.

35
PRUDENCE AND DUTY III

• In knowing how to behave morally, I do not need
  to look to the world and what the possible
  consequences of my action might be, I only need
  to look at whether or not a moral principle, such
  as tell the truth, is consistent with the
  categorical imperative, that is whether or not
  the principle can be universalized, or whether or
  not I can will that everyone ought to tell the
  truth.
• I only need to ask if the action which I am
  considering can be willed to be a universal law,
  and if it cant be then it has to be rejected.

36
PRUDENCE AND DUTY IV

• Thus if the act which I am considering is making
  a false promise I have to ask whether or not
  making false promises can be universalized.
• Since they cannot, because promises would then no
  longer be believable, the maxim of making false
  promises must be rejected.
• For Kant, the necessity of acting from pure
  respect for the practical moral law is what
  constitutes duty, to which every other motive
  must give place, because it is the condition of a
  will being good in itself, and the worth of such
  a will is above everything. (His italics.)

37
TEST 2 SUICIDE I

• Is suicide okay for a depressed person if he or
  she reasons as follows?
• a) To stay alive would be far less good for me
  than bad. b) I love myself. c) Because I love
  myself I do not want to see myself suffer. d)
  Therefore, I ought to commit suicide to end my
  suffering.

Old Man in Sorrow (On the Threshold of Eternity)
Vincent Van Gogh, 1890
38
TEST 2 SUICIDE II

• For Kant, the crucial thing for the morality of
  suicide is whether or not this reasoning to the
  correctness of suicide to end suffering from
  self-love can become a universal law of nature.
  
• And he thinks that it cannot since, according to
  Kant, to commit suicide out of self-love is
  contradictory. It is contradictory because
  self-love is the very thing which motivates us to
  improve our lives.
• However, the removal of life is not improvement
  of life, and so self-love which provided these
  contradictory options cannot be made a universal
  law of nature, and consequently would be wholly
  inconsistent with the supreme principle of all
  duty.

39
TEST 3 WASTING YOUR TALENT I

• What if one is financially independent and is
  also exceptionally talented? What then does she
  owe, if anything to her talent? Is it okay for
  her to indulge in pleasure rather than to take
  pains in enlarging and improving his happy
  natural capacities?
• Kant notes that it is possible for people - even
  an entire culture - to neglect their talents in
  fact, to devote their lives to idle amusement.
  But the moral question is, is it proper?

40
TEST 3 WASTING YOUR TALENT II

• Kant says that it is not, since it is not
  possible to will that the neglect of talent
  should become a universal law.
• He cannot will that we ought to neglect our
  talents since it is by means of our talents that
  we develop and improve our lives, and this is
  what a rational being aims for.
• That is, a rational being will necessarily will
  that his abilities be developed since they are
  useful to him, and serve any number of purposes.
  Accordingly, he cannot at the same time will that
  they be neglected without contradicting himself.

41
TEST 4 CONCERN FOR OTHERS I

• Kant says that the world might in fact be
  composed of people who mind their own business
  and take no interest in the lives of others.
• However, he says that it is impossible to will
  this lack of concern for others.
• This is because there may be cases in which we
  need the help and consideration of others.

42
TEST 4 CONCERN FOR OTHERS II

• But if we will it to be a universal law that no
  one should help anyone else, then we would
  thereby deprive ourselves of the very assistance
  which we require.
• Thus in both willing it that no one should help
  anyone else, while desiring it ourselves when we
  are in need, we contradict ourselves.
• Accordingly, it would be impossible to will a
  lack of concern for others to have the universal
  validity of a law of nature.

43
PRUDENCE AND DUTY V

• Kant takes the above test cases to show that if
  duty is a conception which is to have any import
  and real legislative authority for our actions,
  it can only be expressed in categorical, and not
  at all in hypothetical imperatives.
• Thus one does not say, if you want to be
  well-liked, then help others in need, which is a
  hypothetical imperative which might be thought
  prudent for a person to follow. Instead, we see
  that we ought to help others since a principle
  which maintains that we ought not to help others
  in need cannot be consistently universalized.
• Helping others then fits the categorical
  imperative which pertains to the universalization
  of correct moral actions.

44
PERSONS AND THINGS

• According to Kant, persons are rational agents
  who are ends in themselves.
• Thus Kant says that man and generally any
  rational being exists as and end in himself, not
  merely as a means to be arbitrarily used . . .
• For Kant, rational beings are persons and
  non-rational beings are things.
• Persons are ends in themselves and have absolute
  value, whereas things are means to an end and
  only have relative value as means to an end.

45
PERSONS AND THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE I

• Because persons are rational, they are ends in
  themselves for Kant, and not merely things which
  have relative value because they are only means
  to something else.
• The status of persons as rational agents who are
  ends in themselves gives rise to a second way of
  stating the categorical imperative So act as to
  treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in
  that of any other, in every case as an end
  withal, never as means only.

46
PERSONS AND THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE II

• Although persons can sometimes be used as means
  to an end - as you use a teacher as a means to
  the end of getting an education - persons are
  never to be used merely or only as means.
• Thus something like slavery is morally
  reprehensible since you are treating a slave as a
  thing and not as a person, you are using a slave
  as a machine or an instrument of cheap labor and
  not recognizing his or her essential humanity.
• All rational beings are subject to the same
  universal moral laws which conform to the
  categorical imperative of acting on a principle
  which you can will to become a universal law.

47
THE KINGDOM OF ENDS I

• The community of rational beings who act under a
  system of common moral laws Kant calls a kingdom.
• Each person must recognize himself as an end in
  himself and must recognize at the same time that
  every other person too is an end in himself.
  This is our duty according to Kant.
• Kant says that all rational beings come under
  the law that each of them must treat itself and
  all others never merely as means, but in every
  case at the same time as ends in themselves.

48
THE KINGDOM OF ENDS II

• That is, every person is subject to the second
  form of the categorical imperative, the law which
  says that it is our duty to treat each person as
  an end in herself and never as merely as a means
  to an end.
• Whenever a person is treated as a means to
  something else, it must be recognized at the same
  time that she is an end in herself.
• According to Kant, when we all recognize each
  other as ends in themselves, and not merely as
  means to an end, then our community, our kingdom,
  becomes a community of persons treated as ends in
  themselves, or what Kant calls a kingdom of ends.

49
KANT AND MORALITY I

• We know that, for Kant, respect for the moral law
  is of the utmost importance.
• And Kant thinks that we should not consider the
  value of our own pleasure or well-being or that
  of others over the moral law.
• Contra at least act utilitarianism, in a contest
  between increasing happiness and the moral law,
  the moral law should win.

50
KANT AND MORALITY II

• Some people think that Kants devotion to the
  moral law can have absurd consequences. For
  instance, he said that it is our duty always to
  tell the truth. As such it would not seem
  permissible ever to tell a lie, even to save the
  life of another person!
• We have an obligation to tell the truth since
  lying cannot be universalized, and we have an
  obligation to help others for reasons seen above
  in the fourth test of the categorical imperative.
  Might we not then need to lie to help another?
  And doesnt this raise a problem about
  conflicting duties?
• However this might be dealt with, since moral
  rules like telling the truth, are both
  universally valid - for everyone, at every time
  and at every place - and thus admit of no
  exceptions - for Kant we have an absolute duty to
  follow them.

51
Maria von Herberts Challenge to Kant
Rae Langton (1961-)
52
MARIAS PROBLEM I

• Maria von Herbert was a young woman who wrote to
  Kant for advice.
• Maria was in love with a young man who also loved
  her until she was honest with him about her
  having had a past sexual relationship with
  another man.
• Her honesty about the past affair causes the man
  to lose his love for her, and this in turn so
  depresses her that she considers suicide.
• In fact, the only thing which prevents her from
  committing suicide is Kants ethics, which
  prohibits suicide.
• The problem for Maria is that Kants philosophy
  does not help her in dealing with the pain which
  she now experiences.

53
Edvard Munch, Ashes, 1894
54
KANTS RESPONSE TO MARIA I

• Perhaps the first telling thing here regarding
  Kants role in this matter is that he asks a
  friend what he should do, rather than being able
  to decide for himself.
• Why would someone who has written works in moral
  philosophy, which tell people what to do and what
  not to do, need advice from someone else?
• Kant writes back to Maria and tells her that the
  mans indignation is justified, but that she was
  right to have told the truth, since it is our
  duty to tell the truth.

55
KANTS RESPONSE TO MARIA II

• Kant also tells her that, with time, the man will
  return to her if his love for her was genuine and
  moral. If he does not return than his affection
  was more physical than genuine.
• Kant also tells Maria that she must meet her
  misfortune with composure, and says that the
  value of life, insofar as it consists of the
  enjoyment we get from people, is vastly
  overrated.
• This quote perhaps is telling, since someone who
  gets little enjoyment from others may have little
  sympathy or feeling for others.
• And as Langton points out, Kant thinks that Maria
  deserves to have lost her love, and that her
  suffering is appropriate punishment for her
  immoral behavior.

56
MARIAS PROBLEM II

• Maria writes again to Kant and says that she has
  lost her interest in life, which is pointless,
  that her soul is empty, that desire is gone, and
  she says that each day interests me only to the
  extent that it brings me closer to death.
• Maria also asks Kant to write back to her with
  specific details about how to deal with her
  problems, and also asks permission to visit him.
• For Langton, Marias life with its problems
  constitutes a profound challenge to Kants
  philosophy

57
MORAL MOTIVATION, DUTY, AND FEELING

• Langton reminds us that, in Kantian ethics, an
  action has moral worth when it is done for the
  sake of duty it is not enough that the action
  conforms with duty.
• Thus, for Kant, if we do something moral we ought
  to do it out of respect for duty, and not, for
  instance, due to sympathy.
• According to Kant, the person who treats persons
  out of duty to the version of the categorical
  imperative which says to treat persons as ends
  and never merely as means, and yet who has no
  sympathy or feelings for others, is more moral
  than someone who is sympathetic.
• Kant thinks that sympathy and feeling are
  burdensome. It is reverence for the moral law
  which is to be respected, and it must prevail
  over all human inclinations and desires.

58
PERSONS AND THINGS I

• Kant does not reply to Maria or honor her request
  to visit him, but now considers her mentally
  deranged and sends off her letters to an
  acquaintance.
• Langton says that evil for Kant is the reduction
  of persons to things (the second version of the
  categorical imperative).
• Langton points out that, in the society in which
  Maria lived, women must perpetually walk a
  tightrope between being treated as things and
  treated as persons.

59
Edvard Munch, Evening on Karl Johan Street, 1892
60
PERSONS AND THINGS II

• Langton points out that Maria would have had to
  contend with the sexual marketplace, where human
  beings are viewed as having a price, and not a
  dignity, and where the price of women is fixed in
  a particular way. (Her italics.)
• Langton Women, as things, as items in the
  sexual marketplace, have a market value that
  depends in part on whether they have been used.
  Virgins fetch a higher price than second hand
  goods.
• Langton remarks that this is to treat a person as
  a thing, and that such treatment must be evil
  according to Kants own philosophy. And she says
  that this is a point which Kant himself did not
  recognize, since he thought it was appropriate
  that Maria suffer as she did for her confession.

61
QUESTIONS

• Is it different now?
• Do women feel that they are sometimes or often
  treated as things, sex objects?
• Do men now look at women that way?
• How are women first looked at?
• Do women see themselves as the equals of men?
• Do men see women as equals?

62
PERSONS AND THINGS III

• Kants ethics says that we ought always to tell
  the truth, and so Maria had an obligation to tell
  the truth about her past. However, Langton
  suggests that, by telling the truth, Maria is
  transformed from a person into a thing, used
  merchandise, because of the attitudes of the
  culture in which she lived.
• Langton thinks that perhaps Maria can be
  permitted to lie because the culture in which she
  lives is evil. It is evil since it sees
  unmarried women who are not virgins as things
  rather than persons.
• The idea is that, knowing that she will be
  treated like a thing if she is honest, she may
  lie in order to protect her status as a person.

63
PERSONS AND THINGS IV

• But further, Langton thinks that Maria may even
  have a duty to lie, on Kantian theory, since it
  is part of Kants ethics that each person has a
  duty of self-esteem, an obligation to respect
  herself, and a duty to recognize that people are
  not, like things, for sale at any price.
• Marias duty not to treat herself as a thing, or
  to allow herself to be treated as a thing, means
  that she ought to lie to protect herself from
  such treatment.

64
THE KINGDOM OF ENDS

• Remember that the Kantian Kingdom of Ends is the
  world in which every person respects every other
  person, and where no person is treated merely as
  a means rather than as an end, a community of
  persons treated as ends in themselves.
• Langton says that Kant thinks we should act as
  if the Kingdom of Ends is with us now. He thinks
  that we should rely on God to make it alright in
  the end.
• This is the idea that the virtuous person who is
  not rewarded for his or her morality on earth
  will be rewarded by God in the afterlife.
• But Langton says that God will not make it all
  right in the end. And the Kingdom of Ends is not
  with us now.
• And she adds that Perhaps we should do what we
  can to bring it about.

65
PERSONS AND THINGS V

• Maria von Herbert never got to visit Kant and she
  finally killed herself.
• In not treating her with the respect and sympathy
  which she deserved, Langton thinks that Kant
  ended up treating Maria as a thing rather than as
  a person.
• See the study questions at the end of the
  article.

66
The Holocaust and Moral Philosophy
Fred Sommers
67
TWO ETHICAL TRADITIONS

• The German tradition in ethics focuses on reason.
  The focus of this rationalist tradition is on
  persons and our duties to them.
• The British tradition in ethics focuses on
  feeling, and on attitudes, thoughts, and
  judgements as they relate to or are prompted by
  feeling. The focus for the sentimentalist
  tradition is on all beings that can feel pain or
  pleasure and directly prohibits cruelty to all
  sentient beings.

68
THE SUPERIORITY OF THE BRITISH TRADITION

• Sommers will argue that the tradition based on
  feeling is superior to the tradition based on
  reason.
• For Sommers, the German tradition in ethics
  helped in the German attitude towards the Jews in
  WWII. This is because Jews were reclassified as
  nonpersons by the Nazis, and only persons have
  respect and moral protection in the German
  tradition in ethics.
• For Sommers then, there must be something
  defective in German moral philosophy.

69
MORAL PATIENTS, DOING WRONG, AND WRONGING

• Sommers points out that there is a difference
  between doing wrong and wronging. You can do
  wrong by damaging a tree, but you do not thereby
  wrong the tree.
• Sommers quotes Geoffrey Warnocks definition of a
  moral patient as Any being that a moral agent
  can wrong.
• Sommers According to the central (Kantian)
  tradition in German moral thinking, the domain of
  moral patients includes all and only moral
  agents, excluding many nonrational beings as
  nonpersons or things.

70
RATIONALITY AND MORAL CONSIDERATION

• According to the German tradition in ethics, you
  cannot wrong a nonrational being or thing.
  Rather, in this tradition, we only owe respect to
  persons.
• Kant says that All moral philosophy rests wholly
  on its pure part. When applied to man it does
  not borrow the least thing from the knowledge of
  man himself (anthropology), but gives laws to him
  as a rational being.

71
SENTIENCE AND THE BRITISH TRADITION I

• Sommers contrasts the ethics of Kant with that of
  Hume, and philosophers such as William
  Shaftesbury, Adam Smith, and the utilitarians who
  base moral obligation on compassion and feelings
  of benevolence.
• For Hume and Bentham the moral community is not
  based on an entitys capacity to think, but its
  capacity to feel and suffer.

72
SENTIENCE AND THE BRITISH TRADITION II

• For these philosophers, and the British tradition
  in ethics, any sentient being can be wronged.
• (Sentient - adj L sentient-, sentiens, prp of
  sentire to perceive, feel (1632) 1 responsive
  to or conscious of sense impressions 2 AWARE 3
  finely sensitive in perception or feeling.
  Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth
  Edition.)
• Kant labeled this approach to ethics
  anthropological, and found it impure.

73
SENTIENCE AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY I

• What Sommers likes about the empirical approach
  of Hume, which is based on feeling, is that
  cruelty or brutality to any sentient being is
  the very paradigm of indecent, inadmissable
  behavior.
• Sommers According to Kant, animals are not in
  the domain of moral patients and we have no
  direct duty to be kind to them. We do have an
  indirect duty to refrain from acts of cruelty to
  animals because such behavior could corrupt our
  character, and this could affect the way we
  behave to rational beings to whom we do owe
  respect.

74
SENTIENCE AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY II

• For Kant then, and the tradition which bases
  morality on reason, the idea is not that we
  should respect animals other than humans because
  of their capacity to feel pain, or that
  mistreating animals is not wrong in itself
  because animals then suffer, but because to
  mistreat an animal could adversely affect the way
  we treat each other.
• Thus the mistreatment of animals is not wrong
  because animals are mistreated, but because the
  mistreatment of animals could lead to the
  mistreatment of humans.

75
SENTIENCE AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY III

• The problem with the Kantian philosophy on this
  issue, for Sommers, is that anyone who would not
  be corrupted by mistreating animals would not be
  doing wrong to mistreat them.
• For Sommers, this shows that there is something
  wrong with the rationalist approach to ethics of
  Kant and his followers.

76
THE NAZI TREATMENT OF THE JEWS I

• Recall how sympathy loses to a bad morality for
  Himmler when, although he has sympathy for his
  victims, he recognizes that it is his duty to
  eliminate them.
• Sommers recognizes that the treatment of the Jews
  by the Nazis would surely have horrified Kant,
  but a moral philosophy which does not directly
  proscribe cruelty to nonpersons makes it
  possible to mistreat any being which is not
  thought to qualify as a person.
• For the Nazis, Jews did not qualify as persons.
  Accordingly, Sommers then points out that, If
  Jews are like insects, killing them is not a
  crime against humanity.

77
THE NAZI TREATMENT OF THE JEWS II

• Of course, the Kantian could say here that
  killing or mistreating Jews is wrong for the same
  reason that mistreating dogs is wrong, because of
  its effect on the people who mistreat them. That
  is, by mistreating Jews, even though Jews are
  nonpersons, we might lead us to mistreat persons.
• Sommers point though is that Kantian ethics
  allows for the mistreatment of certain peoples
  because they can be reclassified as nonpersons.

78
THE NAZI TREATMENT OF THE JEWS III

• Sommers does not think that this reclassification
  of persons as nonpersons does not and will not
  happen in any moral philosophy which is based on
  feeling rather than on rationality.
• Thus he says that A people steeped in the
  sentimentalist moral philosophy such as that of
  Locke, Hume, or Mill regards all sentient beings
  those capable of feeling and sensation, or
  pleasure and pain as moral patients. as
  deserving of moral consideration. And such a
  people would view an openly cruel leader like
  Hitler as unacceptably immoral.

79
THE DANGER OF THE GERMAN RATIONAL TRADITION I

• For Sommers, any ethics which is based on the
  notions of duty and respect rather than on
  kindness and compassion is wrong and dangerous.
• The formal approach to ethics taken by Kant which
  is based on duty to rational agents leaves other
  being worthy of moral consideration outside of
  the moral community.
• And it leaves open the possibility that certain
  beings who we would normally consider to be part
  of the moral community, such as Jews, would not
  be considered persons, and therefore not morally
  protected.

80
THE DANGER OF THE GERMAN RATIONAL TRADITION II

• Such an arbitrary drawing of moral boundaries
  cannot happen for any ethics which is based on
  benevolence and human compassion.
• And this is the case for the British tradition in
  ethics in which the focus is on basic sentience
  and feeling.
• Sommers concludes by saying that a moral theory
  that does not absolutely, directly, and
  foundationally anathematize cruelty must be ruled
  out of court.
• According to Sommers, the German rational
  tradition does not do this, and so is not only
  inferior to the British tradition, but is
  dangerous.