Cuttingedge Discoveries: Transforming Lives, Fueling the Economy

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Cutting-edge DiscoveriesTransforming
Lives,Fueling the Economy
THE INNOVATORS

• Spring 2007

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Biological WarfareThe New Face of Terrorism
THE INNOVATORS

• Thomas Preston, Ph.D.
• Associate ProfessorDepartment of Political
  Science
• College of Liberal Arts

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• We must be prepared for a future where biological
  warfare and bioterrorism will significantly
  threaten our security both here at home and
  abroad!

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We must be prepared.

• Despite 9/11 and the anthrax postal attacks,
  terrorism is athreat that is poorly understood
• Most Federal efforts to improve biopreparedness
  have beenunderfunded or superficial

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We must be prepared.

• Five years after 9/11, we find ourselves
  vulnerable to a new strategic surprise in the
  formof bioterrorism.

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But why is this the case?

• Lack of understanding aboutthe utility of
  bioweaponsand how they could be used
• Lack of future thinking on our part preparing
  to fight the last war
• Past is not always prologue

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Thomas Preston. From Lambs to LionsFuture
Security Relationships in a World of Biological
andNuclear Weapons. Boulder, CO Rowman and
Littlefield, 2007.

• Explores
• The growing threats posed by both nuclear and
  biological weapons proliferation over the coming
  decades from both state actors (like Iran
  andNorth Korea) and non-state actors(like Al
  Qaeda)
• How these threats will alter ourexisting
  security relationships

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Thomas Preston. From Lambs to Lions Future
Security Relationships in a World of Biological
andNuclear Weapons. Boulder, CO Rowman and
Littlefield, 2007.

• For example
• How might a nuclear North Korea or Iran constrain
  U.S. freedomof action in its foreign or military
  policies?

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Thomas Preston. From Lambs to Lions Future
Security Relationships in a World of Biological
andNuclear Weapons. Boulder, CO Rowman and
Littlefield, 2007.

• What might be the impact upon U.S. security of
  the current biotechnical revolution and spread of
  bioweapons know-how to opponents?

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Thomas Preston. From Lambs to Lions Future
Security Relationships in a World of Biological
andNuclear Weapons. Boulder, CO Rowman and
Littlefield, 2007.

• How might terror groups, like Al Qaeda, possibly
  make use of biological weapons in future attacks
  against the U.S. or its allies around the world?

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Nuclear and biological proliferation are rapidly
changing the rules of the game of power
politics.

• The Athenians and Melians during the
  Peloponnesian War
• the strong do what they will, and the weak
  suffer what they must
• Melian Dilemma

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How does the proliferation of biological
weaponscapabilities and know-how change the
natureof the threat we face from bioterrorism?

• Over the coming decades, bioweapons will pose a
  far greater threat to U.S. security than nuclear
  weapons
• Bioweapons will be more readilyavailable and
  impossible to control using traditional counter
  proliferation policies

The threat is not a static one,but a constantly
evolving one.
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How does the proliferation of biological
weaponscapabilities and know-how change the
natureof the threat we face from bioterrorism?

• For terrorists, bioweapons providethe ultimate
  in stealthy, asymmetrical warfare and are
  well-suited to both clandestine development and
  employment

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Between 9 and 20 STATES are suspectedof having
offensive bioweapons programs

• Strong disincentives discourage STATES from
  acknowledging programs or using them offensively
• Bioweapons, reserved for only the most extreme
  threats to central national interests (like
  regime survival, maintaining territorial
  integrity, etc.), are not considered for less
  serious threats
• Deterrence holds

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Between 9 and 20 STATES are suspectedof having
offensive bioweapons programs

• In contrast, NON-STATE, terror group actors are
  impossible to DETER in a classical-sense
• Groups like Al Qaeda (who value instrumental
  violence and creationof mass casualties) would
  likely use such weapons if they obtained them

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How difficult would it be for a terror groupto
acquire the requisite technology andknowledge
needed for making bioweapons?

• Creation of effective bioweaponsis no simple
  task!
• It is extremely unlikely terror groups composed
  of members with limited training in the
  biological sciences or relying upon internet
  sources alone could actually carry off an
  effective large-scale attack

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How difficult would it be for a terror groupto
acquire the requisite technology andknowledge
needed for making bioweapons?

• However, this does NOT rule outthe ability of
  such groups to develop effective capabilities IF
  they acquire individuals with graduate-level
  expertise (or higher) in the relevant biological
  sciences
• OR, if they obtain technical advicefrom those
  who once workedin state-run bioweapons programs

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How difficult would it be for a terror groupto
acquire the requisite technology andknowledge
needed for making bioweapons?
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• Brain drain problem
• Former Soviet BW program employed 65,000
  peopleat its height
• The whereabouts of as many as 7,000 former
  bioweaponeers with significant weapons knowledge
  are unknown

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How difficult would it be for a terror groupto
acquire the requisite technology andknowledge
needed for making bioweapons?

• Japans Aum Shinrikyo cult

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How difficult would it be for a terror groupto
acquire the requisite technology andknowledge
needed for making bioweapons?
Knowledge is the real weapon
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How difficult would it be for a terror groupto
acquire the requisite technology andknowledge
needed for making bioweapons?

• Massive state-run programsNOT required
• Project Bacchus
• Dual-use problem surroundingthis technology
• The cost estimates for a bioterrorism facility
  vary quite widely, from2 million to 200,000
• For a truly small-scale operation,the price
  could be even lower

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How effective could bioterrorismbe and what are
the possibilities?

• Effectiveness of bioweapons acceptedas fact by
  all the major state-run bioweapons programs
• Pentagon conducted 239 open air bio-warfare tests
  during the 1950s and 60s on airports and subway
  systems, across entire cities and regions of the
  country using aircraft or boats
• These tests conclusively demonstrated that even
  small amounts of materialcould effectively
  contaminate thousands of square miles

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How effective could bioterrorismbe and what are
the possibilities?

• Office of Technology Assessment study warned 100
  kilogramsof anthrax released by aircraft over
  Washington, D.C. would kill somewhere between one
  and three million people

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How effective could bioterrorismbe and what are
the possibilities?

• Open air test over San Francisco created a cloud
  of simulants that covered the city, spread
  twenty-three miles inland, and would have
  infected an estimated 800,000 people

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How effective could bioterrorismbe and what are
the possibilities?

• Tests in the New York City subway system used an
  open containerof an anthrax simulant placedon
  the subway tracks

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Bioterrorism could also inflicttremendous
economic damage

• Models predicting the economic impact of various
  bioterror attacks on the suburbs of a major city
  warned of costs ranging from
• 477 million per 100,000 people exposed to
  brucellosis
• 5.5 billion per 100,000exposed to tularemia
• 26.2 billion per 100,000exposed to anthrax

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Bioterrorism could also inflicttremendous
economic damage

• The anthrax mail attacks in 2001 (with two
  letters) ended up costing the U.S. post office 5
  billion (2 billion in lost revenue and 3
  billion to clean up contaminated facilities,
  buying irradiation machines, etc.)
• The economic costs of 9/11 to clean up lower
  Manhattan was 40 billion

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Other possible avenues for inflicting economic
harmwould be the use of agricultural
bioterrorism.

• Foot and Mouth Disease
• Animals become contageous 7-10 days PRIOR to
  visible symptoms
• Highly concentrated natureof our markets
• A release of foot-and-mouth would spread within
  five days to as many as 25 states through the
  normal, regulated movement of animalsfrom farm
  to market

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Other possible avenues for inflicting economic
harmwould be the use of agricultural
bioterrorism.

• 19 billion outbreak in Taiwan in 1997 that
  nearly destroyed its pork industry caused by a
  single pig imported from Hong Kong!
• Overall, U.S. food production alone accounted for
  earnings of over 991 billion in 2001.

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Genetic Engineering and advances in
biotechnologyare creating brand new, novel kinds
of bio-threats.

• At the simplest level, this involves creating
  antibiotic resistance in pathogens
• This results in 30-60 mortality rates for
  Tularemia, 90 or more for Anthrax, and 100 for
  plague
• It is also possible, using more sophisticated
  techniques, to increase virulence and
  communicabilityof pathogens by DNA-shuffling(or
  accelerated evolution) to isolate strains you want

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Genetic Engineering and advances in
biotechnologyare creating brand new, novel kinds
of bio-threats.

• Genetic engineering can be used to insert
  foreign genes into a pathogento give it new
  characteristics
• Examples of Bad Gene Therapy
• Australian Mousepox experiments
• Popovs Myelin toxin gene Legionnaires Disease
  work
• Possibilities for combinationsare endless
• Snake venom genes
• Ability to evade vaccines, etc.

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Genetic Engineering and advances in
biotechnologyare creating brand new, novel kinds
of bio-threats.

• Chimeras (or combination pathogens) are created
  using genetic engineering
• Soviet BW program produced Smallpox/Ebola and
  Marburg (hemorraghic fever) chimeras

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Genetic Engineering and advances in
biotechnologyare creating brand new, novel kinds
of bio-threats.

• With entire genomes (or DNA sequences)of
  pathogens now freely available online, modern
  biotechnology allows us to not only more
  effectively engineer pathogens as weapons, but to
  create pathogens we dont have access to
• The smallpox genome could be modifiedto create a
  related pox-virus like monkeypox or camelpox
• Scientists, using the DNA recipe for Polio,
  recently created a LIVE polio virus
• The same technology could be used to create
  Ebola, Marburg, and many others

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Genetic Engineering and advances in
biotechnologyare creating brand new, novel kinds
of bio-threats.

• Finally, another possibility would be to develop
  agents that turn the victims own auto-immune
  system against itself
• Bioregulators are natural substances produced in
  the human body which regulate metabolism and
  control physiological functions
• The sky is the limit for what could be possible
  using bioregulatory peptides

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So What Can Be Done?

• No silver bullets
• But there are measures we shouldbe taking that
  both recognize the actual security threat we face
  and serve to minimize the impact uponus when a
  bioterror incident occurs
• Damage limitation strategy

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What Can Be Done?Recommendations

• Recognize that counterproliferation strategies
  based purely upon denialof materials or
  technology can no longer be relied upon to
  prevent either state or non-state actors from
  obtaining WMD capabilities
• Bioweapons production equipment and know-how are
  already widespread and completely dual use in
  nature
• Knowledge represents the true WMDat this point
  (not the pathogens themselves)
• Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

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What Can Be Done?Recommendations

• Resources need to be directed towards improving
  existing hospital facilities
• American Hospital Associationestimated it would
  cost a minimumof 11 billion to upgrade the
  nations hospitals to meet likely bioterror
  threats!

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What Can Be Done?Recommendations

• Serious lack of intensive care unitsin most
  U.S. cities
• Even those judged adequate under normal
  circumstances (30-40 bedsin cities the size of
  Baltimore) wouldbe quickly overwhelmed in the
  eventof a mass-casualty bio-attack
• Funding should be provided for development of
  national rapidresponse, mobile ICUs
• Dual-use in the most positive sense!

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What Can Be Done?Recommendations

• We need to greatly increase level of government
  support available to the pharmaceutical industry
  for developing and producing new antibiotics,
  antiviral drugs, vaccines, and other
  treatmentsto counter biowarfare agents!
• It takes between 500-800 million(and anywhere
  from 10-15 years)to bring a new drug or
  vaccineonto the market

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What Can Be Done?Recommendations

• Increase level of government support
  availableto the pharmaceutical industry
• Project Bioshieldset aside 5.6 billion overa
  ten year period to provide incentives for drug
  companies to develop new drugs, vaccines,
  diagnostic devices, and medical treatmentsfor
  countering potential bioattacks
• In 2000, out of 57 countermeasures neededto
  protect the public, only one was available
• By 2004, only two were available (the anthrax
  smallpox vaccines), and these are usefulonly
  against unmodified agents!
• Though expensive, a well-funded initiativewould
  have great dual-use benefits to the American
  public

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What Can Be Done?Recommendations

• We need to really think ahead regarding how the
  public will react to a bioterror attack, so that
  we can reduce the panic that may result and
  better prepare our first-response efforts
• Bioterrorism more likely to inducepanic reaction
  in public
• Historically, epidemics of deadlydiseases have
  created public panicand society breakdowns

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What Can Be Done?Recommendations

• We need to really think ahead regardinghow the
  public will react to a bioterror attack
• First Responder and Medical Communities are not
  immune to this dynamic
• Recent poll found 20 of U.S. physicians believe
  it is NOT their professional dutyto continue to
  treat patients during an epidemic if it puts
  their own lives in danger!
• New Orleans police officers deserted their posts
  to look after their own families in the aftermath
  of Hurricane Katrina

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What Can Be Done?Recommendations

• We need to really think ahead regardinghow the
  public will react to a bioterror attack
• Psychosomatic (or sociogenic) illness within the
  general population might complicateor disrupt
  the response efforts of authorities by
  overwhelming medical facilities
• the worried well
• Department of Defense estimates there would be
  five psychological casualtiesfor every one
  physical casualty duringa bioattack

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What Can Be Done?Recommendations

• We need to really think ahead regardinghow the
  public will react to a bioterror attack
• Others predict for every person seeking medical
  care for physical injuries, at least6 to 10 seen
  will present with psychological concerns
• Worst case estimates place the numberof
  psychological casualties to physicalones at a
  level as high as 50 to 1
• Approximately 80 of victims exposedto a
  terrorist attack will bypass the EMS system and
  seek direct access to medical care usually at a
  local hospital

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What Can Be Done?Recommendations

• We need to really think ahead regardinghow the
  public will react to a bioterror attack
• Biological weapons are perhaps the perfect weapon
  for eliciting such sociogenic responses from a
  population given
• Stealthy nature of bio-agents and uncertainty
  over who is infected
• Varying incubation periods
• Early stages of illness often presentclinically
  with same symptoms as flu

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What Can Be Done?Recommendations

• We need to really think ahead regardinghow the
  public will react to a bioterror attack
• Biological weapons are perhaps the perfect weapon
  for eliciting such sociogenic responses from a
  population given
• Man-made events delivered by an unseen enemy will
  constantly worry public aboutnew outbreaks from
  new attacks foreveron the horizon
• If attacks occurred nationwide at multiple
  locations, if there are subsequent attacks,or if
  a communicable agent is used,sociogenic illness
  could become widespread

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What Can Be Done?Recommendations

• We need to take seriously the need to improve
  our border security! It is necessary to reduce
  our vulnerability to nuclear, biological, or
  purely conventional terrorism.
• 600,000 cargo containers enter oneof our
  nations 361 seaports daily
• Only 2-3 are inspected
• Over 400 million people cross our borders each
  year, including 122 million cars, 11 million
  trucks, and 2.4 million rail freight cars
• Most only receive cursory inspections

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What Can Be Done?Recommendations

• We need to take seriously the need toimprove
  our border security! It is necessaryto reduce
  our vulnerability to nuclear, biological, or
  purely conventional terrorism.
• 3.7 million shipments of imported food arrive
  into the US each year with only 1 being
  inspected
• The US Coast Guard patrols 95,000 milesof
  shoreline with an antiquated fleet of ships and a
  workforce the same size as the NYC Police Dept.
• Little has been done to upgrade securityat
  15,000 sites producing toxic chemicals

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What Can Be Done?Recommendations

• We need to take seriously the need to improve
  our border security! It is necessaryto reduce
  our vulnerability to nuclear, biological, or
  purely conventional terrorism.
• The US airline industry boards 1.5 million
  passengers a day, where weve spent11 billion
  since 9/11 upgrading security
• However, 3.8 million people a day (boardingat
  468 stations) ride the NY subway system where
  hardly any money has been spent.
• Making it a perfect bioterror target!
• The list goes on and on obviously we cant
  afford to harden every soft target, but the
  obvious ones should be secured!

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Questions?
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• Fall 2007
• The Innovators lecture series

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• For more information
• www.wsu.edu/theinnovators
• Toll free 1-877-978-3868