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National Incident Management Systems

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1 Discuss alternative models to NIMS ICS. 2 Cite potential positive and negative ... Suitability to incidents of different scale, scope and duration ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: National Incident Management Systems


1
National Incident Management Systems
  • Session 6 Slide Deck

2
Session Objectives
  • 1 Discuss alternative models to NIMS ICS
  • 2 Cite potential positive and negative
  • attributes of the ICS
  • 3 Discuss some of the limitations of the ICS
  • and obstacles to effective implementation
  • 4 Understand how to utilize information about
  • limitations and obstacles

3
Importance
  • Become a better participant within ICS structures
  • Understand the context in which the ICS operates
  • Understand the challenges faced by the system in
    implementation

4
Alternative models and the NIMS ICS
  • NIMS ICS designed to be universal
  • Alternatives to NIMS ICS not supposed to be used
  • Many different models were used for decades
    within the fire discipline
  • Most models based on either the FIRESCOPE ICS or
    the Fireground Command System

5
FIRESCOPE ICS
  • 1960s response to a series of wildfires
  • Interagency group convened to solve problems in
    1972
  • Outcome was Wildfire Incident Command System
  • Grew in popularity
  • Adopted and adapted by fire departments and other
    disciplines

6
FIRESCOPE ICS and NIMS ICS
  • FIRESCOPE ICS most similar to NIMS ICS
  • Intelligence function different
  • NIMS ICS allows addition of 6th functional area
    for intelligence
  • FIRESCOPE located information and intelligence
    functions within Planning Section

7
Fireground Command System
  • Chief Brunacini at Pheonix Fire Departments
  • Recognized similar problems to those in wildland
    firefighting
  • Believed a system that could be used day-to-day
    more useful
  • Adapted FIRESCOPE model for structural fires

8
Differences Between the Systems
  • Suitability to incidents of different scale,
    scope and duration
  • Utilization of hierarchical levels and
    organizational structures
  • Terminology

9
Examples of Adaptations
  • National Interagency Incident Management System
    (NIIMS)
  • NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire Department Incident
    Management System
  • Model Procedures Guide for Structural Firefighting

10
Shared Concepts and Principles
  • Each version shares basic concepts and principles
  • Examples include
  • Hierarchical modular organization
  • Span of control
  • Establishment and transfer of command
  • Chain of command and unity of command
  • Accountability
  • Information management

11
Differences
  • Terminology
  • Organizational structuring mechanisms
  • Positions (roles and titles)

12
Critical Issue
  • Not the number of variations that exist
  • But that jurisdictions and disciplines have felt
    it necessary to adapt and modify the ICS
  • In fact, variations to this day
  • Nonuse
  • Partial use
  • Modifications
  • Adaptations

13
Variations
  • Implications for response efforts?
  • What may contribute to the tendency of
    jurisdictions to change the system?
  • These questions will be discussed throughout this
    session.

14
Exercise
  • Form groups of 2-4 people
  • Brainstorm a list of potential positive and
    negative attributes of the ICS
  • You will have 10 minutes
  • When finished write your groups list on the
    blackboard/whiteboard

15
Potentially Positive Attributes
  • Flexible
  • Widely applicable
  • Designed to standardize
  • Can be used day-to-day
  • All levels of government and all disciplines
  • Based on proven management characteristics
  • Enjoys wide support
  • Use is required
  • Use can decrease
  • Perception of chaos and confusion
  • Communication problems
  • Leadership issues
  • Duplication of effort
  • Unnecessary response-related expenditures
  • Use can increase safety of responders

16
Potentially Negative Attributes
  • Based on assumptions
  • Characteristics of emergencies and disasters
  • Everyone has to use the system
  • Everyone has to be trained
  • Positions are specialized
  • Everyone has to practice
  • Everyone has recognize incident commander as
    legitimate
  • On-scene management
  • Volunteers and groups will emerge
  • Temporary Use
  • ICS is mandates
  • Buy-in and commitment are necessary

17
Exercise
  • Perceptions vary
  • Levels of government
  • Person-to-person
  • Organization-to-organization
  • Questions to consider
  • Why did you choose to list attributes as positive
    or negative?
  • Are there any attributes that do not belong? If
    so, why?

18
Flexibility and Scalability
  • Certain functions must be addressed in every
    incident
  • System can be adapted based on nature of
    incident, stage of incident, and available
    resources
  • Quickly scaled up or down
  • Facilitated by as little as one or many

19
Applicability
  • Characteristics of incident should not affect the
    use of the ICS
  • Has been used successfully to manage diverse
    incidents

20
Standardization
  • Should be used in the same way
  • Allows predictable and patterned coordination and
    communication

21
Used Day-to-Day
  • Plan events
  • Structure administrative activities
  • Response to routine emergencies
  • Coordinate response to disasters
  • Day-to-day use encourages smooth transition into
    and scaling up of the ICS

22
All Levels of Government and Disciplines
  • Designed to let all entities merge into common
    structure
  • Work together efficiently
  • Despite, different
  • Missions
  • Priorities
  • Responsibilities
  • Terminology
  • Cultures

23
Proven Management Characteristics
  • Practitioner developed
  • Based on best practices and lessons learned
  • Continues to evolve

24
Wide Support
  • Fire discipline has used for decades
  • Other organizations adopted prior to the mandate
    of the ICS through NIMS
  • Examples include
  • United States Coast Guard
  • Occupational Health and Safety Administration
  • Environmental Protection Agency
  • Military and some businesses

25
ICS is Required
  • Condition for funding
  • Should ensure compliance

26
Perception of Chaos and Confusion
  • Common issueperceptions of chaos
  • Link with lack of organization
  • The ICS can reduce when effectively implemented

27
Communication Problems
  • Utilize common terminology, incident action
    planning, ICS forms, and other tools
  • Tools designed to
  • Facilitate flow of information and
  • Minimize communication problems

28
Leadership Issues
  • Common issueperceived lack of command and
    control
  • The ICS provides processes for
  • Designation of incident commander
  • Transferring command
  • Use of unified command

29
Duplication of Effort
  • Common issuemore than one organization attempts
    to meet the same need
  • Leads to unnecessary response-related
    expenditures
  • Use of the ICS should eliminate

30
Increase Safety
  • Priority placed on safety in many ways
  • Examples include
  • Designation of safety officer
  • Incident action planning process
  • Resource management
  • Span of control

31
- Assumptions -
  • Chaotic situations that must be managed through
    command and control
  • System works
  • It works for everyone
  • Everyone will want to use it
  • Response will be efficient if used
  • Little research
  • Implications if any assumptions are not true?

32
- Incident Characteristics -
  • Prior research on disasters
  • Qualitative and quantitative differences
  • How might qualitative and quantitative
    differences impact the ability to implement the
    ICS?

33
- Everyone Has to Use -
  • Relies on consistent use
  • Within organizations
  • Across organizations
  • Creates opportunities for the system not to
    perform

34
- Training -
  • Depends on knowledge
  • Knowledge depends on training
  • Accessible and available
  • Additional position-specific training
  • More than one person in preparation for
    large-scale incidents
  • Ongoing training due to turnover
  • Jurisdictions
  • Commit personnel and funding
  • Easier for some than others
  • What might happen if jurisdictions do not get
    enough training?

35
- Practice -
  • Depends on practice (i.e. experience) using
    system
  • Get practice
  • Exercises
  • Actual incident management
  • Use on a daily basis
  • What happens if organizations do not have enough
    practice?

36
- Incident Commander -
  • Incident commander
  • Must be perceived to be legitimate
  • All must work under the incident commander
  • Clear criteria, but
  • May not follow the criteria
  • And/or may not agree on how command and control
    should be handled
  • What happens if they do not work within the
    structure?

37
- On-scene Management -
  • ICS used for field operations
  • MACs can use what they feel best-suited
  • Implications for response if similar systems are
    not used in each?

38
- Volunteers and Emergent Groups -
  • Volunteers and emergent groups
  • Research has shown common, necessary, and helpful
  • Not always positively perceived
  • Implications of volunteers and emergent groups
    for the ICS?

39
- Temporary Use -
  • Many organizations do not use the ICS on a daily
    basis
  • Reasons why they do not include
  • Organizations mission, priorities, leadership,
    and culture
  • Complexity may be off-putting
  • Potential issues for traditional first responders
    too
  • Implications if not used on a daily basis?

40
- ICS Mandate -
  • Both positive and negative attribute
  • Have to be compliant for certain funding
  • No obligation if they do not seek funding
  • Implications if jurisdictions opt out?

41
- Buy-in -
  • Resentment of federal mandates
  • Training and practice not enough
  • Implications if jurisdictions do not buy-in to
    the system?

42
Exercise
  • Continue to work in same groups.
  • Review and analyze one of four Moynihan (2006)
    case studies
  • Identify the factors that encouraged or limited
    the implementation of the ICS in the case study.
  • You have 20 minutes to conduct your analysis and
    prepare a list.

43
1993 Laguna and 2003 Cedar Fires
  • Encouraged
  • Limited
  • Relationships and trust in place prior to incident
  • There were not enough resources
  • Incidents scope rapidly expanded
  • There were jurisdictional disagreements
  • Individuals worked outside the ICS/chain of
    command
  • Responders did not have sufficient training and
    experience

44
1995 Oklahoma City Bombing
  • Encouraged
  • Limited
  • Limited in scope
  • Limited number of tasks
  • Victims had limited variety of needs
  • Agreement about who should be in charge
  • There were enough resources
  • Well-practiced and trained
  • Preexisting relationships
  • Resources converged
  • Volunteers emerged

45
2001 Attack on the Pentagon
  • Only Encouraging Factors
  • Limited geographic scope
  • Small number of victims
  • Incident site easily accessible
  • There were enough resources
  • The types of tasks generated by incident were
    familiar
  • Incident command established without debate
  • System was used flexibly
  • Responders had training and experience
  • Preexisting relationships and trust

46
Hurricane Katrina
  • Only Limiting Factors
  • Geographic scope widespread
  • Large number of tasks
  • Lack of resources
  • Communications systems and facilities unusable
  • Many individuals and organizations involved and
    worked outside the ICs
  • Neither incident command or unified command were
    established
  • Responding organizations were themselves
    overwhelmed
  • Lack of knowledge and training
  • Lack of accountability
  • Lack of preexisting relationships

47
Patterns?
  • Conditions Encouraging Use
  • Limited number of tasks
  • Geographically limited incidents
  • Limited time pressure
  • A manageable number of organizations involved in
    the response
  • Responders have experience with the ICS model
  • High capacity and adequate resources
  • Preexisting relationships

48
Moynihans Conclusion
  • Responders cannot control nature of crisis faced
  • Implications
  • Issues the system itself cannot correct
  • Nature of the incident
  • Potentially allows explanation and prediction

49
Moynihan (2008)
  • The success of the ICS is contingent
  • Limited
  • Nature of crisis
  • Lack of experience
  • Encouraged
  • Use of SOPs
  • Interagency trust
  • Incidents long duration and limited scope

50
Buck et al. (2006)
  • Preconditions
  • Familiar tasks
  • Preexisting relationships and trust
  • Incident characteristics
  • Conclude
  • System not flawed, rather faulty implementation
  • Doubtful will be used by all actors and in all
    disaster contexts
  • Not a universal system

51
Perry (2006)
  • Preconditions
  • Familiar tasks
  • Training
  • Enough resources
  • Effective resource management

52
Wenger et al. (1990)
  • Problem with system itself
  • Findings
  • The ICS modified and adapted
  • Does not deal well with small scale disasters
  • Issues with command
  • Too fire-centric
  • Did not integrate organizations into system well
  • Depends on significant practice
  • Complex nature of disasters not conducive to
    standardization

53
EFO Papers
  • Supportive of the ICS and its use as a standard
  • But many similar issues to those in academic work
  • Working with other jurisdictions and/or
    agencies/organizations
  • Resource issues
  • How departments (or other organizations) used the
    system
  • Appropriateness for volunteer and small fire
    departments
  • Command and the ICS
  • Command post and emergency operation center
    interface

54
EFO Papers Cont.
  • Conditions
  • Buy-in
  • Training
  • Regional perspective
  • Funding and resources
  • Critical role of practice
  • Daily use

55
Implications from Literature
  • Factors within control
  • Factors beyond control
  • Training
  • Education
  • Practice
  • Resource management
  • Generating buy-in and commitment
  • Availability of resources (e.g. funding)
  • Incident characteristics
  • Victims needs
  • Number and kind of tasks
  • Whether or not other organizations involved have
    trained, practiced, and are committed

56
Implications Cont.
  • Successful implementation may be dependent on
    preconditions
  • ICS not a cure-all
  • But knowledge of limitations and obstacles can
    help

57
Exercise
  • Take 5 minutes to individually consider how the
    information and discussion from this session
    might impact you in your
  • First job where ICS training and implementation
    is required
  • As a professional in the field of emergency
    management
  • As an emergency management student

58
First Job
  • Manage expectations
  • Manage personal performance
  • Recognize where obstacles may exist and work with
    other stakeholders to overcome those obstacles
  • Understand there may be factors beyond control

59
Professional
  • Better understanding of what may have impacted
    the performance of the system in particular
    incidents
  • Understand that some issues can be controlled and
    others cannot
  • System will be refined over time
  • When change required ensure preconditions met
    and/or advocate for the resources necessary to
    ensure they are met

60
Students
  • Understand the contributions that empirical
    research and testing can and needs to make
  • Connect the disaster literature to the ICS
  • Utilize the way we have analyzed the ICS and
    apply this type of analysis to other emergency
    management issues
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