Title: Corporate Governance
1Corporate Governance
- Corporate governance is
- a relationship among stakeholders that is used to
determine and control the strategic direction and
performance of organizations - concerned with identifying ways to ensure that
strategic decisions are made effectively - used in corporations to establish order between
the firms owners and its top-level managers
2Corporate Governance Mechanisms
Internal Governance Mechanisms
Managerial Incentive Compensation
Ownership Concentration
External Governance Mechanisms
Market for Corporate Control
3Separation of Ownership and Managerial Control
- Basis of the modern corporation
- shareholders purchase stock, becoming residual
claimants - shareholders reduce risk by holding diversified
portfolios - professional managers are contracted to provide
decision-making - Modern public corporation form leads to efficient
specialization of tasks - risk bearing by shareholders
- strategy development and decision-making by
managers
4Agency Relationship Owners and Managers
5Agency Relationship Owners and Managers
6Agency Relationship Owners and Managers
- Risk bearing specialist (principal) pays
compensation to a managerial decision-making
specialist (agent)
7Agency Theory Problem
- The agency problem occurs when
- the desires or goals of the principal and agent
conflict and it is difficult or expensive for the
principal to verify that the agent has behaved
inappropriately - Solution
- principals engage in incentive-based performance
contracts - monitoring mechanisms such as the board of
directors - enforcement mechanisms such as the managerial
labor market to mitigate the agency problem
8Manager and Shareholder Risk and Diversification
Managerial (employment) risk profile
Shareholder (business) risk profile
Risk
Dominant Business
Unrelated Businesses
Related Constrained
Related Linked
Diversification
9Governance Mechanisms
- Insiders
- The firms CEO and other top-level managers
- Affiliated Outsiders
- Individuals not involved with day-to-day
operations, but who have a relationship with the
company - Independent Outsiders
- Individuals who are independent of the firms
day-to-day operations and other relationships
10Governance Mechanisms
- Role of the Board of Directors
- Monitor Are managers acting in shareholders
best interests - Evaluate Influence examine proposals,
decisions actions, provide feedback and offer
direction - Initiate Determine delineate corporate
mission, specify strategic options, make decisions
11Governance Mechanisms
- Salary, bonuses, long term incentive compensation
- Executive decisions are complex and non-routine
- Many factors intervene making it difficult to
establish how managerial decisions are directly
responsible for outcomes
12Governance Mechanisms
- Stock ownership (long-term incentive
compensation) makes managers more susceptible to
market changes which are partially beyond their
control - Incentive systems do not guarantee that managers
make the right decisions, but do increase the
likelihood that managers will do the things for
which they are rewarded
13CEO Pay and Performance
- Classic pay for
- performance
- relationship
- Unfortunately, this
- relationship is weak
CEO Pay
- The stronger
- relationship is with
- firm size
Firm Performance
14CEO Pay and Firm Size
- Relationship between
- pay and firm size is
- curvilinear.
- CEO pay increases at
- a decreasing rate
CEO Pay
Firm Size
15Relationship Between Firm performance and Firm
Size
- Relationship between
- firm performance and
- firm size is curvilinear.
- Beyond some point, as
- size increases, firm
- performance declines
Firm Performance
- BUT
- From the graph of CEO
- pay vs. firm size, pay
- doesnt decline
Firm Size
16Relationship Between Firm performance and Equity
Ownership
- Relationship between
- firm performance
- (Tobins Q) and
- managerial ownership
- is curvilinear.
Firm Value
- Beyond some point, as
- ownership increases,
- firm value declines
Managerial Ownership in
17Governance Mechanisms
- Large block shareholders (often institutional
owners) have a strong incentive to monitor
management closely - Exit vs. Voice Cannot costlessly exit due to
equity stake (transaction costs) so they press
for change (exercise voice) - They may also obtain Board seats which enhances
their ability to monitor effectively (although
financial institutions are legally forbidden from
directly holding board seats)
18Governance Mechanisms
- Types of institutional investors
- - Mutual funds, pension funds,
- foundations, churches, universities,
- insurance companies
- Pressure-resistant versus pressure-sensitive
- - Mutual and pension funds are
- pressure resistant
- Are Institutional investors the same?
- - Short vs. long term
- Components of voice
- - Pension fund hit lists
- - Shareholder liability suits
- - Investor alliances
- - Proxy contests
19Governance Mechanisms
- Firms face the risk of takeover when they are
operated inefficiently - Many firms begin to operate more efficiently as a
result of the threat of takeover, even though
the actual incidence of hostile takeovers is
relatively small - Changes in regulations have made hostile
takeovers difficult - Acts as an important source of discipline over
managerial incompetence and waste
20Managerial Defense Tactics
- Designed to fend off the takeover attempt
- Increase the costs of making the acquisitions
- Causes incumbent management to become entrenched
while reducing the chances of introducing a new
management team - May require asset restructuring
- Institutional investors oppose the use of defense
tactics
21Takeover Defenses
- Poison pills
- Leveraged recapitalizations
- Greenmail
- Litigation
22Takeover Defenses
- Poison pills
- Leveraged recapitalizations
- Greenmail
- Litigation
- Scorched earth defense
- Crown jewel sales
- Pac-man defense
23Takeover Defenses
- Poison pills
- Leveraged recapitalizations
- Greenmail
- Litigation
- Scorched earth defense
- Crown jewel sales
- Pac-man defense
- White knight defense
- Other bidder (competitive bid situation)