JMSC6027: Chinas Relationships

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• JMSC6027 Chinas Relationships
• With Taiwan,
  Tibet
• Thomas Hon Wing Polin
• Journalism and Media Studies Centre, HKU
• April 30, 2003

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Taiwan (1)

• BACKGROUND
• Major Chinese settlements began in Ming Dynasty
  (1368-1644) Taiwan incorporated into China in
  1683 by Qing Dynasty emperor Kangxi
• Crucially, except in 1945-49, Taiwan was not
  under direct rule from mainland since its cession
  to Japan after the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War
• Result Estrangement between mainland and island,
  which was intensified by 3 factors --

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Taiwan (2)

• 1) Relatively constructive Japanese rule For
  half a century, Japan helped develop the islands
  economy, infrastructure and education. In Taiwan,
  the Japanese were less brutal occupiers than they
  were in the rest of Asia during WW II
• 2) Harshness of KMT (mainlander) rule Especially
  under Chiang Kai-shek, notably the 1947 Feb. 28
  massacre of Taiwanese

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Taiwan (3)

• 3) Taiwanese identity Nurtured by its growing
  wealth and pride in recent years (the economic
  miracle), the island developed a sense of
  identity distinct from the mainlands
• This fostered the rise of the nativist Democratic
  Progressive Party and its electoral victories,
  culminating in Chen Shui-bians presidential win
  in 2000
• Also helped splinter and defeat the KMT, which
  was seen to represent the mainland legacy

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Taiwan (4)

• In recent years, such growing nativist and
  pro-independence sentiment, combined with
  occasional gestures of apparent support from the
  U.S. (transit visits for Taiwan leaders, arms
  sales, etc.), has alarmed Beijing
• Result Deeper suspicions across the Taiwan
  Strait, no talks, little progress on issues of
  common concern

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Taiwan (5)

• The Big Question Will all this lead eventually
  to Taiwan independence?
• The answer No
• The reasons
• 1) In opinion polls over many years, a big
  majority of Taiwan people have consistently
  expressed their preference for a vague status
  quo a pragmatic view

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Taiwan (6)

• 2) Independence will lead to military attack by
  China. Reason is simple Whatever the
  consequences of military action, no Beijing
  regime can afford to go down in history as having
  lost Taiwan. Such a regime, inevitably, will
  fall
• 3) The U.S. will not back Taiwan independence.
  Not even this extreme-rightwing, trigger-happy
  Bush administration. Reason is also simple No
  U.S. administration can afford to poison
  relations with China for the next 50 years, on an
  issue that does not directly threaten U.S.
  national security

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Taiwan (7)

• 4) Even more important are the rapidly growing
  economic ties between mainland and island. To
  continue to thrive (and perhaps even just
  survive), Taiwans economy needs Chinas more
  than the other way around
• 5) Economic ties lead to personal, social and
  cultural ties. More than a million Taiwan people
  now live in the mainland. Over time, almost
  inevitable that such trends will lead to closer
  political ties

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Taiwan (8)

• If independence for Taiwan is most improbable,
  what about reunification?
• Whatever Beijing says or does, forceful
  unification, initiated by Beijing, is not on the
  cards. Whatever the military feasibilities, the
  overall price is simply too high
• Reunification, under some loose, federal-type
  arrangement, may eventually be possible. But it
  will not happen until the mainlands political
  system and civil-rights regime have evolved into
  something a lot more like Taiwans own

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Taiwan (9)

• The Taiwan question has a major impact on Chinas
  two most important foreign relationships with
  the U.S. and with Japan
• United States For China, Taiwan always has been
  THE issue in ties with the U.S. Nearly all the
  biggest quarrels between the two stem from
  Taiwan. Different U.S. administrations tend to
  adjust, tinker with Washingtons position of
  balance between Beijing and Taipei. None,
  however, openly strays from the one-China
  principle

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Taiwan (10)

• Japan 50 years of colonial rule mean a
  significant Japanese legacy in Taiwan. Many
  older-generation Taiwanese remain fond of Japan
  (e.g., Lee Teng-hui). Rightwing Japanese
  politicians have long favored closer ties with
  Taiwan
• This feeds Beijings latent suspicion that Japan
  still wants to influence Taiwan or even somehow
  separate the island from China ? tensions

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Taiwan (11)

• Looking ahead, key event to watch is Taiwans
  next presidential election, in 2004
• If Chen Shui-bian wins a second term,
  cross-strait relations likely to remain mired in
  mutual suspicion, without major progress on key
  issues
• But if Lien Chan James Soong win (in 2000,
  running separately, the pair took 60 of the
  vote, against Chens 39), look for significant
  progress toward better ties with China

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Taiwan (12)

• The reason is China feels much more comfortable
  with Lien and Soong, both of whom are openly
  committed to the principle of one China and
  eventual reunification
• If Lien-Soong wins, Beijing likely to make a few
  quick concessions to show its sincerity
• Progress is also likely on san tong, as well as
  closer business and political ties. Beijing may
  selective allow Taiwan more of the international
  space that Taipei has long craved

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Tibet (1)

• Like Taiwan, Tibet has long been a major
  political thorn in Chinas side
• Unlike Taiwan, Tibet has a very different
  culture, language and ethnicity from China
• Tibet-China relations date back some 1,400 years.
  Despite loose political associations (and Tibets
  acknowledgement of Chinese suzerainty in the Qing
  Dynasty), China did not directly rule Tibet until
  the PLA marched in in 1950

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Tibet (2)

• After an armed uprising failed in 1959, the
  current Dalai Lama and many of his followers fled
  to northern India, where they set up a
  government-in-exile in Dharamsala
• For Tibet, Chinese rule brought much economic
  development and new infrastructure. Beijing also
  modernized local education, agriculture and
  healthcare
• But Beijing also suppressed Tibets politics,
  identity, culture and, to an extent, its Buddhism

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Tibet (3)

• As the Tibetan diaspora fanned out across the
  world, their political cause as well as Tibetan
  Buddhism gained a substantial following in the
  West
• For many years, Tibet has been a big headache and
  embarrassment for China internationally demos
  follow Chinese leaders wherever they travel,
  Tibet is a favorite cause of international
  human-rights groups as well as movie stars, etc.

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Tibet (4)

• Moreover, Tibet has been a huge drain on China,
  in terms of money and resources devoted to the
  regions development and control. In economic
  terms, Tibet is a never-ending subsidy
• So will Beijing conceivably, as some people have
  suggested, just let Tibet go one day?

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Tibet (5)

• That is unlikely, for 2 reasons --
• 1) Nations almost never give up longstanding
  territorial claims, especially such territory
  that they already control
• 2) More important, perhaps, is the strategic
  value of the Roof of the World to China. In
  Beijings view, if it does not control the
  region, Tibets weakness means that some other
  big power inevitably will come in to fill the
  vacuum

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Tibet (6)

• That power would then be able, from the Tibetan
  highland, to threaten the vast lowlands of
  western China.
• Compare Beijings attitude with Israels
  sensitivity toward the Golan Heights of Syria
  and its steely determination to occupy the
  heights since the 1967 war

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Tibet (7)

• Issues to watch
• 1) Will the growing Han Chinese presence in
  Tibet, as well as economic development,
  eventually absorb Tibet and its distinctiveness?
• 2) Will Beijing do a deal with the Dalai Lama?
  That seems to make sense. The DL is a political
  moderate who has disavowed independence. He is in
  his late 60s, and Beijing has reason to worry
  that a new generation of exiled Tibetan leaders
  may be more radical and violence-oriented

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Tibet (8)

• These factors lend some urgency to the question
  of who will succeed the DL as the dominant
  Tibetan leader
• The current favorite seems to be the Karmapa
  Lama, 18-year-old Urgyen Trinley. His dramatic
  escape from Tibet to India in 2000 captured
  world attention. He is reportedly charismatic and
  intelligent
• But he has a rival, who claims to be the true
  Karmapa Lama Thaye Dorje, 20

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Tibet (9)

• So the relationship between the Dalai Lama and
  the rival Karmapa Lamas (the Dalai and the
  Karmapas come from different Tibetan sects) will
  be one key to Tibets future
• The other, of course, is their complex and
  tangled relationships with Beijing
• (This intriguing saga of political skullduggery
  and maneuvering is told in the Asiaweek story I
  assigned you.)