Political Context and the Economic Vote Ray Duch

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Political Context and the Economic VoteRay Duch
Randy Stevenson

• APSA 8/31/2006
• www.raymondduch.com/economicvoting

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Theory of Context

• Economic voters are instrumentally rational
• Strategic voting incentives vary across contexts
• They should condition the economic vote of
  instrumentally rational voters

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Strategic Voting
selection pivot probability for incumbent
coalition versus alternative coalition
expected utility from vote for party j
abstention
derivative of the selection function for cabinet
g
perceptions of previous economy
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Strategic Voting for Opposition
expected utility from vote for party c
selection pivot probability for incumbent
coalition versus alternative coalition g
selection pivot probability for incumbent
coalition versus alternative coalition g
abstention
perceptions of previous economy
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Distinct Alternative Cabinets
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History of Holding PM and Opposition Economic Vote
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Party Vote Share and the Economic Vote of
Opposition Parties in Non-Coalitional Systems
(Multi-party Systems)
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Predicted Probability of Entering Government and
the Economic Vote of Opposition Parties in
Coalitional Systems
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Strategic Voting for Incumbent
party a and b in incumbent coalition
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Exclusive Incumbent Party
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History of Holding PM and Economic Vote
(Coalition Systems)
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Conclusions re Economic Vote

• Strong opposition parties that voters believe
  are most likely to replace the incumbents
• Weak incumbent parties that are members of most
  of the viable alternative cabinets

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Conclusions re Economic Vote

• Critical test of strategic voting argument weak
  economic vote for perennial PM parties in spite
  of high administrative responsibility.