WORLD POLITICS

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WORLD POLITICS Lecture 9
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• 4. MULTIPOLAR STABILITY IN LIBERALISM (1) The
  Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory
• (Duncan Snidal)

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Realism Claim

• The presence of a single, strongly dominant actor
  in international politics leads to collectively
  desirable outcomes for all states in the
  international system
• Conversely, the absence of a hegemon is
  associated with disorder in the world system and
  undesirable outcomes for individual states

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Realism Claim (Cont.)

• Given the absence of selective incentives
  international public goods are unlikely to exist
  unless a group is privileged so that a single
  state has sufficient interest in the good to be
  willing to bear the full costs of its provision

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Two Underlying Assumptions of Hegemonic Stability

• 1. The presence of dominant actor will lead to
  the provision of stable international politics
• 2. Both, dominant leaders and smaller states
  benefits. Smaller states benefit more, because
  they bear none of the costs and yet share fully
  in the benefits.

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Two Underlying Assumptions of Hegemonic Stability
(Cont.)

• All states will welcome leadership and seek to
  take a free ride on it. Free ride could be
  limited. The dominant power not only provides
  the public good in international politics, but it
  is capable of extracting contributions toward the
  good from subordinate states. The net benefit
  will outweigh the incurred cost, leading
  subordinate states to recognize hegemonic
  leaderships authority.

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The Limits of Hegemonic Stability

• If and only if both propositions hold
  simultaneously is the theory of hegemonic
  stability supported. (The presence of a dominant
  state leads to greater stability and this greater
  stability benefits all states including smaller
  states.)

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The Limits of Hegemonic Stability (Cont.)

• caused
• x, independent variable y, dependent
  variable
• (predominance of a single state) (stability)
• Test
• caused
• more equal distribution instability of
  power

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The Limits of Hegemonic Stability

• If free ride could be limited, the focus of the
  theory shifts form the ability to provide a
  public good to the ability to coerce other
  states.
• Consequences - No reason to assume that the
  distribution of benefits favors smaller
  states.
• - The hegemonic actor can alter the
  distribution of benefits to favor itself.
• - Benefits could be exploitative, because
  costs imposed on smaller states could exceed
  benefits received by smaller states

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The impossibility of collective action?

• If indeed states are rational by behaving in
  self-interest what prevents this rationality
  to collaborate with other states when that is in
  their best interest.
• Self-interest could be achieved through
  collaboration.

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The impossibility of collective action? (Cont.)

• The realist argument (the lack in international
  politics of any centralized authority leading
  anarchy and lack of commitment to cooperate) is
  very restrictive, and does not pertain to
  economic and non-security issues.
• Instead of taking advantage of cooperators,
  states increasingly find it in their interest to
  reciprocate cooperation, especially under
  conditions of growing interdependence.

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• cooperate
• State A self-enforcing State B
• cooperate
• no anarchy but collective action (reputation)

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• Only if states are numerous and small, then
  collective action is unlikely and the predictions
  of hegemonic stability theory will be correct
• But if sizes and capabilities are different
  between the largest and the smaller free riders,
  these conditions could enforce cooperation