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Network Effects on Individual Contributions

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Title: Network Effects on Individual Contributions


1
Network Effects on Individual Contributions
  • Frans N. Stokman
  • ICS, University of Groningen

2
Main Messages
  • Behavior of individuals and social actors should
    be seen as goal directed and social relationships
    as instrumental.
  • SNA microfoundations should include other goals
    than gain, in particular normative (behaving
    appropriately) and hedonic goals (feeling
    good).
  • SNA should be process driven derive and test
    explicitly which relationships and which
    structures produce what.
  • SNA should focus on multiple relationships, under
    which conditions they interact positively or
    negatively with each other.
  • SNA should explicitly deal with the fact that
    relationships and networks vary in terms of
    common and opposed interests.

3
Social capital
  • Access to resources of others.
  • Amount of social capital dependent on
  • Amount of resources of others
  • Their value for my goal realization
  • The willingness of the other to mobilize the
    resources for me

4
Exchange processes in social networks
  • Negotiated exchange (explicit and binding
    agreements)
  • Reciprocal exchange (Tacit, non-negotiated
    exchanges)
  • Generalized exchange (providing resources to some
    while receiving from others)
  • Productive exchange (combining resources)

5
Social Networks and Production Where Do We Stay?
  • Burtian Broker
  • Simmelian Broker

Burt, Research in Organizational Behaviour 22
(2000) 345-423
6
Networks from the perspective of Joint
Production Microfoundations Heuristic
Based on Lindenberg, Advances in Group Processes
14 (1997) 281-331
7
(No Transcript)
8

JP Open networks in Service Specification And
closed networks in Service Delivery
Source Dekker Dissertation 2001 Dekker,
Stokman, Franses 2006 Submitted for Publication
9
JP Role Ambiguity(Dekker, Stokman, Franses 2006)
  • Simmelian brokers in trust network experience
    more role ambiguity, whereas Burtian brokers do
    not
  • Role ambiguity reduces contribution to performance

10
Koster, Stokman, Hodson and Sanders (2007)
Solidarity Through Networks, Employee
Relations (accepted for publication)
11
Policy Networks (PN)
12
PN Where Do We Stay?
  • Spatial autocorrelation models of influence
    (Friedkin, Johnsen, Marsden)
  • Network extensions of Colemans exchange model
    (Marsden, Laumann, Knoke, Pappi, König)
  • Network Exchange Theory
  • Cooperative (coalition) and non-cooperative
    (procedural) models in political science

13
PN Whats Missing?Instrumental and higher
ordered goals
14
PN Bargaining Processes
  • Three fundamental processes to build a coalition
    around the own policy position
  • Management of meaning, oriented towards a
    cooperative solution for all stakeholders
    (information and trust networks dominant)
  • Logrolling, oriented towards profitable bilateral
    deals (exchange networks dominant)
  • Non-cooperative, enforced solutions (power and
    hierarchical networks dominant)

Source Stokman, Van Assen, Van der Knoop, Van
Oosten, Advances in Group Processes 17 (2000)
131-153
15
(No Transcript)
16
Overall Model Performance
17
Conclusions on EU Policy Networks
  • Inclusive and cooperative solutions generate the
    most accurate predictions
  • Bilateral exchanges with serious negative
    externalities for others are not seen to
    contribute to creative common solutions, but to
    serve parochial interests

18
Nash Bargaining Solution for all actors
  • If
  • Reversal point is very undesirable (very high
    costs of no agreement)
  • The grand coalition is possible but firm
    coalitions among subsets are difficult to
    construct
  • Actors are risk averse (quadratic loss functions
    around policy position)
  • The weighted average of the positions of the
    actor is a first-order approximation of the Nash
    Bargaining Solution (NBS)

Source Achen, Chapter 4. Institutional Realism
and Bargaining Models. In The European Union
Decides (Forthcoming)
19
EU Presidential Powers(Tallberg, The Power Of
The Chair, CUP, forthcoming)
  • Agenda Setting
  • Brokerage
  • Representation

20
EU Presidential PowerSchalk, Stokman,
Torenvlied, Weesie (submitted)
21
Conclusions
  • The relevant networks in a certain context should
    be derived from a careful analysis of the
    underlying processes, leading to the joint
    production of outcomes
  • The combination of functional and cognitive
    dependencies determine which of the alternative
    processes is dominant
  • The other processes in the background remain
    relevant and it is important to determine the
    conditions under which they support or undermine
    the dominant process
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