Thierry G. JACQUES

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MUMM - Management Unit of the North Sea
Mathematical Models RBINS - Royal Belgian
Institute for Natural Sciences
National North Sea Contingency Plan the Shaping
of Operational Arrangements

• Thierry G. JACQUES
• Marine Environmental Management Section
• MUMM
• 2006

http//www.mumm.ac.be/
http//www.mumm.ac.be/
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The Shaping of the Plan

1. Setting the scene the history
2. Legal foundations
3. Features of the response strategy
4. Operational arrangements
5. Conclusions

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Rotterdam, Hamburg
1. Setting the scene
Antwerp
65 km of coast
Dover Strait
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The eighties 19 accident alarms

• 1981 World Dignity 100,000 t crude
• 1982 Jumpa containers, toxic
• 1982 Saint Anthony 38,000 t crude
• 1982 Molesta fuel
• 1982 Benetank 3,000 t heavy fuel
• 1983 Sterling 55,000 t crude
• 1984 Mont-Louis nuclear reprocessed
• 1985 Stamy fuel
• 1985 Contract Voyager dangerous drums
• 1986 Staffortshire light petroleum gas
• 1987 Herald of Free Ent. 5 dangerous lorries
• 1987 Olympic Dream 2,100 t gasoline
• 1987 Skyron 137,000 t crude
• 1988 Borcea fuel
• 1988 Seafreight Fariway 3 dangerous lorries
• 1988 Anna Broere 550 t acrylonitrile
• 1988 Westeral dangerous containers
• 1989 Paul Robeson grounding
• 1989 Perintis 5.8 t lindane

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Mont Louis 1984 building awareness

• 30 50-t cylinders of UF6
• just off limits, out of control

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1987 HFE
gt 100 different chemicals
From passive to reactive 1988 North Sea Plan
approved
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The nineties
29 accident alarms
British Trent (1993)
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• 1990 Bussewitz 14,000 t ammonia
• 1990 Thomas Weber 221 dangerous drums
• 1990 Viva fuel
• 1991 Tomisi fuel
• 1991 Globel Ling fuel
• 1991 Clipper Confidence Pb concentrate, Cu, Zn
• 1991 Grete Turkol ethylbenzene
• 1991 British Esk naphtha
• 1992 Jostelle fuel
• 1992 Atlantic Carrier fuel
• 1992 Nordfrakt 3,252 t lead sulphide
• 1992 Long Lin fuel
• 1992 Amer Fuji fuel

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• 1993 Fleur de Lys fuel
• 1993 Alexandros fuel
• 1993 Zaphos 68,000 t condensate?
• 1993 Sherbro bags pesticides
• 1993 Hyaz fuel
• 1993 British Trent 24,000 t gasoline
• 1993 Aya fuel
• 1994 Shoeburyness 90 M14 mines
• 1994 Elatma 1,378 t NH4 NO3
• 1994 Ming Fortune 38 t sodium chorate
• 1995 Carina oil
• 1995 Spauwer capsizal, oil
• 1997 Bona Fulmar 7,000 t gasoline lost
• 1997 Mundial Car oil
• 1997 Vigdis Knutsen oiletanker
• 1999 Ever Decent containers toxic

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1994 MUMM signs first oil recovery contract MUMM
obtains first compensation for .be!
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2. The Legal Foundations

• 1987 law on the territorial sea
• 1989 new Bonn Agreement
• 1990-95 intl. concertation on the EEZ regime
• 1990-96 continental shelf treaties (FR, UK, NL)
• 1998 law ratifying UNCLOS
• 1999 law on the EEZ
• law on the marine environment
• - Strict liability of the polluter
• - ex officio intervention o/b if needed
• - compensation for environmental disruptions

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The 2000s getting at it!
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• Buying oil combating equipment
• Strict liability for remediation
• From reactive to offensive
• and operational!

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3. Special features

• The driving force behind was Science Policy
• Five federal departments have authority
• Principles
• - Strict liability of the polluter
• - compensation for environmental disruptions
• - ex officio intervention o/b if needed
• 2005 Coast Guard Structure

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(features and goals)

• to maximize enforcement capabilities
• to pool resources
• (there is no dedicated response vessel)
• to co-ordinate in a single structure
• (good sense)
• to make the Environment central
• NEBA

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4. The Operational Arrangements

• 1988 the North Sea Alarm Plan
• who is responsible
• how to alarm them and when
• where to go
• but not what to do !
• 21.06.2005 oiled birds
• 21.01.2005 shore cleanup
• 10.08.2006 operations at sea

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Action at sea the philosophy

• The Fed. Dept. Env. takes the lead
• The Navy takes command at sea
• MUMM evaluates impact (NEBA)
• Step by step development of the intervention

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Action at sea the structure

• 7 phases
• alarm
• assessment
• initial counter-mesures
• choice of strategy
• intervention
• follow-up
• debriefing

• 3 scenarios
• S1 danger of poll.
• S2 confirmed
• S3 major

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the assessment

• Search for information in one location
• Site-specific modelling (natural processes,
  behaviour of the pollutant)
• On scene monitoring
• Aerial guidance

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role of the scientist (worse case scenario,
scaling, monitoring methodology)
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the strategic options

• Mechanical recovery
• Chemical dispersion
• Mechanical dispersion
• Do nothing ( monitoring)
• Requisitions
• International assistance
• operations, methods, communications etc.

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How good are these plans?

• They are sound, professional instruments
• But
• they are coined to deploy existing means
• they are typical Tier 1 instruments
• Tier 2 (Rampenplan) and Tier 3 (internl.) require
  further elaboration

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What do we miss?
Public Affairs Safety Health Science Environment T
echnical Legal
OSC
Support Staff Advisors
Deputy OSC
Operations
Logistics
Finance
Planning
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PublicAffairs Safety Science Finance Logistics
Lead Agency
Support Staff Advisors
OSC
Operations Area 2
Operations Area 3
Operations Area 1
Operations Area 4

What we miss
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What do we miss to fulfill the needs of Tiers 2
3?The Future

• Strong technical support for the co-ordinators
  OSC-AR
• IMO/OPRC contingency organization
• administrative, financial, legal support
• centralized logistics
• organizational support for volunteers
• 2 oil-recovery vessels (inshore, offshore)

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5. Conclusions

• The alarm procedures are sound
• We have a professional approach
• We have a potential structure (Coast Guard)
• The IMO doctrine should be implemented
• The ops plans must be scaled up to Tiers 2 3
• Technical advice must be made explicit in the
  plans
• The pooling of resources must be made effective
  to ensure the availability of specialized vessels

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The End