Liquidity Facilities in Emerging Economies - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 14
About This Presentation
Title:

Liquidity Facilities in Emerging Economies

Description:

Issue Bonds, Refinance Mortgage Lenders. Help to reduce liquidity and interest rate risks ... relief (refinance public housing loans) Mortgage lending ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:38
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 15
Provided by: wbg5
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Liquidity Facilities in Emerging Economies


1
Liquidity Facilities in Emerging Economies
  • Housing Finance in Emerging Economies
  • Loïc Chiquier
  • The World Bank
  • March 10-13, 2003

2
Liquidity Facilities
  • Issue Bonds, Refinance Mortgage Lenders
  • Help to reduce liquidity and interest rate risks
  • (maturity matching, circumstantial back-stop)
  • Minimum risk exposure (limited counterpart risk
    and market risk, diversified low-risk mortgages
    as collateral), credit risk to primary lenders
    (over-collateral refinance or purchase with
    recourse)
  • Issue attractive bonds (low risk, sizeable,
    hopefully liquid, and regular issuance)

3
Liquidity Facilities (II)
  • Cheap, robust, simple, secure system to mobilize
    private bonds and to insure liquidity access to
    more mortgage lenders with economies of scale.
  • Less demanding than securitization about legal,
    regulatory, standards infrastructure, but also
    more limited ALM capacities (and more capital
    needed).
  • Compatible with multiple lenders (specialized or
    not, depositories,etc.) and alternative funding
    tools, but not panacea funding solution.

4
Liquidity Facilities (III)
  • Prerequisites
  • Relatively stable macro economic conditions
  • Active and comprehensive homeownership housing
    policy (effective legal and regulatory framework
    for private markets to operate, targeted
    efficient social housing instruments)
  • Deregulated financial markets
  • Transactions exempted from stamp duties/fees
  • Developed bond market infrastructure
  • Transition role to SMM conduit (HMC Trinidad)
    although adaptability challenges.

5
Liquidity Facilities (IV)
  • Catalyst liquidity role rather than direct engine
    (limited impact on FRMs, residual market risks)
  • Tricky corporate governance client/lender/investor
  • State support both as investor and bond guarantor
    (often implicitly) Malaysia , Jordan, Trinidad
  • Gradual privatization FHLBs by members-users
  • French CRH state bond guarantee for three years
  • Rather regulatory/supervisory tool than object,
    although concentrated risks and debt leverage

6
JMRC in Jordan
  • Jordan small and open economy, with a small
    pre-1998 HF system (privileges Housing Bank)
  • Since 1998 JMRC operations to develop sound,
    competitive, and affordable mortgage industry
  • Mixed public-private capital (18 owned by CBJ)
  • Refinance participatory eligible banks
  • Keeps at least 120 over-collateralized mortgages
    (LTVlt 80, main residence purpose, fee-exempted
    transferred mortgage deeds, replacing collateral
    if needed)
  • Issues private bonds (3-5 Y) and short-term notes
  • Conservative risk management policy

7
JMRC (II)
  • Attractive refinancing and ALM tool for banks
    (exempted statutory reserves, better regulatory
    treatment of refinanced loans)
  • Attractive fixed-rate bullet-bond bonds for
    investors (social security fund, banks)
  • Bonds eligible to bank liquidity reserves, 20
    risk-weighted for capital adequacy
  • Catalyst mortgage growth (8,000 loans, 8 banks)
  • Smooth re-directed banking strategy of the HB

8
JMRC (III)
  • Improved housing credit affordability (20 years
    terms, max. LTV 75, 10-13 rates)
  • Budgetary relief (refinance public housing
    loans)
  • Mortgage lending regulatory safeguards
  • Regular issuer of low-risk private securities
    (implicit state guarantee)
  • Prudential lending activities (de facto 153
    over- collateral portfolio), effective cost
    recovery
  • Key to develop new scheme for low-income civil
    servants (5 buy down, social housing)

9
JMRC Perspectives (IV)
  • Needed Islamic housing debt window
    (refinance/purchase)
  • Needed fixed-rate mortgage markets and
    longer-term bonds (lack of Government benchmarks)
  • Further gains in credit affordability (credit
    rates)
  • Non-recourse purchase of mortgage pools and issue
    of MBS (needed effective external MI program)
  • Possible privatization

10
Malaysia Cagamas Berhad (I)
  • Created in 1987 after liquidity crunch and
    recession to provide more liquidity to mortgage
    lenders, reduce market risks, assist social
    housing finance, sustain construction sector,
    develop private fixed-income markets (now 16.6
    share)
  • Cagamas purchases mortgage loans from lenders
    with recourse and obligation to repurchase
    (review periods 3,5,7 years).
  • Cagamas debt amortized independently from
    mortgage pools (just collateral)

11
Malaysia Cagamas Berhad (II)
  • Islamic Islamic finance window (purchase of
    deferred payments sales and housing leasing
    contracts)
  • Cagamas issues matching term debt (variable-rate
    loans, fixed-rate securities)
  • Cagamas as regular rated-AAA issuer

12
Malaysia Cagamas Berhad (III)
  • Central Bank (BNM) key investor (20) as policy
    tool, capital diversified with 74 fin.
    institutions, Board chaired by BNM Deputy
    Governor.
  • Incentives to lenders (exempted reserves) exposed
    to social housing lending quotas and rate
    ceiling.
  • Incentives to bond investors (eligible to bank
    and insurance reserves, 10 risk-weighted)
  • Limited role to renewed short-and medium term
    refinancing of variable rate mortgage credits

13
Malaysia Cagamas Berhad (IV)
  • Catalyst of booming mortgage lending (banks and
    finance companies)
  • Outstanding housing through banks 21.7 GDP
  • THLD public originator as important initial user
  • Successful expansion of demand-driven products
    after 1992 (fixed/variable rate, maturities,
    recourse /non-recourse, Islamic debt,
    leasing/commercial property, etc.)
  • Profitable institution, maybe monopolistic GSE ?

14
Malaysia Cagamas Berhad (V)
  • Cagamas successful through its counter-cyclical
    liquidity role for the markets (buffer), and
    help lenders meet housing lending requirements
  • Cagamas own mortgage market share normally
    fluctuates (up to 41 in 1997 as buffer to
    crisis, now down to 18)
  • Less business recently liquid banks, lower
    market rates, possible direct securitization by
    banks
  • Recent and gradual shift to conduit model
  • But some lenders reluctant to securitize secure
    and profitable variable-rate mortgage assets,
    investors want higher yields for longer term
    amortizing debt, (plus adaptation to regulations,
    standards)
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com