Defence Technology

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Defence Technology Innovation CentreWeapons
Integrated Technology TeamCDE theme day
Welcome
Countering Difficult Air Targets (C-DAT)
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Todays presenters

• Mr Robin Horne
• Maj Michelle Crawford
• Dr Philip Smith
• Mr Andrew Burles

• PL 4 DTIC
• SO2 J3 Ops - Jt GBAD HQ
• Dstl
• Dstl

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Agenda

• Define objectives, scope, boundaries

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Agenda

• Define objectives, scope, boundaries
• Introduce C-DAT

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Agenda

• Define objectives, scope, boundaries
• Introduce C-DAT
• Introduce current capability operational
  perspective

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Agenda

• Define objectives, scope, boundaries
• Introduce C-DAT
• Introduce current capability operational
  perspective
• Coffee

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Agenda

• Define objectives, scope, boundaries
• Introduce C-DAT
• Introduce current capability operational
  perspective
• Coffee
• Introduce Maritime perspective

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Agenda

• Define objectives, scope, boundaries
• Introduce C-DAT
• Introduce current capability operational
  perspective
• Coffee
• Introduce Maritime perspective
• A glimpse into the future

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Agenda

• Define objectives, scope, boundaries
• Introduce C-DAT
• Introduce current capability operational
  perspective
• Coffee
• Introduce Maritime perspective
• A glimpse into the future
• Wash-up

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Agenda

• Define objectives, scope, boundaries
• Introduce C-DAT
• Introduce current capability operational
  perspective
• Coffee
• Introduce Maritime perspective
• A glimpse into the future
• Wash-up
• How what to submit

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Objective

• Reduce or eliminate threat caused by difficult
  air targets

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Scope

• We want to improve our ability to counter
• Rockets, artillery mortars (C-RAM)
• Tactical Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles
• We are concerned about
• Non-state actors
• Asymmetric/homemade threats
• The proliferation of sophisticated kit

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Whats not covered in this call
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Whats not covered in this call
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What is covered by this call

• DRIT
• Detection
• Recognition
• Identification
• Track
• Air Situational Awareness
• Command and control
• Dynamic Air Defence Resource Allocation
• Deny enemy capability through
• Interception (prior to firing)
• Effectors (once in flight)

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Definitions - RAM

• Rockets Artillery Mortars (RAM)
• Indirect Fire weapons (IDF)

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RAM
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RAM flight profiles
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RAM flight profiles
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RAM flight profiles
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Definitions - TUAV

• Tactical Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (TUAV)
• Micro UAV
• Mini UAV
• MALE

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TUAV
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Non-State Threat - RAM

• 240mm
• Homemade 65MM

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Non-State Threat TUAV

• Hezbollah UAVs over Lebanon/Israel

• Hezbollah UAV post flight

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Asymmetric TUAV
Model aircraft
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Asymmetric TUAV
Model aircraft GPS/Autopilot
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Asymmetric TUAV
Model aircraft GPS/Autopilot Payload Threat
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Asymmetric Light Aircraft
Tamil Tigers modified ZLIN 143
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Definitions threat credibility

• Threat credibility depends on
• Readiness to use
• Practical readiness of the target weapons system
• Political will
• Ability to use
• Detection capability
• Targeting
• Availability/capability/survivability of launch
• Probability of encounter
• May not be through direct confrontation with
  country of origin

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Future Effectors

• Kinetic effectors
• Rapid integration onto platform
• Improved Lethality at range
• Ability to take out Difficult Air Targets
• Reduced collateral damage
• Low cost seeker trade-offs
• Rapid system upgrade
• Missile commonality
• Non-Kinetic effectors
• Directed Energy Weapons
• Soft-Kill
• ?

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Kill chain

• The kill chain is made up of a number of discrete
  events.
• Each event has a time penalty
• Time to detect (Td) Time to inform (Ti) Time
  to launch (Tl) Time to cue (Tc) Time to kill
  (Tk)
• Anything that can reduce these time penalties
  improves the chances of success
• We need a networked whole kill chain approach to
  optimise response time and
• Integrate available ABAD, GBAD and MFAD assets
• Maximise enabler system effectiveness
• Ensure that we engage targets in effector
  probability-of-kill priority. Within this we need
  to improve, develop and integrate
• Air target ID and tracking concepts and
  technology
• Air Situational Awareness
• Command and control
• Dynamic AD Resource Allocation

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Things to think about

• Defeat or disrupt
• Troops must want to use it
• Cost of use Vs cost of threat
• The target signature
• Your signature
• SWaP
• Manning levels
• Operational environment

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Environment
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Questions?
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Things to think about

• Defeat or disrupt
• Troops must want to use it
• Cost of use Vs cost of threat
• The target signature
• Your signature
• SWaP
• Manning levels
• Operational environment

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Bid hints
Give tangible deliverables
Reasonable GFA demands
Implications to exploitation route
Identify subcontractor relationship
Identify the innovation
Clearly identify IPR ownership
One step at a time