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My Technological Clock

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Evolution and Human Behavior 21, no. 5 (2000), pp. 317-321. ... One really seeking for a Gucci purse, buys it at a Gucci store. Piracy ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: My Technological Clock


1
My Technological Clock
Source Kanazawa, Satoshi. 'Scientific
Discoveries as Cultural Displays A Further Test
of Miller's Courtship Model.' Evolution and Human
Behavior 21, no. 5 (2000), pp. 317-321.
2
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3
Source the speaker himself, Feb 13th, 2007.
4
The Economic Impact of Piracy
  • 10 of all medication counterfeit
  • GlaxoSmithKline
  • Avastin. Erbitux. Gleevec. Herceptin. Rituxan.
    Tarceva. 100K/year
  • 36 of all software pirated, 29B in 2003
  • Business Software Alliance
  • 33 of all music sold, 50 of all motion picture
    videos, 1996 (the good old times no file
    sharing)
  • 5-8 of world trade
  • 10 aircraft spare parts
  • Western Europe piracy rate 34 in 1999
  • Clothing, pharmaceuticals, perfumes, etc.
  • (Good/bad news money is elsewhere) 380 billion
    in U.S. currency circulated abroad in 1994,
    208.7 million counterfeit
  • Check fraud in the US 14B
  • Off-line credit card fraud bank takes the loss,
    On-line credit card fraud merchant takes the
    loss
  • Piracy can be a killer low-margin, low
    manufacturing but high operational (marketing,
    research, development) costs
  • Some data about losses arguable
  • One really seeking for a Gucci purse, buys it at
    a Gucci store

5
  • Example of Viral Marketing via piracy LOUIS
    VUITTON
  • 1 authentic
  • 18 of all seized counterfeits in EU
  • Piracy
  • Both sides know product is not genuine
  • Counterfeiting
  • Seller tricks buyer into believing product is
    genuine

6
RF-DNA
  • Darko KirovskiMICROSOFT RESEARCH

7
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8
Experimental DesignCircular Loop
9
Simulations
10
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11
Miniaturized Antenna Structure
  • Design Frequency 5.25 GHz
  • Patch Size 3.5 x 2.75 mm
  • RF35 ?r3.5, tand0.0018
  • 2 layers, 787 µm/layer
  • Larger design, higher efficiency
  • Design Frequency 5.32 GHz
  • Patch Size 2.77 x 2.75 mm
  • RF60 ?r6.15, tand0.0028,
  • 2 layers, 787 µm/layer
  • Smaller design, lower efficiency

12
Prototype RF-DNA Instances
13
Prototype RF-DNA Reader
14
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15
The Idea
16
Desiderata for Anti-Counterfeiting Technologies
17
Definition of COA
  • Bauder and Simmons Sandia Labs
  • Desiderata for COA Technologies
  • R1 Inexpensive to manufacture
  • RF-DNA lt US0.01 cost of storage (e.g., RFID)
  • R2 Expensive to create a near-exact replica
  • RF-DNA requires true 3D manufacturing
  • Cost of R2 (Adversarial) margin protection
    limit
  • R3 Inexpensive to sign/verify
  • RF-DNA reader projected cost US100
  • R4 Robust
  • RF-DNA robust to humidity, temperature,
    wear-and-tear
  • Proximity of other objects with strong RF effect

18
Definition of COA
  • Desiderata for COA Technologies
  • R5
  • Inverse design over Maxwell equations
  • Ill-posed problem
  • Tikhonov regularization
  • Even the forward design is difficult
  • Linear system
  • Could be non-linear with magnetic materials
  • Hysteresis too slow
  • Ultimate anti-skimming tool

19
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20
Definition of COA
  • Desiderata for COA Technologies
  • R6 repetitiveness
  • R7 non-collision

21
Definition of COA
  • Desiderata for COA Technologies
  • R8 fingerprint interdependence
  • Sample-by-sample attack
  • If adjusting a sample is easy ? linear complexity
  • R9 simple total one-way destruction

22
Definition of COA
  • Desiderata for COA Technologies
  • R10 visual inspection of the verification path
  • RF-DNA - contactless verification
  • Robust to
  • jamming
  • signal overpowering

23
Challenge/Response Systems
  • Prime candidate
  • Variability in semiconductor manufacturing
  • Need to be on-line
  • Storage vs. lifetime
  • Attack model not clear
  • reverse engineering
  • probing
  • debugging for asynchronous circuits
  • obfuscation
  • Large set of attacks unexplored
  • Need to be on-line
  • Large random number Product ID
  • Follow IDs through supply chains
  • but nearly same effect as with breakable
    C/R systems

24
Applications
  • No association with object
  • Anti-skimming
  • Credit cards
  • Documents of value
  • Money, checks, coupons
  • Travel documents passports, national IDs, visas
  • Dont talk to readers unless they prove they read
    your fingerprint
  • Association with object
  • Tags, certificates of authenticity, K-th owner
  • Software, hardware, consumer electronics
  • Fashion, jewelry, perfume industry
  • Parts cars, aircrafts, boats
  • Seal
  • Tamper-evident hardware
  • Mail
  • Pharmaceuticals

25
Summary
  • Bauder and Simmons, Sandia
  • RF-DNA
  • R1-10 ?
  • Size inch-by-inch by 1-2mm
  • Materials science
  • Manufacturing optimization
  • Robustness to nearby RF actors
  • Packaging solutions for seals
  • Fingerprint compression
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