Doctrine for Counter Insurgency: The British Armys Experience

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Doctrine for Counter InsurgencyThe British
Armys Experience

• Colonel Alexander Alderson
• Afghan COIN Centre

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Counterinsurgency

• Those military, paramilitary, political,
  economic, psychological and civil actions taken
  by the Government to defeat insurgency

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The Evolution of COIN Doctrine

• Northern
• Ireland
• SOPs

2009
2001
1995 - Counter Insurgency Operations
1972
1966
1950
Control
1934 Notes on Imperial Policing
1909 Field Service Regulations
Maj. Gen. Sir Charles Gwynns Imperial Policing
Expansion
1906 - Callwells Small Wars
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Field Service Regulations (1909)
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1923 Minimum Force?
Amritsar, India April 13, 1919
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Amritsar the Change to Policy

• The principles which have consistently governed
  the policy of His Majestys Government are
  determined that Minimum Force shall remain, the
  primary factor of policy whenever circumstances
  unfortunately necessitate the suppression of
  civil disorder by military force within the
  British Empire.

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Gwynn Imperial Policing (1934)

• Questions of policy remain vested in the civil
  Government
• The amount of military force employed must be the
  minimum the situation demands
• Take firm and timely action
• Co-operation the task of restoring order does
  not rest on the Army alone

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Inter-War Assumption Status quo ante?
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Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (1952)

• The Job of the British Army out here is to kill
  or capture CT in Malaya. This book shows in a
  clear and easily readable form the proven
  principles by which this can be done. This book
  is by no means perfect. Criticisms and
  improvements are invited by GOC Malaya, who will
  produce a revised edition in six months time.

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• Warn the crowd by all available means that
  effective fire will be opened unless the crowd
  disperses at once. This can be done by a call on
  the bugle, followed by the display of banners
  showing the necessary warning in the vernacular.
• Land Operations Volume III, Counter-Revolutionary
  Operations, 1969, Part 2, p. 103

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Sir Robert Thompson

• The government must have a clear political aim
  to establish and maintain a free, independent and
  united country which is politically and
  economically stable and viable
• Function in accordance with law
• The government must have an overall plan
• Give priority to defeating the political
  subversion, not the guerrillas
• In the guerrilla phase, secure base areas first

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• Secure
• Clear-Hold-Build
• Find-Fix-Strike
• Deter, Disrupt, Dislocate

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Elements of Effective Security

• Security for the Population
• Presence
• Continuity
• Embedded Training Teams
• Intelligence
• ISTAR
• Influence
• Education

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Conclusions