Democracy and Accountability

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Democracy and Accountability
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Democracy and Accountability in the EU

• Ending of the permissive consensus
  (ratification of Maastricht Treaty in 1992-93).
• Democracy self-governing community deciding what
  should be done. Accountability controlling those
  who are acting on its behalf.
• Democracy cannot operate without accountability

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The state-centrist view

• Liberal democracy Democracy and accountability
  operate through the electoral process
  (socialization and political education).
• Proponents of state-centrism opposed any aspects
  making the EU different than a traditional
  international agreement between states
  (threatening to liberal democracy).
• Maintaining the veto in the Council, a weakening
  of the ECJ, a strict limitation on Community
  competencies, governmental control over the
  Commission, and rolling back the power of the EP.

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The state-centrist view

• However this argument can be considered
  anachronistic
• The extent of integration and interdependence is
  so advanced that the repatriation of policy to
  the member states could only be secured with
  massive disruption and destabilization in Europe.
• Many of the forces of globalization which
  undermine the domestic autonomy of all but the
  strongest states would operate whether or not the
  EU existed.

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The state-centrist view

• Any state which attempted repatriation of policy
  by itself would almost certainly suffer as a
  result of the potential punitive power of other
  member states.
• There are normative arguments against
  state-centrism as it promotes intolerant
  nationalist rhetoric against multi-ethnic and
  multi-lingual environment that the EU has created.

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Federalism

• If the nation-state no longer seems a viable
  location for democracy, there is the temptation
  to accept the other extreme.
• There has always been a federalist tradition
  among supporters of European integration which
  has favored the establishment of some kind of a
  United States of Europe, on normative grounds
  (Spinelli).

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Federalism

• It has been suggested that the EU is an embryonic
  federation since it has a federal legal system, a
  single market, and supranational political
  institutions.
• A constitution which would openly define and
  limit the powers operating at each level is a
  requirement for the establishment of clear forms
  of democracy and accountability.

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Federalism

• However there are several problems with this
  approach too
• The EU does not resemble a federal state. The
  governments retain primacy in the policy-making
  process and exercise a range of powers in
  domestic and external policy.
• The stronger member states remain important
  international actors. Bilateral relations of
  individual states (US) are often of greater
  significance than those between the member states
  (CFSP).

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Legitimacy and the nation-state model

• Commission and the Council
• Sought to counter democratic concerns by treating
  them as a crisis of legitimacy which might be
  reversed by enhancing the popularity of the
  community and the European identity of its
  citizens.
• Symbols that recycle the rituals of national
  construction have been used like a European
  flag, anthem, and passport.
• More important was the establishment of a
  European citizenship with the Treaty of
  Maastricht, but it was again largely symbolic and
  of course not necessarily democratic.

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Legitimacy and the nation-state model

• Legitimacy rests on a sense of a common identity.
  
• Because of we-feelings towards the rest of the
  population in a states, we are willing to accept
  our state and its need for significant powers.
• However, the attempts to create such a feeling in
  the EU have been largely unsuccessful.

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The institutional approaches

• Alternative Institutions of the EU should
  resemble those within the states.
• The EP main vehicle toward democratization, its
  powers have significantly increased (only body
  directly elected on a European basis).
• Room for skepticism about the extent to which the
  EP has ameliorated the problems of democracy and
  accountability, or can be expected to do so.

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The institutional approaches

• EP remoteness from the electorate..
• Its role is relatively obscure in relation to
  government, (governments are not formed from it,
  and cannot be forced out of office by it).
• The population would take more note of the EP if
  it had the power to bring down the Council for
  instance. The EP could not secure such power
  without the establishment of a federation, which
  is difficult in itself.

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The institutional approaches

• Alternative direct election of the Commission on
  alternative partisan programs would stimulate
  popular interest in the system, promote a greater
  sense of division between government and
  opposition, and provide the Commission with
  both a democratic base and legitimacy which it
  presently lacks.
• highly unlikely that the member states will allow
  an alternative body, which has greater initiating
  power than the EP to claim a democratic mandate.
• Nor would the EP want a new rival to challenge
  its democratic legitimacy.

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The institutional approaches

• Alternative view Commission to be indirectly
  elected out of the majority party group in the
  EP.
• Governments dont want to cede the power of
  appointment of the Commission to the EP, and
  reluctant in losing their power to nominate their
  Commissioner.
• All reforms hardly noticeable to the public, as
  happened with every other reform.

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Democratic outputs and efficiency

• Alternative Treat the problem as one that can be
  remedied by greater effectiveness and efficiency.
  
• Enhancing the powers and competencies of the EU
  so that it can compete more effectively in the
  world, or make the single market a success.
• Preoccupation with the output side of
  policy-making.

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Democratic outputs and efficiency

• Concentration on outputs without improvements on
  democratic inputs, can simply reinforce the
  initial problems.
• Inefficiency in decision-making can undermine a
  system of democracy.
• Improving efficiency within the Council for
  instance, complicates the process of domestic
  accountability whenever a government is outvoted
  or accepts a decision solely on the expectation
  of being outvoted.

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Independent accountability

• Distinct forms of governance are necessary.
  Argues that the nation-state has high levels of
  welfare expenditures and that elements of
  redistribution are acceptable because of a shared
  identity.
• EU should focus on regulation, rather than
  redistribution, and the appropriate agency is an
  independent body of experts established by the EU
  to oversee tasks entrusted to it.

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Independent accountability

• Independence and accountability can be reconciled
  through various mechanisms
• including statutory objectives for performance
  standards,
• reason-giving and transparency requirements
  facilitating judicial review and public
  participation,
• due process provisions to ensure fairness among
  the inevitable losers from legislation,
• and professionalism in order to withstand
  external interference and to reduce the risk of
  capture.

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Independent accountability

• Critiques liberal democracy and the nation-state,
  that governments have manipulated economic policy
  for electoral advantage or to appease particular
  interest groups in society.
• One such independent institution in the EU can be
  considered the ECB, and ensuring that it is
  outside political control is the best way of
  keeping it to its appointed tasks.

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Independent accountability

• Independence for the ECB means that there is no
  strong form of democratic authorization for its
  policies at the domestic and EU levels.
• ECB not more conducive to democracy and
  accountability (inequalities between areas and
  social groups, by removing existing tools of
  economic policy-making from the control of the
  member states).

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Policy-making by consensus and intra-elite
accountability

• Construction of a consensus. Assumptions of
  conflict have very little relevance for the
  policy-making process of the EU
• The government-opposition dichotomy does not
  apply and there is a very strong incentive for
  cooperative policy-making both within and between
  EU institutions.

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Policy-making by consensus and intra-elite
accountability

• Votes take place only rarely in the Council and
  the main impact of QMV has been to facilitate the
  search for a consensus.
• The search for an absolute majority in the EP has
  facilitated cooperation between major groups and
  not competition.
• The co-decision procedure means that the Council,
  EP, and Commission have powerful inducements to
  conciliate one another in ensuring that agreement
  is reached on proposals.

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Policy-making by consensus and intra-elite
accountability

• The committee and comitology systems remain
  obscure neither the way that committees are
  appointed, nor the ways they operate are
  transparent.
• The exclusion of the people obviously excludes
  ideas that might undermine the elite consensus on
  which policy is currently based.
• The goals of democracy and accountability
  necessitate the inclusion of discordant voices
  (privileged actors and interests).