Infowar'mil

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Info_at_war.mil

• War and Military Affairs in the Information Age

Sean Lawson Science and Technology
Studies Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Guest
lecture for Information in History and
Society Instructor Kate Boyer 28 November 2005
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Overview

• Military Information Needs
• Means of Collecting Information
• Information Warfare 101
• Information Age Threats
• The Emerging InfoAge Military
• Second Thoughts

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Military Information Needs

• Strategic Intelligence (i.e. macro-level)
• Information about a potential adversarys
  political and economic system, language, culture,
  etc.
• Tactical Intelligence (i.e. battlefield)
• What it is doing
• - Command and Control (C2)
• - Situational awareness
• What the adversary is doing
• - Capabilities, intentions, disposition, location
• What the environment is like
• - Geography, weather conditions, etc.

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Means of Collecting Information

• Most basic is sensing
• Sight eyes, cameras, radar, infrared, etc.
• Hearing ears, sonar, etc.
• Touch skin, thermometer, vibration sensors, etc.
• Smell and taste chemical/biological
  sniffers/detectors

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Means of Collecting Information

• HUMINT (Human Intelligence)
• Spies

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Means of Collecting Information

• SIGINT (Signals Intelligence)
• Electronic and communications intercepts

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Means of Collecting Information

• IMINT (Imagery Intelligence)
• Satellites, spy planes, etc.

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Means of Collecting Information

• OSINT (Open Source Intelligence)
• Non-classified information from libraries, news
  media, Internet, etc.
• OSINT companies like Janes, Stratfor, etc.

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Information Warfare 101

• Definition
• Information warfare consists of those actions
  intended to protect, exploit, corrupt, deny, or
  destroy information or information resources in
  order to achieve a significant advantage,
  objective, or victory over an adversary. --John
  Alger, Dean, School of Information Warfare and
  Security, National Defense University

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Information Warfare 101

• The Offense
• Exploit, corrupt, deny, or destroy adversary
  information or information resources
• Deception

Inflatable Sherman tank, WWII
Inflatable armored car, WWII
Quaker gun, Civil War
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Information Warfare 101

• The Offense
• PSYOPS (Psychological Operations)
• - Targeting enemy soldiers will to fight

PSYOP leaflet dropped over Afghanistan
Back Stop fighting for the Taliban and live!
Front Taliban we know where you are!
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Information Warfare 101

• The Offense
• Perception management
• - Shaping enemy leaders and publics perceptions

In peace, radio and TV outlets can be used to
spread the U.S. message and to influence foreign
leaders and publics.
In crisis and in war, the U.S. deploys the EC-130
Commando Solo.
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Information Warfare 101

• The Offense
• SOFTWAR
• - The hostile use of global television to shape
  another nations will by changing its vision of
  reality

Bin Ladens election message
Azzam al-Amriki, an American al-Qaeda member,
threatens Americans
Nick Berg beheading, Iraq
Paul Johnson beheading, Saudi Arabia
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Information Warfare 101

• The Defense
• Protect information or information resources
• - Classification (top secret, secret, eyes-only,
  etc.)
• - Authorization (security clearances)
• - Compartmentalization (SCI, need-to-know, etc.)
• - Barriers physical and electronic (passwords,
  encryption, etc.)
• Disseminate and use information and information
  resources
• - Security must be balanced with need to
  disseminate the right info, to the right people,
  in time to be used effectively

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Information Age Threats

• Some international relations terms
• Levels of analysis sub-state, state, regional,
  international, etc.
• Issue sectors social, political, security,
  economic, environment

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Information Age Threats

• Security threat characteristics
• Hybrid more than one issue sector
• Multiple more than one level of analysis
• Simultaneous all at once
• Decline of the state i.e. terror targets
  civilians directly, challenges states ability to
  provide security
• Dispersed/decentralized foes IT allows
  geographic dispersal and decentralized
  organization
• Rise of social/cultural conflict netwar, clash
  of civilizations, Jihad vs. McWorld, etc.

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The Emerging InfoAge Military

• Technological characteristics
• Command, Control, Communications, Computers (C4)

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The Emerging InfoAge Military

• Technological characteristics
• Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR)

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The Emerging InfoAge Military

• Technological characteristics
• Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs)

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The Emerging InfoAge Military

• Technological characteristics
• Communications

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The Emerging InfoAge Military

• Technological characteristics
• Simulation

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The Emerging InfoAge Military

• Organizational characteristics
• Network forms of organization
• Modularity
• Sensor/shooter boundary blurs
• Increased horizontal data-sharing
• Increased responsibility for lower-level soldiers
• Increased training and professionalization

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The Emerging InfoAge Military

• Strategy and tactics The New Rules
• Fight first for information superiority
• Speed of command
• Access to information shared awareness
• Dispersed forces noncontiguous operations
• Demassification
• Self-synchronization
• Deep sensor reach
• Compression of levels of war

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The Emerging InfoAge Military

• Strategy and tactics (cont.)
• Emphasis on maneuver and precision
• Effects-based operations
• OODA Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action
• Multiplicity multidimensional, multidirectional
• Simultaneity all at once
• Just-enough, just-in-time, on-demand
• Jointness

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Second Thoughts

• Drawbacks to an InfoWar strategy
• Appears as lack of willpower to adversaries
• Leads to enemy acts which are more brutal (i.e.
  televised beheadings), not less
• Leads to enemy actions which are more irrational,
  unpredictable, and dangerous, not less
• Creates foundations of a surveillance/propaganda
  state at home
• Self-defeating The more we seek quick, bloodless
  victory, the more it eludes us.

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Second Thoughts

• It has become part of the conventional wisdom
  that intelligence is the necessary key to success
  in military operations. A wise opinion would be
  that intelligence, while generally necessary, is
  not a sufficient means to victory. Decision in
  war is always the result of a fight, and in
  combat willpower always counts for more than
  foreknowledge. Let those who disagree show
  otherwise. John Keegan, Intelligence in War