The Battle of Shiloh MPCCC 0106

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The Battle of ShilohMPCCC 01-06
2
Purpose

• The purpose of this brief is to provide an
  informative analysis of the Battle of Shiloh to
  include leadership, significance of the action,
  contemporary significance, and the principles of
  war.

3
References

• Battle in the Civil War Fieldbooks Griffith,
  Paddy, 1986.
• The Battle of Shiloh Civil War Series,
  Daniels, Larry J., Eastern National 1998.
• Staff Ride Handbook for. the Battle of Shiloh,
  6-7 April 1862 LTC Jeffrey J. Gudmens. Combat
  Studies Institute. Combat Studies Institute
  Press. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
• Shiloh Historical Handbook Albert Dillahunty.
  National Park Service
• Wiley Sword Bloody April Press of Morningside
  Bookshop, Dayton, OH 1983
• U.S. Army War College Guide to the Battle of
  Shiloh University Press of Kansas 1996
• "The West Point Atlas Of American Wars"  Praeger
  Publishers 1959 pg. 31 38.

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Agenda

• Introduction CPT Sybert
• Historical Strategic Setting CPT Workman
• Task Organization CPT Al-Harbi
• Order of Battle CPT Mertz
• Terrain Analysis CPT Brown
• Weather MAJ Azeem
• Weapons CPT Carpio
• Tactical Setting 1LT(P) Latorre
• Actions of the Battle CPT Bailey
• Union Analysis CPT Marks
• Confederate Analysis CPT Stearns
• Contemporary Significance CPT Reusch
• Summary CPT Sybert

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Introduction

• Who The Union Armies of Tennessee and Ohio
  (66K) and the Confederate Army of the Mississippi
  (45K)
• What The Battle of Shiloh
• When 6-7 April, 1862
• Where Southwestern Tennessee near Pittsburg
  Landing
• Why To determine which side has control of SW
  Tennessee, to include the strategically important
  Corinth Railhead

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Map Displaying Area
PITTSBURGH LANDING
CORINTH
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Strategic Setting
8
29 March 1862
Union Victory at Fort Henry/Donelson
9
Road To War

• NOV 1860 Lincoln wins Presidential Election
• FEB 1861 Confederate States of America formed
• JUL 1861 Confederate Victory at the First
  Battle of Bull Run
• JAN 1862 Confederate Army establishes
  defensive cordon from Eastern KY to Western TN/MS
  
• JAN-MAR 1862 Union Victories at Mill Springs,
  Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Pea Ridge Grant
  opens an invasion route through MS Valley

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Union Victory at Fort Henry
Union Victory at Fort Donelson
GRANT
PITTSBURGH LANDING
CORINTH
JOHNSTON
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General Strategic Setting

• Both sides recognized importance of Mississippi
  River
• South needs it for supplies and logistics
• North needs to deny southern logistics efforts
  and paramount for operations against Confederate
  Railroads
• War confined to East (Virginia and Kentucky)
• Confederacy off to strong start at First Bull Run
  with an overwhelming and decisive victory. Ever
  since Union has enjoyed significant success.

12
Union Strategic Setting

• No quick and easy victory over South
• Wanted to use Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers to
  divide South with Anaconda Plan
• Needed to exploit successes of Ft. Henry and Ft.
  Donelson and Keep Up Tempo
• Wants to capture Corinth, MS and deny South use
  of its only East/West Railroad.

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Confederate Strategic Setting

• Confederacy on defense. Established a cordon to
  defend Mississippi River and Railroad in Corinth.
• Grant had recently taken control of Fort Henry
  and Donelson and had effectively denied the use
  of Tennessee River from Confederacy
• Must stop Grant's advance. GEN Johnston realized
  defense will not win war. Must move troops from
  Tennessee to gain initiative against Grant.

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Task Organization
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Union Composition (1 of 2)
Commander MG Grant
16
Forces Available Union

• MG Ulysses S. Grant- The Army of the Tennessee
• (48,000 troops)
• 1st Division MG John McClernand
• 2nd Division BG William Wallace
• 3rd Division MG Lew Wallace
• 4th Division BG Stephen Hurlburt
• 5th Division BG William Sherman
• 6th Division BG Benjamin Prentiss

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Union Composition (2 of 2)
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18
Forces Available Union

• MG Don Carlos Buell- The Army of the Ohio
  (17,000 troops)
• 2nd Division BG Alexander McCook
• 4th Division BG William Nelson
• 5th Division BG Thomas Crittenden
• 6th Division BG Thomas Wood

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Confederate Composition
Commander GEN Johnston GEN P.T.G. Beauregard
MS
20
Forces Available Confederate

• Army of the Mississippi (45,000)
• 1st Corps MG Leonidas Polk
• 2nd Corps MG Braxton Bragg
• 3rd Corps MG William Hardee
• 4th Corps MG John Breckinridge

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Order of Battle
22
Composition

• Army of Tennessee
• Six Divisions
• Veterans of Forts Henry and Donelson
• Green Units
• Some Brigades had artillery, four of six
  divisions had consolidated artillery
• Nine battalions and eight companies of cavalry -
  each division had from four companies to two
  battalions
• Army of Ohio
• Four Divisions
• Army of Mississippi
• Four Corps
• Majority untested in battle
• Each Brigade had at least one artillery battery
• Five battalions of cavalry - some brigades had
  cavalry

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Disposition

• Army of Tennessee
• Pittsburgh Landing
• Army of Ohio
• Nashville
• Army of Mississippi
• Corinth

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Strength

• Army of Tennessee
• 48,000
• Army of Ohio
• 18,000
• Army of Mississippi
• 46,000

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Tactics

• Napoleonic tactics and Mexican War major
  influence
• Infantry marched in column - deployed into lines
  to fight
• Frontal attack maneuver of choice
• One or two companies forward to prevent surprise
• Regiment moved within 100 yards
• Delivered volley and charged
• Artillery engaged from 400 yards

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Tactics (cont.)

• Army of Tennessee Cavalry
• Cavalry used in rear for escort and couriers
• Army of Mississippi Cavalry
• Supported artillery
• Attempted to mount charges
• Conducted extensive reconnaissance

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Training

• Both sides lacked adequate training
• Army of Tennessee attempted to train at Pittsburg
  landing prior to Confederate attack

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Logistics

• Army of Tennessee
• Used 174 riverboats for supply
• Enjoyed comfortable camp life
• Had all required supplies on hand but had a
  faulty distribution system
• Pittsburg landing became overwhelmed with wounded
  and troop movement - prevented ammunition from
  being delivered
• Army of Mississippi
• Used wagons to move logistics from Corinth
• Pilfered Union camps and captured large amounts
  of supplies

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The Army of Tennessee
Key Players of the Union
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Major General Ulysses U.S. GrantArmy of
Tennessee Commander

• Early Years
• Military Career
• Between the Wars
• Civil War Years
• Post Civil War

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BG William T. ShermanArmy of TennesseeFifth
Division Commander

• Early Years
• Breakdown at Louisville
• Total War

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Brigadier General B.M. PrentissArmy of
TennesseeSixth Division Commander

• Early Life
• A Hero at Shiloh

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Major General Lewis WallaceArmy of
TennesseeThird Division Commander

• Early Years
• Civil War
• Post Civil War

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Major General Don Carlos BuellArmy of Ohio
Commander

• Early Years
• Army of the Potomac
• Southern Sympathizer

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Key Players of the Confederacy
The Army of Mississippi
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General Albert Sidney Johnston Army of the
Mississippi Commander

• Early Life
• Texas Army
• U.S. Army
• Civil War

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General PGT BeauregardSecond in Command, Army of
Mississippi

• Little Napoleon
• The Hero of Fort Sumter
• 1st Bull Run
• Shiloh
• Personality

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The Battling Bishop Major General
Leonidas PolkArmy of MississippiFirst Corps
Commander

• The Early Years
• The Battling Bishop

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Major General Braxton BraggArmy of
MississippiSecond Corps Commander

• Early Life
• Pre-Civil War Military Experience
• Adherence to Regulation
• Civil War
• Advisor to Jefferson Davis

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Major General William J. HardeeArmy of
MississippiThird Corps Commander

• Early Years
• Drill Manual
• Civil War
• Later Years

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Colonel Nathan Bedford ForrestArmy of
MississippiCavalry Commander

• Early Life
• Civil War Career
• Cavalry Command at Shiloh
• Mobile Cavalry Warfare
• Impact of Forrests Doctrine

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Terrain Analysis
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Terrain Analysis

• Orientation to the Battlefield
• The Shiloh battlefield was densely vegetated with
  one major road (Hamburg-Savannah) running north
  and south. There was one major road running east
  to west (Corinth-Pittsburg).
• The waterways that surrounded the battlefield
  were arrayed as follows Tennessee River, Lick
  Creek, Locust Grove Creek, Oak Creek, Owl Creek,
  and Snake Creek.

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Terrain Analysis

• Observation and fields of fire
• Favored the defender who could pre-place and
  choose battle positions that blocked key avenues
  of approach.
• Cover and concealment
• Excellent natural concealment to both attacker
  and defender
• Thick forest, thickets , ravines, encampments and
  prepared battle positions

No Confederate who fought at Shiloh ever said
that he found any point on that bloody field easy
to assail. Colonel William Preston
Johnston
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Terrain Analysis

• Obstacles
• Pittsburg Landing
• Tennessee River and creeks
• Roads

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Terrain Analysis

• Key Terrain
• Pittsburgh Landing
• Snake Creek Bridge
• Western Eastern Corinth Road
• Avenues of Approach
• Hamburg-Savannah Road
• Corinth-Pittsburg Road
• Western Eastern Corinth Road
• Traveled on roadways then take a direct route to
  the field where each specific battle took place.

The country was heavily wooded and unsuited to
travel, and the men were generally unsuited to
marching. The officers, in main, knew nothing
practically of campaigning, and the progress was
slow and wearisome. Lieutenant Edwin H.
Reynolds, 5th Tennessee
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Weather
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Weather

• Precipitation

• Heavy rain for weeks was slowing down the
  movement on the roads.
• Affects the morale and strength of the soldiers.
• Slows down Gen. Buells approach to the battle
  field by bogging down the heavy cannon and combat
  trains carrying supplies and ammunition.
• Swells waters in Snake Creek to the N, Owl Creek
  to the West and the Tennessee River to the E and
  Lick Creek to the S making movement extremely
  difficult in the area, and delaying the
  Confederate attack until the morning of the 6th.

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Weather
Cloud cover

• Cloud cover led to delayed daybreak and earlier
  nightfall.
• These increased hours of darkness also allowed
  scouts and cavalry to move about the battlefield.
  

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Weather
Temperature and Humidity

• It is reported to have been cool and rainy during
  the daytime and cooling down more during the
  night.
• The humidity also added to the importance of
  keeping the gun powder for the muskets and
  cannons dry.

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Weather
Winds

• The heavily forested area limited the impact of
  winds on the forces, especially the Union
  soldiers that were camped with tents.
• During combat heavy winds would influence the
  flight of smooth bore musket rounds.
• Too a lesser extent this also carried over to the
  rounds fired from the smooth bore and rifled
  cannon.

52
Weather
Visibility

• During the morning hours light fog in the
  low-lying areas heavily favored the strategy and
  tactics used by the Confederates.
• Other than times of morning fog visibility
  favored the defenders, because of the ability to
  see extended distances.

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Weapons
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Weapons

• Weapons characteristics
• Rifled Muskets
• Minie round
• 40 rds combat load
• 3 rds per min
• 40-120 minutes to fire
• 20 sec. load

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Weapons (cont.)

• Enfields
• .577 cal.
• 9lbs 3 oz with bayonet
• 800 yds accurate
• 1,100 yds fairly accurate
• Second to Springfield
• Impact at Hornets nest
• Highly sought by Confederates

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Weapons (cont.)

• Hall Carbine
• Calvary
• Single shot breechloader
• Springfield
• .58 cal
• Rifled, fired minie
• 500 yds
• 8.75 lbs

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Characteristics of a FirefightRegiment on
Regiment
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Weapons (cont.)

• 12 pounder
• 1,680 yds
• 6 pounder
• Smoothbore
• 24 pounder

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Weapons (cont.)

• Canister Shot
• Sawdust used to keep shot in place
• Close range gt400yds
• No internal charge
• Anti-personnel
• Broke in the air disbursing rounds

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Weapons (cont.)

• Solid Shot
• Smashing and battering effect
• Used on buildings and mass formations

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Weapons (cont.)

• Case
• Thinner walls then shell
• Filled with iron balls or round lead
• Anti-personnel role
• Shell
• Hollow with fuse
• Broke up into jagged pieces
• Low detonation produced minimal fragments
• Psychological impact

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Impact of Rounds
800 yds
1600 yds
300 yds
Shell
Roundshot
Case
Canister
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Weapons (cont.)

• 06 APR 1862
• USS Lexington 0100
• 10 minute intervals
• Rounds go overhead
• Psychological impact

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USS Tyler and Lexington

• Two, 32 pdr
• Four, 8 in guns

• One, 32 pdr
• Six, 8 in guns

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Relative Combat Power
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Tactical Setting
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Tactical Setting

• Influenced by Napoleonic and Mexican Wars
• Studied small unit tactics in open terrain
• Offense was favored
• Effect of rifled-musket

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Infantry Tactics

• Frontal Attack
• Successful but very high casualties
• Command and Control often lost
• Rifled-musket favored defense
• Soldiers entrenched every time they halted

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Artillery and Cavalry

• Artillery
• In offense, maneuvered within 200 yards of
  infantry
• In defense, engaged advancing infantry then
  quickly withdrew
• Cavalry
• Rear and flank security
• Patrols and raids
• Utilized horses for mobility then dismounted and
  fought like infantry

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Civil War Tactics Doctrinal Template
ENEMY LINE
RECON
SKIRMISHERS
FRONTAL ATTACK
ARTILLERY
CAVALRY FLANK SECURITY
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Civil War Tactics Doctrinal Template
ENEMY LINE
RECON
SKIRMISHERS
ARTILLERY
CAVALRY
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Tactics at Shiloh

• Union
• Intended to train forces in preparation of
  southern offensive
• Army of Tennessee order to build fortified
  defenses positions, but did not
• Left with unsupported flanks
• Trained in open areas but fought in woods
• Artillery lacked adequate command structure did
  not account for rifled-musket range but able to
  mass fires at key points in the battle
• Cavalry never used effectively

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Tactics at Shiloh

• Confederate
• Developed simple plan, used frontal attack
• Terrain and musket-rifle severely effected
  command and control
• Artillery massed effectively at key points in the
  battle
• Cavalry not used effectively

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Actions of the BattleDAY ONE
06 April 1862
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(No Transcript)
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0300-0900
D
C
B
A
1
77
0900-1030
D
A
B
C
2
78
1000-1530
B
A
C
D
3
79
1030-1700
4
80
1200-1730
C
B
A
5
81
1630-1800
A
C
B
6
82
1630-1800
A
C
B
6
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Actions of the BattleDAY TWO
07 April 1862
84
Dark-1400
8
A
B
85
1400-1700
A
B
9
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Union Analysis
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Union Analysis

• Defense (Retrograde)
• Preparation
• Security
• Mass
• Flexibility/Agility
• Offense (Attack)
• Surprise
• Concentration

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Union Analysis

• Objective
• Grant gave Prentiss clear objective to delay at
  Hornet's Nest
• Economy of Force
• Sherman delays 2/3 of Confederate forces
• Simplicity
• Single line
• Mass/Depth
• Buell's forces mass on the eastern flank on the
  morning of the second day

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Union Analysis (cont'd)

• Unity of Command
• Grant spoke directly to division commanders
• Maneuver
• - Failed to effectively use cavalry

90
Union Analysis (cont'd)

• Initiative
• Failed to pursue
• Synchronization
• Prentiss' forces delay while Union line reforms
• Delay of L. Wallace

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Casualties
                      US                     
CSAkilled               1754                   
  1723wounded              8408                 
    8012captured/ missing    2885                
     959 13047 10694
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Union Significance

• Won battle
• Held terrain
• Eventually seized Railroad at Corinth
• Short Term Significance
• Combat experience
• Preserved enough combat power for later
  operations in that sector
• Long Term Significance
• Changed Union strategy

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Confederate Analysis
94
Confederate Analysis

• Defense (Retrograde/Delay)
• Preparation
• Neither Johnston or Beauregard planned on the
  Union forces massing enough to cause a
  Confederate retreat.
• Security
• Committed a 5000 man Rear Guard with Cavalry and
  heavy artillery support (they finally got it
  right!)
• Disruption
• The Confederates used the Rear Guard to delay the
  Union forces enough to move quickly from the
  field.
• Mass
• While the Confederate Rear Guard was small it was
  positioned in such a way to allow just frontal
  assaults against massed infantry and artillery.
• Flexibility
• COL Forrest used his skills as a Cavalryman to
  keep the Rear Guard engaged but still highly
  mobile.

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Confederate Analysis

• Offense (Attack)
• Surprise
• Johnston used speed and stealth to move his Army
  to within striking distance of the slumbering
  Union forces. Counter Intelligence created a
  window to surprise the Union forces.
• Concentration
• Johnston massed his firepower on-line, even
  though terrain made this difficult if not
  impossible in places. At the Hornets Nest Bragg
  piece-mealed Brigades and Regiments into the
  Union line without artillery support.
• Tempo
• Johnston used multiple avenues of approach to
  move close to the Union front before deploying.
  Johnston quickly lost the tempo of the attack
  when his forces began pillaging and during the
  multiple attacks on the Hornets Nest. Task
  Organization of Army makes relay of timely orders
  difficult to the Brigade level.
• Audacity
• Johnston chose a plan that had worked
  historically and was full of audacity, he and his
  leadership lacked the ability to execute.
• Rallied troops on the regimental front lines

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Confederate Analysis

• Objective
• In order to destroy the Union forces in the South
  Johnston had to quickly defeat Grant and
  consolidate and reorganize before Buell could
  link up.
• During the attack Johnston felt if he could keep
  the Union from Pittsburg Landing and the Bridge
  at Owl Creek he would carry the day.
• Economy of Force
• As the Confederate forces moves forward Johnston
  chose to put 4 BDEs on line with 5 BDEs online
  directly behind them, this caused excessive rate
  of march problems.
• Simplicity
• Johnston chose a plan that while battle tested
  required technical and tactical excellence to
  execute, traits he and most of his commanders did
  not possess.
• Mass
• At areas like the Hornets Nest the confederates
  failed to mass for combined arms attacks.

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Confederate Analysis

• Unity of Command
• Johnston and Beauregard directly influenced
  commands below the Division level.
• During Day One, the movement forward of
  Confederate forces caused units to become
  intermingled.
• Security
• Johnston relied heavily upon pickets instead of
  using Cavalry to scout the field 1-2 days in
  advance of his main body.
• Surprise
• Johnston tried to use speed and stealth to keep
  his large force hidden on the battlefield.
• Maneuver
• Johnston tried to use the same tactics as
  Napoleon during the Battle of Jena to move his
  force along separate but parallel lines to
  advance quickly across the battlefield.

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Confederate Analysis

• Offense
• Johnston did not use his cavalry to screen and
  scout during his advance or during the night
  following the battle during day one.
• Johnston ordered his Soldiers not to fire on
  enemy forces as they advanced upon the Union
  positions during day one.
• Brigade, Division and Corps integrity quickly
  crumbled during the attack because of dense
  terrain and multiple speeds of march.
• Discipline dissolved during the Confederate
  attack as hungry, tired Soldiers moved through
  the Union camps during the morning fighting.
• Piece-mealing Soldiers against the Union Center
  (Hornets Nest) without artillery support stalled
  the Confederates for over 6 hours and cost 2400
  casualties. This action also severely damaged
  the morale of many units.
• Beauregard halted the fighting at the critical
  moment during day one and then failed to defend
  during the night, a mistake that almost destroyed
  his Army during Day Two.
• Many of the Confederate Officers hoped the Union
  forces would retreat during the night and the
  fight would be finished Hope is never a
  successful COA.
• COL Forrest discovered Buells army crossing the
  river, but his COC failed to act
• Control of force of relied on visual signals,
  which became impossible during the forest
  fighting

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Confederate Analysis

• Initiative
• Generally lacked the ability to think critically
  on the field, tunnel vision (hornets nest) and
  working below the command level (Johnston
  controlling BDEs), was common during this battle.
• Agility
• As a whole the Confederates concentrated on
  destroying all forces in their path rather than
  staying focused on their objectives (cutting off
  the Union escape).
• Depth
• It did not take long for the Confederates to
  commit over 70 of their combat forces on day
  one. Poor use of Artillery during the attack to
  destroy the deadly Union batteries.
• Synchronization
• From non tactical to tactical the Confederates
  were horrible at this during the fight. The
  Confederates were unable to adapt to the thick
  and/or difficult terrain.

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Confederate Significance

• Lost battle
• Allowed the Union Army to Join forces
• Lost the Railroad at Corinth (Major Rail hub)
• Lost key leader (Johnston)
• Short Term Significance
• By allowing the Union Army to join the
  Confederates lost the ability to attack.
• Long Term Significance
• Damaged the morale of the Beauregards Army

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Contemporary Significance
102
- Cavalry Tactics - Casualty Operations -
Defensive Positions - Intelligence and
communication - Command and Control
Contemporary Significance
103
Summary
104
Summary

• Introduction
• Historical Strategic Setting
• Task Organization
• Order of Battle
• Terrain Analysis
• Weapons
• Weather
• Tactical Setting
• Actions of the Battle
• Union Analysis
• Confederate Analysis
• Contemporary Significance
• Summary

105
Conclusion

• The Battle of Shiloh was a significant battle
  early in the Civil War. It fundamentally altered
  the strategic goals of both sides of the Civil
  War. The principles of war are timeless and the
  lessons of reconnaissance, combined arms, and
  pursuit are still relevant today.

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Questions?