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• Ghoshal, Uzzi,
• Barney, Kogut

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• Burt, Granovetter

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14
Two Kinds of Social Capital
1. Bridging (Structural Holes)
Fragmented network with structural holes

• Exploitative Rent
• Rent is a function of disconnection
• between alters
• Individual level only
• Value appropriation
• Asymmetric dependency
• Non-redundant information
• Non-redundant opportunities
• Less constraints
• Distrust
• Selective discrimination
• Theories
• Burts structural holes
• Granovetters Weak Ties

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Two Kinds of Social Capital
2. Binding Cohesive Network

• Composite Rent
• Individual and group levels
• Value creation
• Symbiotic inter-dependence
• Contextual and tacit knowledge
• Non-standard technological transfer
• Trust
• Reduction transaction cost
• Overcoming risk and uncertainty
• Rent is a function of connection
• and synergetic combination with alters
• Theories
• PS Putnams participatory network
• OTGhoshals corporate social capital
• SOC Wellmans network capital

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Structure - Conduct- Performance
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Producer

Resource Segments
Producer and differentiated resource environment
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B
A
F
C
E
D
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Input-Output Data
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Producer i
Producer j

Resource Segments
Structural Equivalence
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3
7
8
4
2
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1
5
6
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Average Position of
Industrial Sectors
(Multiple Classification Analysis
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Structure - Conduct- Performance
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A Causal Model for Industrial Profitability
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OLS Estimates of Israeli Markets Profit Margin
In the Late 1970s Pooled Results
plt.05, plt.01, plt.001
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3 Styles of Structural Embeddedness (Uzzi, 1997
2000)
Embedded Ties
Under-embeddedness Arms length ties
Over-embeddedness Dense Ties Transitive Relations
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Social Capital and Survival
Bridging
Survival
Binding
Expected
Low
High
Density / Transitivity
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A causal model for industrial instability
33
Four Models of OLS Estimates of Israeli
Instability 1976-1986 (Manufacturing Industries)
plt .10, plt.05, plt.01, plt.001
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Imperfect Competition Paradigm Market
Imperfection Competition (free)
Market Share Connections
Price level
Elitist Theory
Political Hierarchy
Collective Bargaining (exclusive)
Political Access Resource Mobilization
Radical Political Economy Supervision
Technology Managerial Power
Labor Dismissal Slack
Wage Level
Perspective
Relevant Structure
Driving Mechanism

Ability to influence Outcome is
modified by Outcome (Rent)
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Does Corporate Rent Trickle Down to Employees? A
Cross-Level Analysis of Industrial Embeddedness
Industry-level data Inter-Industrial
Relations Production attributes Political
Embeddedness Geographic Dispersion
OLS aggregate
HLM
(ln) Earning
Individual-level data labor attributes
(demographics human capital)
OLS individual
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????? N1 7,159 N2 28
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39
Postulates

• Social capital can be studied as a rent
  generator
• Social capital is a function of (1) the social
  structure of the competition, and (2) the
  political organization of the economy
• Rent is the reward on social capital

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Implications for Future Research

• Two contradictory types of social capital
  co-exist with two kinds of rent (coupling
  supplier-customer)
• Future studies on co-production and allocation
  process
• Dynamic rent (changing social base)
• Narrative mechanisms of rent generation
• Collective goods and extended prisoners
  dilemmas in regards to two kinds of rents

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