HIGH LEVEL EUROPEAN ACTION GROUP FOR ATM SAFETY (AGAS)

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HIGH LEVEL EUROPEAN ACTION GROUP FOR ATM SAFETY
(AGAS)
Peter Stastny Head of Safety Regulation Unit
EUROCONTROL
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AGAS Process

• A Strategic Safety Action Plan developed from
• A study to provide an overview of European ATM
  safety
• Four Working Groups
• Implementation of EUROCONTROL Regulations
• Incident reporting data sharing
• ACAS
• Ground-based safety nets.
• Internal EUROCONTROL Action on Oversight,
  Airports Human Factors.
• A European Action Plan for the Prevention of
  Runway Incursions.

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Objective of Safety Overview Study

• To deliver a short term, initial, overview of
  safety related issues of European ATM
• Two central questions were examined
• Does the current achieved level of safety across
  ECAC meet the expectations?
• In the light of existing and planned safety
  efforts, is it likely that the future level of
  safety across ECAC will meet expectations based
  on forecast traffic growth?

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Methodology

• Involve all 41 ECAC States plus MUAC
• Regulators
• Service Providers
• Stakeholders
• 16 Separate Study Areas
• Questionnaire
• Provides comparative data on current position
  which can be analysed statistically
• Telephone Interviews
• Provides comments that identify and qualify key
  issues

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Maturity of States
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Categorisation of States

• With respect to the management of safety in ATM,
  States can be broadly categorised as follows
• Confident Adopters
• They introduced SMS more than five years ago, are
  confident risk assessors and understand their
  safety requirements.
• Willing Developers
• They introduced SMS within the last five years,
  they have made progress in many areas but
  recognise they have some way to go.
• Uncertain Starters
• These are often smaller organisations with an
  uncertain regulator and limited resources, many
  are only now introducing ICAO procedures. They
  have problems understanding what needs to be done
  and how.

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Maturity of States
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Effect of Traffic Volume and Growth
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Observations the Downside

• Two Major Concerns key inhibitors
• Leadership Commitment
• Resources
• Other Issues
• Data reporting and sharing Yes, but
• Needs of Individual States are different
• Access to training in safety management is
  lacking
• Technical Safety Issues confuse even the experts
• ESARR Compliance local solutions Yes, local
  interpretation No
• Effectiveness Appropriateness small
  organisations struggle with one size fits all
  approach

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Observations the Upside

• The following features appear to have helped
  progress
• Starting early. At least 5 years are required for
  a mature SMS
• An organisational culture that embraces proactive
  leadership of Safety/Quality
• The discipline of an ISO9000 certified
  organisation.
• Regional or peer groups that share information
  and provide mutual assistance.
• Being close to EUROCONTROL

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Overall Conclusion

• No information has emerged with respect to the
  management of safety in either the questionnaires
  returned or the interviews conducted that the
  European ATM System is not as safe as reasonably
  practicable.

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But ..
Not all States have comparable Safety Systems and
there is some evidence to suggest that the less
developed States are also the smaller States and
likely to experience the highest growth
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So ..
If there is a correlation between traffic volume
and safety, the risk will increase in those less
developed States and since they already lag
behind in the implementation of formal safety
systems they will require more and special
attention in order to catch up
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Overall Conclusions Rephrased

• There is no evidence that European ATM System is
  currently not as safe as reasonably practicable
• BUT
• Progress on establishing mature SMSs is not
  universal
• Less developed States tend to also be the smaller
  (volume of IFR traffic)
• Less developed States are also predicted to have
  highest growth
• Where smaller units operate independently from
  State ANSPs, progress appears to be slow (TMA,
  Airport)

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So Action is Needed

• To develop leadership and commitment for the
  proactive management of safety
• To develop suitably qualified resources to lead
  the change

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ONE SAFE SKY FOR EUROPE

• A Strategic Safety Action Plan (SSAP) for
  Enhanced ATM Safety in a Single Pan-European Sky
• High Priority Areas
• Safety related human resources in ATM
• Incident reporting and data sharing
• ACAS
• Ground-based safety nets
• Runway safety
• Enforcement of ESARRs and the monitoring of
  their implementation
• Awareness of safety matters
• Safety and human factors research development
  (RD).

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Observations the Upside
PRIORITY AREAS

• Safety-related human resources
• States to provide adequate resources in safety
  management and regulation
• EUROCONTROL to facilitate training in safety
• Incident reporting and Data sharing
• Implement a Just Culture
• Sharing of safety information and lessons learned
• Enhance voluntary reporting

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Observations the Upside
PRIORITY AREAS

• ACAS
• Review documented ACAS provisions (CAA/JAA)
• Requirements for flight-crew training (CAA/JAA)
• ACAS Training for controllers (EUROCONTROL)
• Maintain/expand ACAS monitoring (EUROCONTROL)
• Ground-based Safety Nets
• Mandate STCA, MSAW, APW
• Last-resort voice communications

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Observations the Upside
PRIORITY AREAS

• Runway Safety
• Endorsement of the Action Plan for the
  Prevention of Runway Incursions
• Enforcement of ESARRs/Monitoring
• Develop a strong oversight programme for ESARR
  implementation
• Investigate whether CIP-based or not
• Alignment with ICAO USOAP

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Observations the Upside
PRIORITY AREAS

• Awareness
• Improve awareness on safety issues
• Identify regulatory issues addressing
  cross- border regulation and EASA
• Raise priority of safety at national and regional
  levels
• Safety and HF RD
• Improve the relevance and strategic fit of RD
  activities in these areas.

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EUROPEAN ACTION PLAN FOR THE PREVENTION OF RUNWAY
INCURSIONS

• Core to the recommendations in the European
  Action Plan for Runway Incursion Prevention is
  the uniform application of ICAO provisions at
  those aerodromes that come under the auspices of
  ICAO
• The National Aviation Safety Authority will
  decide upon the strategy for implementation at
  applicable aerodromes within its own state
• The recommendations are mainly generic and it
  will be for the responsible organisations to
  decide specific details, after taking local
  conditions into account
• An annual progress report will be made to the
  Provisional Council.

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But...

• Current proposals require to be further
  elaborated in terms of
• specific actions
• responsibilities
• timescales/milestones
• and these need to be effectively monitored
• Current proposals do not take into consideration
  the report of the BFU into the Uberlingen
  accident

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Observations the Upside
SUMMARY

• AGAS has concluded that
• the development of safety regulation and
  management frameworks is uneven across the ECAC
  area
• sustained delivery of capacity depends on
  sustained investment in ATM safety and actions
  need to be continued over future years
• there are 8 High Priority areas that need to be
  addressed, 5 of which need immediate focus
• an implementation programme together with an
  appropriate implementation monitoring mechanism
  should be established to ensure that safety
  enhancements are put in place and to keep the
  PCand stakeholders advised of progress
• AGAS has completed its task and should now be
  dissolved.

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HIGH LEVEL EUROPEAN ACTION GROUP FOR ATM SAFETY
(AGAS)
Peter Stastny Head of Safety Regulation Unit
EUROCONTROL