Lessons learned on the introduction of the Cluster Approach

1
Lessons learned on the introduction of the
Cluster Approach

• Pakistan earthquake

2
Presentation outline

• Setting the scene
• The Relief effort
• General
• Within the UN
• With the NGOs
• With the Government
• The Transition
• Within the UN
• With the NGOs
• With the Government
• The Early Recovery
• Within the UN
• With the NGOs
• With the Government

3
Setting the Scene

• The size
• 7.6 magnitude Earthquake.
• 73,000 dead (cf approx 200,000 in tsunami)
• 125,000 injured (cf 100,000 in tsunami)
• 3.5 million homeless (c/f 1.5 million tsunami)
• 600,000 homes destroyed (250,000 tsunami)
• Mountainous and freezing terrain
• Handled by one country (3 major impacted in
  tsunami)
• Little immediate international sympathy

4
Setting the Scene

• The result Big Picture
• Cluster system adopted by the humanitarian
  community and the government.
• No second wave of deaths
• No reports of massive duplication or of unmet
  gaps
• 1 million tents, 400,000 emergency shelters, 60
  field hospitals, 2,500 Cuban Doctors.
• Air Operations Cell biggest helicopter airlift
  ever.
• Strategic Oversight Group Full Integration

5
Setting the Scene

• The structures - Humanitarian
• HQ in Islamabad with four field hubs
• Cluster coordination meetings in field hubs and
  Islamabad hence 5 cluster coordinators required
  per sector. For UNICEF, which led 3 sectors, this
  meant 15 coordinators!
• Cluster Heads meeting became the strategic
  decision making body for the international
  community, not the UNCT, IASC CT or GCM

6
Setting the Scene

• The structures Government
• Federal Relief Commission created
• FRC bought into cluster concept and structured
  themselves in a complimentary way
• Military wing was the implementing arm of the
  Federal Relief Commission and quickly learnt the
  culture and capacities of NGOs and UN Agencies.
• Led to non-interfering coordination.

7
The Relief Effort

• General
• Extremely successful on the big picture but
  lack of baseline data made it difficult to
  measure progress the result was over-delivery.
• Within the UN
• Mild improvement in coordination but a lot of
  room for improvement in ToRs, guidelines and
  pre-training of meeting facilitators

8
The Relief Effort

• With the NGOs
• How to herd the cats and incorporate NGO
  strategic thinking? Is Clusters enough? Would
  more be to much (Paralysis by analysis)?
• With the Government
• This is where clusters delivered gold.
• Clear government leadership
• Joint planning and analysis
• Key personal relationships to get over problems
• True and genuine partnership

9
The Relief Effort

• Two points to consider
• The role of the Cluster Heads.
• How does the Cluster Heads forum interact with
  the UNCT and IASC CT?
• Where are strategic decisions made and under what
  authority?

10
The Relief Effort

• Two points to consider
• Non-interfering coordination
• Military learnt quickly that NGOs and UN Agencies
  could not be tasked.
• Rather than tasking, the military observed
  where humanitarians were acting and then
  back-filled gaps.
• Ironically some NGOs then felt there was a lack
  of decision making because they were not
  tasked.
• NGOs remained unaware of how much they were
  coordinated by non-interference.

11
Transition from relief to recovery

• Within the UN
• Closing the clusters a recognised mistake. Less
  coordination results in more fragmentation.
• But how does one transition them?
• When to hand-over from OCHA to UNDP?
• What if UNDP does not pick up the ball?
• With the NGOs
• Closing the clusters meant losing the NGOs
• With the Government
• Key partnerships lost, and coordination
  decreased. In the end the government requested
  for a re-start of the clusters.

12
Transition from relief to recovery
13
The Early Recovery

• Within the UN
• The ERP coordinated by OCHA and the RCO, not by
  UNDP.
• Clearer role needed for UNDP should be
  satisfied by HLP reforms.
• With the NGOs
• Some engaged in ERP some did not. Exit timelines
  and strategies not well known.
• With the Government
• At first luke-warm to ERP, now want it extended.
• Together with UN counterpoints the Working
  Groups or successors to clusters working well,
  and Operations Group, successor to Cluster heads,
  now integrated with government.

14
Summary lessons learned

• Get strong government buy in and preferable align
  government and UN structures to facilitate
  personal and institutional relationships.
• Do not double hat people.
• Cluster coordinators must have coordination
  expertise more so than sectoral expertise.

15
Summary lessons learned

• Must undertake joint analysis and cross sector
  analysis. Cluster Heads forum should do this.
• Joint not shared decision making can be
  facilitated by the clusters.
• Get base-line data if possible, but if not agree
  on key assumptions and move on.
• Clarify roles of
• UNCT
• IASC
• Cluster Heads
• Senior NGOs.

16
Summary lessons learned

• How do you coordinate NGOs? Should ICVA have a
  field presence in major operations?
• Dont close the Clusters. Set them up in advance
  if possible.
• Do Early Recovery planning early.
• Allow key personal relationships to flourish, and
  be flexible with human resources.