INDIA: OUTBREAK OF AVIAN INFLUENZA: Control and Containment

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INDIA OUTBREAK OF AVIAN INFLUENZA Control and
Containment

• Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying
  Fisheries
• Government of India

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Why we are so much talkingabout AI

• Are we over reactive?
• Will Avian Influenza become Pandemic ?

• Why we are so conscious
• about AI

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• The present situation can give rise to another
  influenza pandemic.
• Avian and human influenza viruses can exchange
  genes when a person is simultaneously infected
  with viruses from both species.
• The process of gene swapping inside the human
  body can give rise to a completely new sub-type
  of the influenza virus to which only a few humans
  would have natural immunity.
• If the new virus contains sufficient human genes,
  direct transmission from person to person can
  occur (happens in 1918 1919 in 2 year
• 40 50 million persons died)

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WHY THERE IS A PANIC WORLDWIDE?

• Human immune system will have no pre-existing
  immunity.
• Once a fully contagious virus emerges global
  spread is must.
• Speed volume of international air travel
  infection can reach all countries less than 3
  months.
• 5 150 million people can die.
• No beds will be in the hospital - no antiviral
  drug.
• No people will be available to contain the
  disease.
• Entire economy will collapse.
• Social disruptions will be great.

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History of Avian influenza
1878- Perroncito described serious disease in
chicken in Italy

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• Four recorded outbreaks in the last century

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Pandemics recur 1st in last century
1918-1919 Spanish Flu A (H1N1)
40-50 m. deaths Worldwide. Nearly half were
young, healthy adults
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Spanish Flu 1918-1919
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Deaths due to Influenza in India-1918
Source Annual Report of The Sanitary
Commissioner with the Govt. of India
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Pandemics recur 2nd in last century
1957-1958 Asian Flu (H2N2) 1st identified
in China Feb. 1957
2 million deaths
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Pandemics recur 3rd in last century
1968 Hong Kong Flu
(H3N2)
1-4 million deaths
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4th in last century.

• Present wave commenced in Hong-Kong in 1997

H5, H7
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Latest Situation of AI in poultry

• Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) 71
  countries in four continents since 1997
• 2 in America
• 11 in Africa,
• 30 in Europe
• 28 in Asia

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18 Countries affected with HPAI in 2007

Afghanistan Cambodia
Bangladesh Kuwait
Hong Kong Ghana
Hungary Japan
Laos Myanmar
Pakistan China
Russia Saudi Arabia
Thailand Turkey
United Kingdom Vietnam
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AI in Asia 14 countries in 2007
Afghanistan China,
Cambodia Hong Kong
Japan Laos
Myanmar Pakistan
Vietnam Thailand
Bangladesh Kuwait
Saudi Arabia India
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Countries with confirmed H5N1
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Confirmed cases of H5N1 in human since 2003
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Impact

• Large economic losses to poultry industry
• Over 250 million poultry dead or destroyed
• Loss for upstream and downstream sectors at 15
  of stock
• Additional costs and responsibilities for
  Governments in outbreak countries
• Trade restrictions on outbreak countries
• Negative spillover into other industries eg
  tourism
• Combined loss to GDP at more than USD 10 billion
  to USD 15 billion globally

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Human cases in 12 countries
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Avian Influenza in India

• No case of Avian Influenza (H5 or H7) in India
  till January 2006

• First outbreak on 18th Feb. 2006

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Sequence of Outbreaks
Oubreak I Navapur/Uchchal MAH / GUJ 18th Feb.
Oubreak II Jalgaon, MH and Ichchapur, MP 14thMarch
Oubreak III Imphal, Manipur July, 2007
Oubreak IV Birbhum, D. Dinajpur, 15.01.08
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Endemic neighborhood

• Five countries neighboring India
• Afghanistan,
• Bangladesh,
• Pakistan
• China
• Myanmar

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Pakistan

• Earlier reported H7
• 1st Outbreak of H5N1 in 2006 freedom
• 2nd outbreak of H5N1 on 4th Feb 2007 Punjab
  NWFP poultry, pigeons, parakeets, pheasants,
  peacocks
• Total 35 outbreaks
• 20 outbreaks in 2007

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Bangladesh

• H5N1 reported on March 30th 2007
• Recent outbreak on 13th May 2007
• 30 outbreaks
• Affected areas very close to West Bengal
• Downplaying the situation
• Porous border
• Sale of cheap poultry and poultry products a
  cause for concern
• 1 crore poultry along WB border

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Afghanistan

• 1st outbreak in March 2006
• 2nd outbreak in February 2007
• 22 outbreaks in all

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China

• 1st reported on 27th January 2004
• Last outbreak reported on 1st March 2007
• China has not been free since 2004
• 87 reported outbreaks
• H5N1 reported in wild/ migratory birds in Qinghai
  lake in Tibet area
• Subtypes continue to emerge
• Situation not under control 2005
• Mass vaccination of poultry
• Human cases 24/15

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Myanmar

• 1st outbreak reported in March 2006
• Recent outbreak in February 2007
• 86 outbreaks in all
• Porous border

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3 Major flyways of migratory birds

• may be the cause?

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Flyways of migratory birds
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Research findings of Bhopal

• Introduction of infection through migratory birds
• Vietnam-Thailand-Malaysia lineage in Navapur
  virus
• Virus of high pathogenicity
• Highly virulent to mammals
• Potentiality to adapt to mammals
• Sensitive to Tamiflu

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Flyways of migratory birds
Large number of water bodies and sanctuaries
are located in the country
Source www.mapsofindia.com
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Key wintering areas of migrating waterbirds in
India
Source www.kolkatabirds.com
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Etiology

• Viral disease, member of Orthomyxoviridae
• A - BIRDS, MAMMALS
• (including humans, pigs, horses,
  mink, sea mammals etc)
• B HUMANS
• C HUMANS, PIGS

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Avian Influenza Hosts

• AIV can infect a variety of domestic wild avian
  species (including chickens, turkeys, ducks,
  domestic geese, quail, pheasants, psittacines,
  gulls, shorebirds, emu others). Clinical
  manifestation of infection ranges from
  asymptomatic infection to rapidly fatal disease
• Aquatic birds, particularly ducks, shore birds
  gulls are considered the natural reservoirs for
  AIV These waterfowl generally do not develop
  disease when infected with AI viruses.
  Asymptomatically infected domestic ducks are
  shedding more H5N1 to domestic poultry

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TRANSMISSION

• Direct contact with infected birds secretions,
  faeces.
• Airborne virus can spread from bird to bird
  when inhaled.
• Droppings from infected wild bird both in
  commercial backyard poultry.
• Contaminated feed, water, equipment, vehicles,
  cages, clothing and shoes.
• Feet and body of the animals i.e. rodents
  acts as mechanical vectors.
• Clinically normal waterfowl sea birds.
• Contaminated broken eggs.
• 1 gm. contaminated manure can infect 1 m.
  birds.

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CLINICAL SIGNS

• Incubation period 3-5 days.
• Severe depression, inappetence.
• Drastic decline in egg production.
• Facial oedema with swollen cyanotic combs
  wattles.
• Petechial haemorrhages on internal membrane
  surfaces.

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CLINICAL SIGNS

• Sudden death (100 mortality)
• Neurological signs
• Lack of energy and appetite
• Swelling of head, eyelids,comb, wattles and legs
• Purple discoloration of thewattles and combs
• Nasal discharge
• Coughing and sneezing
• Diarrhoea from greenish to white

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SYMPTOMS IN HUMANS
Fever, Sneezing, Cough, Sore throat, Muscle
aches, Eye infections, Pneumonia
Severe Respiratory distress.
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Action Plan of Government of India to combat
Outbreak of Bird Fluin India
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• The Action Plan Constitutes
• Pre-outbreak preparedness
• Steps to be taken in case of suspicion of
  outbreak of bird flu
• Action Plan in case outbreak of HPAI is
  confirmed.
• Bio Security Measures, Advice to persons handling
  HPAI infected poultry etc.

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I. Pre-outbreak preparedness
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• I.1. Surveillance Need to be in a state of
  alertness and preparedness
• Surveillance to include both poultry and
  migratory birds
• Poultry owner is responsible for reporting
  unusual mortality and sickness
• Routine Surveillance
• Population density of poultry birds in each
  tahsil both in backyard and commercial.
• Fly-way of migratory birds.
• Existence of wild-life sanctuaries/National Parks
  / water bodies visited by migratory / wild birds.
• Population of ducks/ geese etc acting as virus
  carriers.
• Active and targeted surveillance (detection
  reporting in 24 hrs.)
• Mortality more than 5 of bird population in a
  commercial poultry in 48 hours time can be taken
  as unusually high mortality

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• Immediate response to unusual sickness and
  mortality
• In addition to the poultry owner the field
  veterinary institution shall ensure the
  detection and reporting of any unusual mortality
  or sickness in 24 hours.
• Regular visit to high density poultry unit both
  in commercial and backyard.
• The entire machinery of Animal Husbandry/
  Veterinary Department in a state of full
  alertness and preparedness.
• All veterinary Officers in the District
  (Government/ Semi government / Private) report to
  CVO/DAHO immediately by FAX, E-mail/Phone in case
  there is a mortality above average or unusual
  sickness which can not readily diagnosed in
  poultry and in wild and migratory birds.
• Similar action by forest officials to senior
  Forest officer and Animal Husbandry Department
• Integration of strategy for surveillance of
  poultry and wild/migratory birds

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II. STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A SUSPICION OF
OUTBREAK OF BIRD FLU
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II.1. CVO/DAHO TO VISIT SITE IMMEDIATELY ON
RECIEPT OF PRELIMINARY INFORMATION

• On receipt of information of unusual or above
  average mortality
• CVO/DAHO along with DIO equipped with Kit
  should visit the site within 24hrs
• Conduct preliminary and clinical investigations
  and collect required samples for laboratory
  analysis

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II.2. Preliminary and clinical investigations by
DIO

• Wear protective gear and equipment for DIO.
• Information to be collected
• Identification of the specific unit of the farm
  and its subunits including topography of the farm
• Number of birds and other animals on the farm
• Identification of staff and vehicles directly
  involved with the unit
• Recent movement of people, equipment, vehicles
  and animals/birds
• Availability of disinfectants and equipments for
  disinfecting the premises on site

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II.3. IDENTIFICATION OF ALERT ZONE
An area of 10 Kms radius from the affected place
should be identified as the alert zone. All
villages and habitations with in that area
should be identified. Panchayat authorities,
civil and veterinary staff in those areas should
be alerted about the possibility of avian flu and
requested to strictly enforce the restrictions
stated
10Kms
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II.4. RESTRICTIONS TO BE ENFORCED AT THE ALERT
ZONE PENDING RECIEPT OF TEST REPORTS

• Pending receipt of the results, the entire
  suspected farm should be cordoned and following
  restrictions should be immediately enforced in
  the farm and in the alert zone.

• 1. No vehicles to be allowed to come in
• and out of the affected farm premises.
• 2. No movements of poultry, eggs, dead
• carcass, manure, used litter, farm machinery,
  equipments or any such material should allowed
  within the alert zone and to outside the zone
• 3. Disinfection procedures should be strictly
  applied at the entrance of premises.

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• 4. The farm personnel should wear protective
  clothing all the time inside the farm, including
  face masks and gloves, gumboots etc.
• 5. While leaving the farm premises, farm
  personnel should leave the protective clothing
  etc. at the farm and clean themselves thoroughly
  with suitable disinfectants.
• 6. Movement of people to and from the suspected
  farm to be restricted. No other animals should be
  allowed in the farm.
• 7. Inter-sectional movements of farm personnel to
  be banned. They should not visit any other
  poultry farm, bird sanctuary, zoo etc.
• 8. All records of birds present at the farm are
  to be maintained properly.
• 9. The possibility of closing the markets and
  shops in the area may be explored in
  consultations with revenue authorities, if more
  farms become suspect during this period.

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• The poultry farmers at the suspected site to be
  informed about the restrictions and asked them to
  comply with the same.
• Pending receipt of results, CVO/DAHO should
  arrange to record the mortality or sickness of
  birds at the suspected site and in the alert
  zone.
• During this period the information also to be
  collected about individual total poultry
  population those who keeping more than 100 birds
  in the alert zone (separately in a radius of 0-3
  Kms and 3-10 kms from the suspected site).
• Actions by Forest Department in bird sanctuaries
  etc as indicated in paras II.1 to II.7.

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III. ACTION PLAN IN CASE OUTBREAK OF HPAI IS
CONFIRMED
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III.1. IMPLEMENTION OF CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES
UNDER CO-ORDINATION OF DISTRICT COLLECTOR/DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER

• Once the occurrence of NAI is confirmed all
  contingency procedures for containment and
  eradication of NAI to be implemented at once.
• The responsibility of this shall vest with the
  District Collector/Deputy Commissioner with
  technical assistance of Animal Husbandry, Human
  Health and Forest Departments.
• CVO/DAHO act as the supervisor officer for
  operations on the animal health side.

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• Conduct of operations in
• Outbreak areas in India ---
• A pictorial sequence
• on the line of Action Plan

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III.2. Pre-requisites to launch operations

• Control Room
• RRTs
• Personal Protective
• Equipment (PPE)
• Antiviral drug (Oseltamivir)

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Control Room
Control room becomes the nerve centre for the
entire operations against the disease
The Nerve Centre
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Essentials

• Telephone with STD
• Fax Machine
• Computer with internet access
• Secretarial assistance
• 24 hour operation
• Designated officer (s)
• Information capacity to communicate

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Logistic Support

• JCBs, Trucks Tempos etc.
• Jeeps cars
• Suction cum jetting machine
• Fogging Machine, Flame Guns, LPG cylinder, Blower
• Spray pumps, fogging machine
• Spade, groom
• Plastic gunny bags, plastic sheets
• Diesel, kerosene, fire wood, coal
• Gum boot, extra gloves, masks, shoe covers
• Vaccinator, syringes needles
• Casual labourers

• Disinfectants
• Calcium hydroxide
• Sodium hydroxide
• Sodium hypochlorite
• Formalin, phenyle, KMn04
• Bleaching powder
• Quick Slack Lime
• Sodium Phenobarbital
• Alpha chlorazole

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RAPID RESPONSE TEAMS (RRTs)

• Animal Husbandry RRTs - responsible for
  operations of culling, disposal, vaccinating,
  supervising and undertaking clean up and
  disinfection etc.
• State Govt. should ensure
• Total nos. of RRTs based on poultry population
• Composition of RRTs vary as per the task
• Min. time required to mobilize RRTs to the site
• Deployment of RRTs- detailed plan
• Man power may be required from other districts

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RRTs

• Veterinary and Para-veterinary Staff
• Train all vet/paravets in control and containment
• Develop capacity to lead and supervise
• Ensure and emphasize individual safety
• After operation responsibility quarantine,
  self-observation, surveillance

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PPE- most consumed item

• 2 kinds of kits
• N-95 is a must for cullers/persons in direct
  operations
• Stock reserves of PPE
• Keep supply chain open with capacity to supply
  quickly in emergency

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In the morning of the day of operation
Use of PPE

• RRTs were trained to use of PPE.
• Single use item No PPEs shall be used twice.
• Shall be burned or buried after use.
• No entry in the farms or start of operation
  without wearing of PPE.
• Farmers were requested to co-operate with the
  Government machinery for culling the birds.
• Farmers were informed about the rate of
  compensation mode of payment as soon as the
  Panchnama is ready.

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BRIEFING
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Very large quantities used up in operations
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III.3. DECLARATION OF INFECTED AND SURVEILLANCE
AREAS
10Km RADIUS SURVEILLANCE ZONE (VACCINATION)
IMMIDEATE REPORTING

• Sign boards in
• local language
• Names of all
• villages, habitat,
• poultry
• population, no.
• of farms in that area

5Km RADIUS INFECTED ZONE
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ONCE HPAI IS REPORTED FOLLOWING STEPS TO BE
INITIATED

• ABSOLUTE BAN ON MOVEMENT OF POULTRY AND ITS
  PRODUCTS (movement of poultry/ products/ farm
  personnel from and to infected area)
• CLOSURE OF POULTRY AND EGG MARKETS/ SHOPS IN 10
  KM. RADIUS (assistance of Revenue and municipal/
  Panchayat authorities)
• BAN ON MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES PERSONS AND
  DISINFECTION OF THE SAME (farm personnel in 10 km
  area should not allow to visit other poultry
  farm)
• RESTRICT ACCESS TO WILD STRAY BIRDS
• (All steps to be taken to ensure that wild and
  stray birds
• do not have access to the poultry, poultry
  sheds and water
• supplies in the infected area)

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Quarantine Restrict access to infected
premises Jalgaon- village
Navapur-station and
bus-stand shifted
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Quarantine to reduce further spread control
over the movement of personnel's vehicles
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Physical survey of the area of operation
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Physical survey of the area of operation
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Physical survey of the area of operation
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Physical survey of the area of operation
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Outcome of Physical Survey Navapur

• Cleaning of the farms was not being undertaken
  regularly
• Hygienic conditions of most farms were poor
• Huge quantities of solid, semi-solid, liquid
  fecal material, feathers and other waste
  material lying unattended
• Farmers un-co-operative

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Outcome of Physical Survey Jalgaon outbreak

• Largely backyard, free-roaming poultry
• Villages ranged from clean to very dirty
• Larger deployment of manpower as
• poultry spread over
• Quicker operation as lesser birds
• Clean-up spread over but not as time
• consuming as in Navapur
• Co-operative locals?

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III.4. Destruction of birds

• The entire stock of diseased and in-contact birds
  to be destroyed.
• Stamp out all birds in the infected zone of 5 km.
  radius and surveillance zone of 5-10 km. radius
• Destruction in presence of designated officer,
  concerned local authorities i.e. revenue
  department, municipality, panchayet etc. for
  determining the compensation to be paid.

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DEPOPULATION

• The depopulation and disposal of infected birds
  must be done in quickest possible time to prevent
  spread of infection

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Culling more than 14.5 lakh birds killed
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Culling The birds were sedated with sodium
phenobarbital mixed with water. The medicated
water was supplied to the birds in the morning
kept at over-night fasting at least 3-4hrs prior
to culling
Sodium Pheno Barbital, Alpha chlorazole
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Culling review required for quicker,
mass-killing alternatives on commercial farms
Decapitation and dislocation of neck
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Culling public announcement not to release birds
in morning panchayats involved common disposal
ground identified in villages birds collected by
veterinarians in morning cash for bird
tremendous response
Different Strategy For Backyard poultry
Poultry owners were advised to observe
precautions such as cover face, nose etc. while
dealing with birds.
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Backyard poultry sites for disposal identified
by panchayat
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III.5.DisposalTwo methods burn or bury

• Dispose birds, eggs/trays, sacks, feathers,
  feed/feed ingredients, fecal material, manure
  etc.
• All non-disinfectable, biodegradable material
  (wood, card board) must be buried along with the
  birds.
• Burning material requirements higher
  Approximately 5 quintals of wood per 100 dead
  birds, bury ash, remains etc. burn well
• Burying dig deep dumped material be kept below
  ground level
• No access of rodents or stray animals to the
  burial place. Site to be suitably marked and
  should not be opened for at least 5 years.

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Safe Disposal of Birds
Lime 5-6 bags of in 2 x 2 mtr pit cover with
40 cm. earth layers

• Deep trenches
• dug by JCBs
• also used in Jalgaon
• even though poultry
• is backyard.
• Pit size
• 2 mtr.x 2 mtr. x 2 mtr.
• - 1800 fully grown birds
• 3000 birds by making
• the deep 1 mtr. More

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Disposal killed birds were buried into pits
dug by JCBs
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Disposaleggs destroyed and buried with egg trays
etc. more than 16.67 lac eggs destroyed
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Disposal of feed and feed materials

• Infected material
• Feed manufacturing units within poultry farm
• More than 8500 MT burnt and buried in Navapur
  Uchhhal

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Disposal of feed and feed materials
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Disposal of feed and feed materials
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Disposal of feed and feed materials
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Disposal of other material PPE
PPE burnt on each farm on exit by each person
from each farm
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Disposal Clean up Solid and wet litters
Commercial farms
Major activityFarms are largely two-tier
structures.
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Disposal Clean upCommercial farms
Upper storey has bird cages and support systems
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Disposal Clean upCommercial farms
Lower storey is dump ground for fecal matter
slurried due to water leakage from bird water
systems
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Disposal Clean upCommercial farms
Physically impossible to enter clean
up.Difficult to access lower storey due to
low height

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Disposal of Solid Litters
laborious work not possible manually
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Disposal digging of pit for disposal of solid
litters
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Disposal of solid litters Commercial farms
Sheds cleaned manually thereafter

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Disposal material carried out manually for
disposal from farms/villages
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Disposal Clean upWet Litter Commercial farms
Many farms were in this situation especially in
MH.
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Disposal Clean up Wet Litter Commercial farms
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Disposal Clean upWet Litter Commercial
farms
Jetting suction machines deployed
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Disposal Clean upWet Litter Commercial farms

Liquid material pumped out
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Disposal Clean up pits covered by earth and
limed
Alternate layers of earth and lime to pack it
well
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Disposal Clean up pits covered with plastic
sheets
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Feather disposal
laborious work not possible manually
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Feather disposal
Flame guns purchased and used operated by LPG
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Feather disposal
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Feather disposal
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III.6. DISINFECTION CLEAN UP

• All units physically or functionally connected to
  the establishment (i. e, hatchery , egg storage
  rooms, packaging rooms , egg trolleys , egg
  product plants) must be disinfected.
• Vehicles used for transporting live animals, eggs
  animal feed to be disinfected.
• Washing disinfection of walls, floors ceiling
  of the infected establishments. All equipment
  inside the house such as drink food hoppers
  must be washed treated with a disinfectant for
  at least 48 hours.
• Water reservoirs must be emptied, washed
  disinfected.
• Feed tanks need to be emptied, washed with a hot
  water pressure pump subsequently fumigated.
• After washing disinfecting, all units must be
  fumigated twice with at least two weeks between
  fumigation.

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LIST OF ACTIVE DISINFECTANTS

• Wash floors and walls with calcium hydroxide
• (3 solution)
• Spray of bleaching powder lime in floors of
  sheds and farm area
• White-wash of concrete and bricked area with lime
• Spray 4 formalin over area
• Treat equipment with sodium hypochlorite solution
  (2) for 48 hours
• KMnO4 mixed in water tanks etc
• Close chamber fumigated with KMnO4 formalin

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Disinfecting Spraying Commercial Poultry
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Disinfecting Spraying Commercial Poultry
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Disinfecting Spraying Commercial Poultry
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Disinfecting Spraying Commercial Poultry
Foggers provided by GOI. Sprayers to be
provided by State Govt.
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Disinfecting Spraying Commercial Poultry
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Disinfecting Spraying Backyard Poultry

• Different strategy
• Heavily populated villages in Jalgaon
• Complete culling in village before starting
  clean-up
• Burn baskets/egg trays/litter/feed and all the
  poultry in 10 km radius
• Bury the eggs
• Remove, burn all litter from permanent cages and
  clean the cages
• Burn garbage around poultry keeping area
• Whitewash the houses 3km/10km

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Disinfecting Spraying Backyard Poultry

• Spray all houses in 0-3 km
• Spray poultry rearing houses and yards in 3-10 km
  zone
• Spray all damp areas/drains with 4 formalin
• Formalin not to be used in inhabited areas due to
  irritation to humans
• Alternatives Trilocid Concentrate, Virkon-S,
  Sodium hypochlorite
• Sprinkle lime on the roads, streets etc in all
  the villages under the operation

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Cleaning of cages
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Burning of baskets/egg trays/litter/feed
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Spray in poultry rearing houses
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Sprinkle lime on the roads, streets etc
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Sanitized farms
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Sanitized farms
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Sanitized farms
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Sanitized farms
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Sanitized farms
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Sanitized farms
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Poultry owners to be responsible for clean up and
disinfection

• States may consider that clean up and
  disinfection is the responsibility of the poultry
  owners under the supervision of
  veterinarians/Para veterinarians.
• Because they are responsible to maintain minimum
  standards of hygiene.

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Sealing of farms
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Sealed farms
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III.7. Post operation Surveillance Protocol
(POSP) freedom from disease

1. Issue of sanitization certificate
2. Intensive physical surveillance of operational
   area No poultry to be re-stocked for 3 months
3. Surveillance of adjoining area for 3 months 5 km
   zone clinical, serological, virological
4. Disease-free if no sample tests positive and no
   outbreak of Avian
   Influenza.
5. Fumigation and spraying every 15 days
6. Maintain vigil

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III.8. Restocking of poultry in farms

• After the POP, the farms were allowed to re-stock
  by keeping sentinel birds for 21 days
• 50 shed capacity 8000 or 10,000 brooder/grower
• 100 - shed capacity more than above
• 0 day - serum sample from 5 birds per shed
• 12 day - cloacal/pharyngeal/nasal swabs. One
  pooled sample of 5 birds.
• 21 day Serum sample from the same birds.
• Any mortality
• If owner does not follow restocking protocol, he
  will not be allowed to restock the birds.

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III.9. Compensation

More than Rs. 3 crore paid.
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COMPENSATION TO BE PAID FOR FORCED CULLING

• For effective control of the disease, adequate
  compensation to poultry farmers is essential.
• Advisable to involve District Collectors for
  minimizing the chances of misuse in disbursement
  of compensation.

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Quarantine of RRTs and labor after active
engagement for 10 days
Issues of catering and labor wages for
Quarantine Period
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IV. Bio Security Measures, Advice to persons
handling HPAI infected poultry etc.
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IV.1. MEDIA BRIEFING BY OFFICIAL SPOKESPERSON

• In order to avoid spreading panic both in terms
  of public and distress selling by poultry
  farmers, clear and precise briefing of the media
  should be made regularly by a designated official
  spokesperson of the state Govt.
• The notification, instruction to be followed and
  information in terms of human consumption of
  poultry products should be announced through
  media
• Unauthorized persons should be discouraged from
  voicing opinion in the media which is left to the
  experts identified by state Govt. for HPAI

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IV.2. Bio-security measures
The best way to control HPAI by preventing to
exposure to virus imposing strict bio-security
measures

• Keep distance
• Keep cleanliness
• Do not let the disease enter the farm
• Know the signs
• Report sick bird
• Guidelines for farm personnel

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IV.3. PUBLIC AWARENESS

• Awareness in the general pubic about the disease
  and its consequences should be made through
  printed mass media campaigns based on
  scientific facts figures
• The media people should also be invited to
  awareness campaigns to report the things in the
  right perspective.

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Campaign to reduce panic fear amongst public
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IV.4. ADVICE ABOUT CONTACT WITH POULTRY IN AN
AREA WITH HPAI

• People should avoid contact with chickens, ducks
  or other poultry even if the birds are thought to
  be healthy.
• Children - no contact with poultry or any
  affected birds.
• Avoid handling (live or dead) chickens, ducks or
  any other poultry while visiting friends or
  family
• Avoid contact with chicken farms, duck farms or
  any farm sick birds, killed or are thought to
  have bird flu.
• If a person comes in contact with an environment
  that has had sick/dead chickens, ducks and other
  poultry, he/she must wash hands well and monitor
  temperature for 4 days, consult a doctor.
• If he/she develops high temperature, consult
  doctor to see if treatment is needed.

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IV.5. PRECAUTIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN BY ALL THOSE
INVOLVED IN THE SLAUGHTERING OF AFFECTED BIRDS

• Cullers should be provided with appropriate PPE
  and should disinfect their hands after the
  operation.
• All persons who have been in close contact with
  the infected animals should wash their hands
  frequently.
• Environmental clean up should be carried out in
  areas of culling.
• All persons exposed to infected chickens or to
  farms under suspicion should be under close
  monitoring by local health authorities.

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IV.6. RAISING POULTRY AT HOME IN AN AREA AFFECTED
WITH HPAI

• He/she should know what to do if and when they
  are killed or die. He/she should know how to
  dispose of them and clean up the yard/pen, etc.
• In contact with poultry, shed/pen or anything
  with faeces on it, make sure he/she is protected
  by a mask, goggles, gown, rubber boots and
  gloves. If not available, use a cloth around
  the mouth and nose, plastic bags to cover the
  hands and shoes, over-all that can be washed etc.
• After the work remove all the protective apparel
  and wash hands, clothes and if possible the body.
  A shower is the best option. If possible wash
  clothes in hot or warm soapy water and hand them
  in the sun to dry. Discard gloves, plastic bags
  and any other disposable materials. Clean all
  reusable items such as rubber boots and glasses.

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CONCLUSION

1. Export of eggs and DOC was totally stopped.
2. At higher temperature virus does not survive in
   the environment.
3. It is not a food borne disease.
4. Cooking of the meat and eggs will destroy the
   virus.
5. No human to human transfer.

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Future course..
Surveillance work has to be taken up on top
priority basis --- Must continue.
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Presented byDr.D.BiswasRegional Quarantine
Officer, AQCS, Kolkata Department of Animal
Husbandry, Dairying FisheriesGovernment of
India
Thank you