Unfree Labour: A New Approach to an Old Problem

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Unfree Labour A New Approach to an Old Problem

• Diane F. Frey
• London School of Economics
• Development Studies Association
• 8 November 2008

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(No Transcript)
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Introduction

• Background
• 1.3 million victims
• 25 involve trafficking
• 75 economic exploitation

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Theoretical Framework

• Institutions (North, Helmke Levitsky)
• Formal (rulesenforcementinterpretation)
•  Informal (normssocial conventions)
• Compliance Theory (Koh)
• Human Rights Conventions as Benchmarks
• Internalisation (legislative, judicial,
  political and social)

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ILO Forced Labour Convention 29 (1930)

• Prohibits all work or service which is ex-acted
  under menace or any penalty for which said person
  has not offered himself voluntarily
• Exceptions
• Military service
• Normal civic obligations
• Prison labour
• Emergency, calamity
• Minor communal services
• Overtime within limits of legislation or
  contract

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Methodology Sources of documentary evidence
ILO, UN
U.S State Dept
NGOs ITUC
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Methodology

• 1. Divide evidence by form of forced labour
• 2. Analyze as institutional components
• 3. Compare outcomes to compliance benchmarks
• 4. Match compliance interventions to
  institutional arrangements

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Institutional Dimensions

• Effectiveness of formal institutions
• Interaction between formal and informal
  institutions
• Interactions with institutions in other spheres
  of social life

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Example Obligatory Overtime

• Obligatory overtime violates Convention 29 if
• it exceeds legislative or collectively bargained
  limits, and
• meets one of the two following criteria
• 1. Threat of dismissal
• 2. Means to earn the minimum wage

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Honduras and Nicaragua

• Widespread disregard of national work-time limits
• Dismissals for refusals in Honduras but not in
  Nicaragua
• Distinctive institutional pathways

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Effectiveness of Formal Institutions

• Nicaragua
• Contradictory rules
• Inspectors and judges side with employers
• Weak enforcement

• Honduras
• Broad exceptions written into rules
• Lack of sanctions for violations
• Slow complaint procedures
• Lack of enforcement

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Interactions with Informal Institutions

• Nicaragua
• Worker acceptance of employer demands
• Workers do not challenge and even volunteer

• Honduras
• Extreme forms of coercion (dismissal, physical)
• High workload volumes/production quotas
• Obligatory OT as new modern idea

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Interactions Among Institutions

• Nicaragua
• Low salaries
• Employer discretion
• Market fluctuations

• Honduras
• Low salaries
• Monetary policy and currency fluctuations
• Economic development policy includes labour
  enforcement concessions

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Conclusions

• Limits of the ILO Convention
• Shortcomings of institutions can be matched with
  compliance interventions
• Interventions must be multiple and mutually
  reinforcing across institutions
• Interventions must challenge institutional
  influences counter to human rights obligations