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UNRESTRICTED. I&C Concepts for an On-line Regional Overpower Protection (ROP) ... flow partially bypasses fuel, lower CCP. reactor power limited by ROP trip set point ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: I


1
IC Concepts for an On-line Regional Overpower
Protection (ROP) System for CANDU Reactors
Presented by B. Sur
  • Collaborators
  • V. Mihaylov, H.W. Hinds,
  • V. Anghel, G. Jonkmans,
  • D. Wallace, V. Caxaj, F. Laratta

IAEA Technical Meeting on Increasing Power Output
and Performance of NPPs by Improved IC Systems,
29 - 31 May 2007, Prague, Czech Republic.
2
Outline
  • Background
  • Instrumentation
  • Concepts for improvements
  • Issues and challenges
  • CANDU Reactors
  • Need and Requirements for ROP System
  • In-core sensors, control and shutdown devices
  • ROP Trip chain instrumentation
  • Digital IC implementation
  • On-Line flux shape monitoring
  • Digital Safety System Qualification
  • Risk

3
CANDU (Canada Deuterium Uranium) Reactors
  • Large core numerous critical flux shapes,
    possibility of localized flux shape distortions
  • Regional Overpower Protection (ROP) needed

4
Regional Overpower Protection (ROP) System
  • ROP uses in-core flux detector signals to
    shutdown reactor before any fuel reaches dryout
    (Critical Channel Power or CCP)
  • After 20 years service, for existing stations
  • fuel channel diametrical creep
  • flow partially bypasses fuel, lower CCP
  • reactor power limited by ROP trip set point
  • ROP system first implemented in Bruce A (4 x 800
    MWe) units early 1980s
  • Darlington (4 x 935 MWe) is only CANDU station
    with computerized ROP system

5
CANDU In-core Instrumentation
Shut-off Mechanical Control Absorber Rods
Vertical ROP Flux Detectors (SDS1)
HorizontalROP Flux Detectors (SDS2)
Liquid Zone Controllers
(Adjuster Rods)
Ion Chambers
Poison Injection Nozzles
Vanadium Flux Detectors
6
ROP detector trip chain (One of 60)
Manually adjustable 2 time constants, gains
7
Current ROP Methodology
  • Determination of Trip set-points (TSP) performed
    off-line, every 2-4 years and requires
  • 1000 standard case-sets of reactor flux shapes
    (channel powers, flux detector readings),
  • Thermalhydraulics code to calculate Critical
    Channel Power (CCP)
  • Probabilistic code to calculate TSP with
    stringent availability requirements for SDS1
    SDS2
  • Detector gain adjustments for normal flux shape
    variations performed daily
  • Reactor Physics code T/H code used offline
  • Calculate Channel Power Peaking Factor (CPPF)

8
Analog electronics-based ROP system
9
Fully automated digital IC ROP concept
10
Benefits Improved Performance
  • Automated TSP download and tracking
  • Automated detector gain adjustments and tracking
  • Automated on-line trip testing
  • On-line signal validation
  • Improved dynamic response correction
  • Automatic adjustments and tracking of dynamic
    response parameters
  • Reduced operations and maintenance costs,
    improved reliability

11
Benefit Increased Power Output
  • Current trip set-points reflect the margin
    required to protect against any possible flux
    shape
  • An on-line flux-mapping approach, on the other
    hand, calculates a trip set-point which is based
    on the instantaneous configuration of the reactor
  • Still protected for events which have a low
    probability of occurrence, but not penalized
    during normal operations
  • Increased margin-to-trip from an on-line
    (computer based) ROP trip system

12
Assessment of set-point increase
D.J. Wallace, V. Caxaj, A.S. Seidu, W. Hartmann,
B. Sur and A. McDonald , Advanced On-Line
Regional Overpower Surveillance (AOL-ROS) System
Development 5th ITM on NPICHMI Albuquerque, NM,
Nov 12-16, 2006
13
Digital Safety System Qualification
Usage of international standards IEC 61508 safety
critical systems IEC 61513 nuclear safety
systems IEC 62138 software lifecycle IEC 61131
programming languages
Safety Integrity Level 3 (SIL-3) certifiable
hardware (PLC, DCS, PSS) and certified software
libraries available ABB, Siemens, Triconex,
RTP, Pilz,
14
Risks / Challenges
  • Current Canadian regulatory standards are
    evolving from OH AECL Software Evaluation
    Standard (OASES)
  • Stations must be convinced of cost / benefit
    ratio of digital retrofit
  • history of safety system software projects
  • risk of new system not licensable
  • risk of new system not performing as expected
  • phased approach? Initially install On-Line
    Regional Overpower Surveillance system

15
Status of Digital ROP Development
  • Alternatives for on-line flux-shape monitoring
    algorithms being evaluated
  • Further analysis of real plant data underway to
    refine understanding of ROP margin gain by
    on-line flux-shape monitoring
  • Generic requirements and program specifications
    being developed for retrofitting digital ROP to
    existing CANDU plants
  • New CANDU reactors will have digital ROP systems

16
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