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A Stochastic Pursuit-Evasion Game with no Information Sharing

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Title: A Stochastic Pursuit-Evasion Game with no Information Sharing


1
A Stochastic Pursuit-Evasion Game with no
Information Sharing
  • Ashitosh Swarup
  • Jason Speyer
  • Johnathan Wolfe
  • School of Engineering and Applied Science
  • UCLA

2
Introduction
  • The game considered here is the LQG stochastic
    pursuit-evasion game.
  • Deterministic version of this game was studied by
    Ho, Bryson and Baron.
  • The case in which both players process their own
    noisy measurements was studied by Willman.
  • We continue investigating this class of games.

3
Willmans Approach
  • Attempted to find strategies in which each
    players control is an assumed linear function of
    his entire observation history.
  • Optimizing the cost function resulted in a set of
    implicit equations for the control gains.
  • No closed form solution shown for implicit
    equations results were obtained numerically for
    up to 3 stages.

4
Our Objective
  • Examine conditions under which closed form linear
    and/or nonlinear optimal solutions exist.
  • Willman sets up an LQG problem and states an
    optimality result without proof. We use dynamic
    programming to derive conditions for optimal
    controllers.
  • If possible, eliminate the need to smooth over
    each players entire observation sequence
    (dimensionality constraint).

5
Problem Setup
  • System Dynamics given by
  • x(i1)x(i)Gpu(i)-Gev(i)q(i)
  • Subscripts p and e refer to pursuer and evader
    respectively.
  • The pursuers and opponents controls are u and v
    respectively.
  • q is Gaussian white, (0,Q), x(0) is Gaussian,
    (x0,P0), statistics of q and x(0) a priori known
    to both players.

6
Problem Setup (contd.)
  • The players receive noisy measurements
  • zp(i)Hpx(i)wp(i)
  • ze(i)Hex(i)we(i)
  • Each player has no information about his
    opponents observation, but knows his opponents
    noise statistics.
  • wp Gaussian white, (0,Rp).
  • we Gaussian white, (0,Re).
  • Both players start off with common a priori
    estimate of the initial state x(0).

7
Problem Setup (contd.)
  • Observation Histories
  • Zp(i)f zp(j), j0,..,i g
  • Ze(i)f ze(j), j0,..,i g
  • Cost function
  • J(u,v)E Sfx(n),x(n)?0n-1(Bu(i),u(i)-Cv(i),
    v(i))
  • Pursuer minimizes the cost function while evader
    maximizes.

8
Saddle Point Condition
  • Finding optimal controls involves solving the
    following saddle-point inequality
  • J(u,vo) J(uo,vo) J(uo,v)
  • Optimize person-by-person by solving the
    following inequalities
  • J(uo,vo) J(uo,v)
  • J(u,vo) J(uo,vo)

9
The One-Stage Game
  • Cost function
  • J(u,v)E Sfx(1),x(1)Bu(0),u(0)-Cv(0),v(0)
  • Optimize to get expressions for uo(0) and vo(0).
  • Assume a linear functional form of the controls
  • uo(0)?u?ux0?uzp(0)
  • vo(0)?v?vx0?vze(0)
  • Solving for the coefficients using the equations
    derived previously gives ?u?v0, and nonzero
    values for the other matrix gains.
  • An assumed nonlinear form of the optimal controls
    degenerates into the above linear controllers.

10
The Two Stage Game
  • The cost function in this case is
  • J1(u,v)ESfx(2),x(2)?01Biu(i),u(i)-Civ(i),v
    (i)
  • Assume a linear form of the controls
  • uo(0)k0k00x0k00zp(0) vo(0)l0l00x0l00ze(0
    )
  • uo(1)k1k01x0k10zp(0)k11zp(1)
    vo(1)l1l01x0l10ze(0)l11ze(1)
  • Optimize cost function using dynamic programming
    to get expressions for uo(0), vo(0), uo(1) and
    vo(1).
  • Use the expressions derived for the optimal
    controls to get 14 equations for the 14 unknown
    control-coefficient matrices.

11
The Two Stage ProblemAnalytical Constraint
  • Solving the equations for the control gains
    involves inverting a matrix with unknown
    elements.
  • Results in polynomial equations in the unknowns.
  • Consider the scalar case first to extract
    properties of the system.

12
The Two Stage GameProperties of the Scalar
Equations
  • k00, l00, k01, l01, k11 and l11 are mutually
    dependent and do not depend on the other
    variables.
  • This reduces the number of equations we have to
    solve simultaneously from 14 to 6.
  • The other variables k0, l0, k00, l00, k1, l1, k01
    and l01 depend on the above 6 variables, and can
    be solved for after solving the above 6
    equations.

13
The Two Stage GameSolving the Scalar Equations
  • k00 and l00 can be eliminated by solving
  • k00?p(kp1kp2l00)
  • l00?e(ke1ke2k00)
  • ?p, ?e, kp1, kp1, ke1, ke2 and le2 are functions
    of k01, l01, k11 and l11.
  • We thus need to solve 4 equations for the 4
    variables from the final stage.

14
The Two Stage GameSolving the Scalar Equations
(contd.)
  • As we go on to the final stage, we encounter
    polynomial equations of the form
  • k01fp(l01, k11, l11)
  • l01fe(k01, l11, k11)
  • Eliminate k01 and l01 from these equations and go
    on to solve the pair of equations for k11 and
    l11.
  • Back-substitute values of k11 and l11 into
    previous equations to solve for remaining 4
    variables.
  • We thus have a dynamic programming kind of
    approach for these 6 variables i.e. solve for
    variables from the final stage first and then
    solve for subsequent stages.

15
Conclusion and Future Work
  • Even seemingly simple linear structures result in
    complex polynomial equations.
  • If analytical linear solutions exist in the
    scalar case, do nonlinear solutions exist?
  • Is it possible to find analytical closed form
    solutions for the vector case?
  • Can the need to smooth over the entire
    observation sequence be eliminated?
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