Title: Presentation by: Sherkhan Khan, Fang-Yun Kuan , and Mikra Krasniqi
1Presentation by Sherkhan Khan, Fang-Yun Kuan ,
and Mikra Krasniqi
The Trade Dispute Over U.S. Cotton Subsidies.
2Background and Chronology of Events
- Complainant Brazil Respondent
United States - September 27, 2002 Brazil requested
consultations with the US - February 6, 2003, Brazil requested the
establishment of a panel - September 8, 2004 the Panel Report was
circulated to Members of the WTO - October 18, 2004 Notice of Appeal filed by the
United States - March 3, 2005, The Appellate Body issued its
report
3Brazil's Position
- U.S. cotton subsidies have depressed cotton
prices worldwide, and have hurt Brazilian farmers -
- According to Brazils estimates, commissioned
from an American agricultural economist, U.S.
cotton production would have fallen by 29 in
2001 - 2002 and its cotton exports dropped by 41 - The contraction of US production would have led
to a rise in international cotton prices of 12.6.
4Areas in question
5Brazils Legal Claims
- User marketing (Step 2) payments to exporters
under Section 1207(a) of the FSRI Act of 2002 are
per se export subsidies listed in Article 9.1(a)
of the Agreement on Agriculture - Export credit guarantee programs in respect of
exports of eligible agricultural commodities are
export subsidies inconsistent with Articles 8 and
10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture - The ETI Act of 2000 is inconsistent with
Articles 8 and 10.1 of the Agreement on
Agriculture, as well as with Articles 3.1 and 3.2
of the SCM Agreement
6Brazil argues that export subsidies constitute
- Marketing loan program payments
- User marketing payments
- Production flexibility contract payments
- Market loss assistance payments
- Direct payments
- Counter-cyclical payments
- Export credit guarantee programs
- Crop insurance payments
- Cotton seed payments
7- Marketing loan program
- Interim financing to domestic producers to
facilitate the gradual distribution of the
commodity throughout the year - Production flexibility contract payments
- Support to producers based on historical acreage
and yields (not related to current prices of
cotton)
8- Market loss assistance payments
- Ad hoc emergency and supplementary assistance
provided to producers for compensating potential
losses should commodity prices fall under a
certain level - Direct payments
- Support to producers based on historical acreage
and yields (not related to current prices of
cotton)
9- User marketing payments
- ("Step 2" program) Marketing certificates or cash
payments to domestic users and exporters of
upland cotton when certain US cotton pricing
benchmarks are exceeded - Export credit guarantee measures
- ("GSM 102", "GSM 103" and "SCGP") Guarantees to
US exporters against the risk of not being paid,
in the event that the foreign bank failed to pay
under the foreign bank letter of credit or the
importer failed to pay under the importer
obligation
10- Crop insurance payments
- Insurance coverage to producers for losses due to
natural disasters and market fluctuations - Cottonseed payments
- Ad hoc emergency and supplementary assistance
provided to first handlers and producers of
cottonseed
11WTO Pertinent Laws and Agreements
- Articles 4.1, 7.1 and 30 of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM
Agreement") - Article 19 of the Agreement on Agriculture
-
- Article XXII of the GATT 1994
12U.S. Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act
- The 1972 Act sought to redress tax disadvantages
faced by U.S. companies exporting or operating
overseas. U.S. enacted the Domestic International
Sales Corporation (DISC) provisions to the U.S.
tax code, which allowed U.S. firms to defer
taxation on a percentage of their export profits.
- The European Commission challenged the DISC
provisions in the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), on the grounds that it
constituted an illegal export subsidy. - In November 2000, US replaced DISC with ETI Act
13United States Position
- Aggregate the value of all U.S. payments and
claim that those subsidies have had an effect
on production and prices - Misuses the data on production by making
comparisons using marketing years 1998 and 2001 - Decoupled payments that are not linked to
production of upland cotton. - The Sumner Model presented by Brazil is
inadequately explained
14Decisions of the WTO Panel
- Agricultural export credit guarantees are subject
to WTO export subsidy disciplines and three
United States export credit guarantee programs
are prohibited and as such are not protected by
the provisions of the Peace Clause - Also, domestic support programs are not supported
by the provisions of the Peace Clause and
certain of these programs result in serious
prejudice to Brazils interests in the form of
price suppression in the world market
15 Appellate Bodys decision
- The Appellate Body upheld most of the Panels
findings. - U.S. shall bring its cotton policy into line
with the panels ruling within a
reasonable time. If it fails to act, it has to
enter into negotiations with Brazil in order to
determine mutually-acceptable compensation - If no satisfactory compensation is agreed,
Brazil may ask the Dispute Settlement Body for
permission to impose limited trade sanctions). -
16Implementation Stage
- U.S. missed several deadlines on the
implementation of the WTO ruling . In October
2005, Brazil threatened U.S. with major trade
sanctions - Two moths later, the Bush administration agreed
to start the process of implementing the
elimination of subsidies - Senate approval triggered immediate actions,
which provided West African nations with
duty-free access to its cotton markets
17Implementation Stage (Cont.)
- Following Senate authorization, the U.S. House of
Representatives, in early February 2006, also
voted in favor of the bill, thus effectively
ending a long time agricultural impasse in
international trade negotiations - In accordance with the bill, major subsidies and
other domestic support programs for cotton
producers and exporters have been eliminated
18Our Proposal
- Eliminate all distortions and inconsistencies in
the remaining support programs between small and
large producers - Use these resources to support numerous RD
projects, which encourage innovation and
diversification of agriculture products, rather
than cotton overproduction - Because this is a major breakthrough, the U.S.
should seek and be rewarded access to numerous
markets (i.e. high tech products and
pharmaceuticals)
19Policy implications in the domestic market
- Fairer environment for small producers, which
will have a greater share of the market - Encourage diversification or agricultural
products( widen the production base) and
discourage overproduction of one particular
product - Cotton prices will increase (normalize), however,
this will reveal the fact that until now cotton
prices have been kept low by U.S. taxpayers
money
20Policy implications in the world market
- Cotton prices in the international market will
stabilize, reaching more reasonable levels - United States will gain more access for its
exports in developing countries (i.e. Brazil,
West Africa, etc.) - EU and Japan will be under increasing pressure to
eliminate their tariffs in agriculture imports
21Policy Implications in International Trade
Relations
- It will pressure European Union, Japan and other
protective countries to further liberalize and
open their markets - The authority of the WTO panels and rulings will
gain more prevalence by strengthening the rule of
law and enforce trade regulations and
implementations - U.S.s controversial position and its commitments
to free trade and open markets will no longer
embarrass U.S trade representatives before other
nations
22References
- http//www.buyusa.gov/finland/en/tradesanctions.ht
ml - http//www.businessdayonline.com/?c45a4392
- http//news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4672786.stm
- http//www.ustr.gov/
- http//www.mercopress.com/Detalle.asp?NUM7166
- http//internationaltraderelations.com/
- http//www.commerce.gov/
- http//www.wto.org