Title: DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process DIACAP
1DoD Information Assurance Certification and
Accreditation Process (DIACAP)
Richard Holzer Director, IA Army IT
Sector richard.holzer_at_gdit.com
2Agenda
- DIACAP Background
- DIACAP vs DITSCAP
- DIACAP Package
- DIACAP Activities
- Summary
3DIACAP Background
DIACAP
DITSCAP
It's all just CA to me...
NIACAP
4DIACAP Background
Security or Assurance??
As long as you understand this has nothing to do
with security, youll be fine
5DIACAP Background
- Interim DIACAP signed 6 Jul 2006
- Replaces DITSCAP
- Process based on automated toolsbut tools are
not yet fully available - Limited input fields and standardized databases -
limit paperwork avalanche - Attempts to further standardize test methods and
risk categorization remove subjectivity - Severity Category Codes (I III)
- Impact Codes (High Low)
- Aligns CA with FISMA Requirements
6DIACAP Background
- Two associated Web-based services the DIACAP
Knowledge Service (KS) and the Enterprise Mission
Assurance Support Service (eMASS)
7DIACAP Knowledge Service
- DIACAP Knowledge Service
- Library of references, tools, diagrams,
templates, process maps to aid in DIACAP
execution - Collaboration workspace for the DIACAP User
Community - Lessons learned, best practices
- https//diacap.iaportal.navy.mil/ks/default.aspx
8e-MASS
- e-MASS
- Automated CA process with workflow logic,
validation methods and data repository support - CA status tracking and document repository
9DIACAP vs DITSCAP
- Broadens perspective from system-centric
(DITSCAP) view to examine potential systems
impact on the network and other systems on that
network (DIACAP) - More emphasis on continuous security review and
improvements, vice once every 3 years - Specific Requirements for Accrediting Authority
and Certifying Authority (Senior IA Officer)
single CA for each service - Risk Assessment is now by the numbers (DIACAP)
findings mandated by IA Control and potential
for compromise
10DIACAP vs DITSCAP
DITSCAP
DIACAP
11DIACAP vs DITSCAP
- Systems still need
- to identify IA requirements based on MAC and
Confidentiality Level - to implement security requirements (IA Controls)
- to be certified
- to be accredited
- Documentation has changedbut not as much as
everyone thinks
12DIACAP vs DITSCAP
- DoD 8500.2 still requires
- Configuration Management Plan
- Continuity of Operations/Disaster Recovery Plan
- Incident Response Plan
- Acceptable Use Policy
- Security Education, Training, and Awareness Plan
- MOUs / MOAs / SIAs
- Architecture
13DIACAP vs DITSCAP
14DIACAP vs DITSCAP
- DIACAP no longer requires
- System / Security Concept of Operations
- Security Test and Evaluation Plan
- Risk Assessment Report
- Technical Security Controls
15DIACAP Packages
- Executive Package
- System Identification Profile (SIP)
- DIACAP Scorecard
- Plan of Action Milestones (POAM), if required
16DIACAP Packages
- Comprehensive Package
- Executive Package (SIP, DIACAP Scorecard, POAM)
- DIACAP Implementation Plan
- Supporting Documentation
- Artifacts
- Certification results
- Materials required to support or justify
compliance with all IA Controls
17DIACAP Activities
18Initiate and Plan CA
- Register System (APMS)
- Army Portfolio Management System (APMS)
- Create System Identification Profile (SIP)
- Assign IA Controls
- Baseline Controls plus Service and system unique
IA Controls - Assemble DIACAP Team
- Create DIACAP Implementation Plan
- Assign Responsibilities
- Allocate Resources and Schedule
19Implement Validate IA Controls
- Execute DIACAP Implementation Plan
- Implement the IA Controls
- Conduct Validation Activities
- DITSCAP Lite?
- Compile Validation Results using DIACAP Scorecard
- Risk Assessment Lite?
20Implement Validate IA Controls
- DIACAP Scorecard
- Summary of system IA Control compliance status
(compliant, non-compliant, N/A) - Intended to convey information about the IA
posture of the evaluated system in a format that
can be easily understood by managers - Rigid definitions for Probability of Exploitation
and Degree of Impact (Harm) - Severity Code
- Impact Code
21Implement Validate IA Controls
- Severity Category
- I Allows security to be by-passed, resulting in
immediate unauthorized or root-level access - II Potential to lead to unauthorized access
- III Recommendations that will improve IA
posture - Impact Code
- High Severely Disrupt GIG
- Medium Moderately Disrupt GIG
- Low Minimally Disrupt GIG
22Make Certification Determination Accreditation
Decision
- Make Certification Determination
- Severity Code
- Impact Code
- Danger to the GIG
- Issue Accreditation Decision
- IATT, IATO, ATO, DATO
Single CA for each Service determines risk
Only the Service CIO can authorize operation for
a system with a Severity Category I finding
23Make Certification Determination Accreditation
Decision
Plan of Action and Milestones (POAM)
- Management Tool for IA Control non-compliance
tracking - Programs must regularly update (quarterly) CIO on
remediation progress - Shared with Service or Agency IG to support IVV
of identified weaknesses and completed corrective
actions
24Maintain Authorization and Conduct Reviews
Comply with FISMA
- Maintain Situational Awareness
- Annual Revalidation of some IA Controls
- Must result in 100 Review of all IA Controls
over 3-year period - Maintain IA Posture
- Annual Status Report with Recommendations
- DAA decision to continue / alter prior approval
Information Assurance Manager Responsibility
25Decommission
- Address disposition of DIACAP registration
information - Address disposition of system-related data or
objects in GIG
26Summary
- CA Assurance
- DIACAP better aligns CA process with FISMA
- Big Changes Include
- Central CA enforces single Service-wide
standard - More focus on enterprise-wide impacts rather than
system specific ones What does it do to the
GIG? - Only the CIO for each Service can approve systems
with Severity Code I issues
27Questions