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Li Tie Yan

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Goal: Point-to-Point authentication and encryption not relying on hardware. ... Attacks: TinyOS Bless protocols (suffer Bogus routing information, selective ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Li Tie Yan


1
Infocomm security Lab. of ICSD at I2R
Security in Sensor network (Research issues)
Li Tie Yan InfoComm Security Department
(ICSD) Institute for Infocomm Research
(I2R) 19th, Jul. 2004
2
Outline
  • Sensor constraints
  • Security map of sensor network
  • Research issues
  • Light weight crypto-algorithms
  • Security (attacks) analysis on distributed
    sensor network
  • Key management schemes for distributed
    sensor network
  • Other issues
  • Secure location (context aware security)
  • Secure data fusion (secure information
    aggregation)
  • Challenges

3
Sensor constraints
  • Light weight crypto-algorithms
  • Goal Point-to-Point authentication and
    encryption not relying on hardware.
  • Constraint Based on TinyOS of Berkeley Mote
    (Mica Motes feature a 4MHz processor, 128K of
    program space 4k RAM, 36 byte packets, and
    run on 2 AA batteries).
  • Light-weight Less overhead per packet
    (conventionally, the overhead is 16 byte).
  • Assumption Keys are pre-distributed and shared
    by sensors (simplest solution).
  • Analysis Cryptanalysis, attack analysis
  • Attacks TinyOS Bless protocols (suffer Bogus
    routing information, selective forwarding,
    sinkholes, Sybil, wormholes, HELLO floods)
  • Related works
  • 802.15.4, New standard supported by ChipCon 2240
    (Zigbee).
  • TinySec, Link layer encryption mechanism of U.C.
    Berkeley

4
Security map
5
Security map
6
TinySec related researches
  • TinySec related approaches
  • TinyPK Authentication and DH key exchange
    (BBN).
  • TinyCrypt ECC key exchange (Harvard Univ.)
  • Light-weight key management Key exchange,
    group management, key revocation (SRI).
  • Securesense Dynamic security service
    composition (UMASS).
  • PKC Public key crypto in sensor. (WPI)
  • SenSec (I2R)
  • Others Many efforts in Industry

7
Research issues
  • Attacks on sensor networks
  • Denial of Service, by Wood et al. in IEEE
    Computer2002.
  • Routing security, by Karlof et al. in 1st IEEE
    workshop SNPA03.
  • Sybil attack, by Newsome et al. in ACM IPSN04.
  • Key management schemes
  • Key management, by Eschenauer et al. in ACM
    CCS02.
  • SPINS, by Perrig et al. in Wireless Networks
    Journal (WINE), 2002.
  • Random Key Assignment, by pietro et al. in ACM
    SASN '03.
  • Establishing Pairwise Keys, by Liu et al. in ACM
    CCS03.
  • LEAP, by Zhu et al. in proc. of ACM CCS03.
  • Pairwise Key Pre-distribution, by Du et al. in
    ACM CCS03.
  • Random Key Predistribution, by Chan et al. in
    IEEE SP03
  • Deployment knowledge, by Du et al. in IEEE
    INFOCOM'04.

8
Other issues
  • Location aware security (a problem of context
    aware security)
  • Privacy-Aware Location, Gruteser et al. in
    USENIX HOTOS IX, 2003.
  • Location-Based Pairwise Key Establishments, Liu
    et al. in ACM SASN '03.
  • Location claims, by Sastry et al. in ACM
    WiSe03.
  • Data fusion security (a problem known as False
    data injection)
  • SIA, by Przydatek et al. in proc. of ACM
    SenSys03.
  • Secure aggregation, by Hu et al. in workshop on
    security and assureance in Ad hoc Networks, 2003.
  • Witeness, by Du et al. in proc. of IEEE
    GLOBECOM03.
  • SEF, by Ye et al. in proc. of IEEE INFOCOM04.
  • Integrity protection, by Vogt et al. in
    technical report no. 434, ETH Zrich.
  • IHA, by Zhu et al. in proc. of IEEE SP04.
  • uTESLA, by Perrig et al. in proc. of ACM
    Mobicom01.
  • LEAP, by Zhu et al. in proc. of ACM CCS03.

Authentication based
9
Challenges
  • Software only cryptography (best balance of
    security and performance, PKC)
  • Efficient key management (support random key
    pre-distribution, PKC)
  • Robust multi-hop routing protocols (against node
    compromise DoS attacks)
  • Location aware security (or context aware
    security)
  • Secure and resilient aggregation (towards False
    data injection)
  • Secure data centric storage (secure indexing,
    secure overlay)

10
Collaboration
http//www.i2r.a-star.edu.sg/icsd/SecureSensor/
Key management, Calling for
Collaboration on PKC, Location
aggregation If you have passion on designing
symmetric/asymmetric crypto/security mechanisms
for wireless/constrained devices, lets do sth.
Interesting!
Thank you! Q A
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