Title: Risk evaluation Risk treatment
1Risk evaluationRisk treatment
2 Risk Management Process
3 Risk Management Process
- The main elements of the risk management process
are - Context identification
- Identify areas of relevance and the background
and structure of the evaluation. Develop risk
evaluation criteria, against which risk is to be
evaluated. - Risk identification
- Identify what, why and how things can go wrong as
the basis for further analysis. - Risk analysis
- For each hazard analyse, evaluate and document
their consequences. - Estimate their likelihood /frequency.
4 Risk Management Process
- Risk evaluation
- Combine consequence and likelihood to produce an
estimated level of risk for each hazard. - Compare estimated levels of risk agianst
pre-established criteria. - This enables risks to be ranked so as to identify
management priorities. - If the levels of risk established are low, then
risks may fall into an acceptable category and
treatment may not be required. - Risk treatment
- Accept and monitor low-priority risks.
- Identify options for risk treatment for hazards
with non acceptable risks. - Assess alternative treatment options, which
includes consideration of funding.
5Risk classification
- When quantitative methods are used to describe
the severity end frequency of a hazard, it is
possible to produce a numerical value for the
associated risk by combining these two values. - This is however not possible when qualitative
measures are used. - In such cases risk can be described by using a
risk class (risk level, risk factor). - The use of risk categories is common even where
numerical values are used for severity and
frequency of hazards, as this simplifies the
adoption of standards and guidelines. - Most standards define a set of risk classes and
then set out development and design
techniquesappropriate for each category of risk.
6Risk classification
Severity of a hazardous event
Frequency / probability of a hazardous event
7Risk classification - IEC 61508
8The acceptability of risk -ALARP
ALARP As Low As is Reasonably Practicable
9The acceptability of risk -ALARP
- IEC 61508 divides level of risk into three
levels - Unacceptable
- As Low As is Reasonably Possible (ALARP)
- Acceptable
- The uppermost level represents hazards where the
risk is so great that it is deemed to be
intolerable. - The lowermost level represents hazards where the
risk is so small that it generally can be
neglected. - In between these two levels lies a third level
where a risk, though not insignificant, may be
acceptable under certain circumstances. - The criterion for acceptance of a particular risk
is based on a decision as to whether it is as low
as is reasonable practicable (ALARP). This is
based on the benefits of the system and the cost
of any further reduction. - A risk within the ALARP level is never acceptable
if it easily can be reduced.
10The acceptability of risk
11Levels of integrity
- Safety requirements differs widely between
applications and is related to the risks
involved. - One can view the differing safety requirements in
terms of the level of risk reduction required. - High-risk systems require far more risk reduction
compared to low-risk systems. - A nuclear reactor protection system requires more
risk reduction than an electric toaster!
12Levels of integrity
- Differing requirements for safety systems lead to
the concept of levels of integrity for
safety-critical - Safety integrity The likelihood of a
safety-related system satisfactorily performing
the required safety functions under all the
stated conditions within a stated period of time.
- Although safety integrity can be expressed
quantitatively, it is more common to allocate a
system a safety integrity level. - Safety integrity levels can be expressed both
quantitatively, in terms of measures of
performance , or qualitatively, in terms of
system characteristics.
13Levels of integrity
- Various standards classifies safety-critical
systems into a different number of integrity
levels. - IEC 61508 defines 4 different integrity levels,
where level 1 represents the least critical level
and level 4 the most critical level. For each
level - the standard sets out target failure rates for
systems operating in continuous mode (failures
per year) and on demand mode (failures on
demand). - the standard also gives guidance on design - and
development techniques that must be used for each
level.
14Allocation of integrity levels
Severity of hazardous event
HW integrity classification
Risk classification
Integrity classification
Systematic integrity classification
SW integrity classification
Frequency of hazardous event
Risk measure of the likelihood , and
consequences of a hazardous
event. Safety integrity measure of the
likelihood of the safety system correctly
performing its tasks.
15Achievable levels of integrity?
- When developing critical systems, one must both
- Achieve a high level of integrity
- Demonstrate that this has been done
- Unfortunately, the latter often proves to be
difficult, and perhaps even impossible, for
critical systems. - Possible requirements can be less than 1
failure pr 1000 years, 10 000 years or 100 000
years of operation. At present we know of no
method of testing a system to demonstrate this
level of performance. Is it possible to
demonstrate this - At present we know of no method of testing a
system to demonstrate this level of performance. - Instead, requirements to which activities that
must be performed are listed.
16Risk treatment
- Possible options for risk treatment
- Avoid the risk by deciding not to proceed with
the activity likely to generate risk (where this
is practicable). - Reduce the likelihood of the occurrence
- Reduce the consequences
- Transfer the risk
- Retain the risk
17Exercises
- Chapter 4 7, 9, 14, 17, 20, 21, 23