Title: Emerging Disease Response EDR
1Emerging Disease Response EDR
- Cord Heuer
- EpiCentre, IVABS, Massey University
2An epidemic curve
Last case 30SEP01
http//www.defra.gov.uk
3Pests
4Biosecurity program 3 main components
- Prevention (keeping things out)
- Surveillance (finding things as soon as
possible) - Response (eradication control)
- All parts underpinned by science, and involve
rules, research, risk analysis, education, audit,
and enforcement
5End to end biosecurity
- Import risk analysis
- Offshore risk management
- Clearance procedures at NZ border
- Post-border surveillance and monitoring
- Incursion response
- Pest management
6EDR Requirements
- Targets
- Legislation
- Population data
- Surveillance
- Incursion response
- Investigation
- Response
- Preparedness
- Resource for technical information backup
- examples
7Legislation
- Animal Welfare and Biosecurity Act, Govt.NZ
- OIE List A Diseases
- Transmissible diseases that have the potential
for very serious and rapid spread, irrespective
of national borders, that are of serious
socio-economic or public health consequence and
that are of major importance in the international
trade of animals and animal products. - Foot and mouth disease
- Swine vesicular disease
- Peste des petits ruminants
- Lumpy skin disease
- Bluetongue
- African horse sickness
- Classical swine fever
- Newcastle disease
- Vesicular stomatitis
- Rinderpest
- Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia
- Rift Valley fever
- Sheep pox and goat pox
- African swine fever
- Highly pathogenic avian influenza
8Population data
- AgriBase, AgriQuality
- database of NZ farms, with livestock populations
- Most important spatial frame for livestock
disease surveys - Animal Registries
- MINDA registry of dairy cattle
- dog registries, breeder/producer associations,
eg. apiaries - Industry Databases
- Vet Council vet practitioners client databases
- Animal product processing premises
- Benchmarking studies
- Disease programs eg Ovis management, Leptosure
- Ecological, geological and climate data
9Surveillance
- Prevalent disease
- Prevalence D / N
- N Population updates
- D Diseases
- New disease
- Emergence incidence of a new disease
- Population at risk (susceptible pop)
- Disease definition
- Diagnostic criteria
10Background Sources of surveillance data
- Case ascertainment from private veterinary
- practice
- Submissions to laboratories for diagnostic
testing - Reports to MAF of suspect exotic, new or emerging
- diseases
- 0800-809-966
- Summaries published quarterly in Surveillance
- http//www.biosecurity.govt.nz/about-us/our-publi
cations - Specific surveillance projects
- Ongoing e.g. Arbovirus monitoring programme
- One-off e.g. Avian influenza in migratory birds
- Investigation and/or response to exotic disease
reports - De-limiting and/or proof-of-freedom surveillance
- Export testing
11http//www.oie.int/eng/en_index.htm
12(No Transcript)
13Incursion Response
- Investigation
- Response
- Preparedness
14Investigation
- Notification system 0800-809-966
- MAF Exotic Disease and Pest Hotline
- Around 13,000 calls per year
- Contracted call centre
- Filtering process to direct calls to appropriate
responder - Incursion Investigation Teams
- Field investigations and/or sampling
- Interaction with diagnostic service providers via
IDC Labs - Rapid assessment of impacts and actions
- Immediate actions
- Technical management of operations during
incursion response
15Response
Response structure
16Preparedness
- Prepare response to future incursions
- Exercise preparedness
- E.g. Pandemic preparedness Influenza H5N1
- H5N1 Bird flu pandemic in Eurasia
- Predictions of viral mutation to infect and
readily transmit between humans - Historical pandemics with high mortality rates
- Whole of government preparedness projects in NZ
- Ministry of Health lead agency for human health
- MAF lead agency for animal health
17Possible Emergence of a Pandemic Virus from Birds
(1) Mutations
Pandemic virus
- (3) Reassortment
- in humans
- (2) Reassortment
- in swine
Pandemic virus
18Resources for technical information backup
Orf
http//www.defra.gov.uk/footandmouth/pdf/ageing-le
sions.pdf
FMD
First infected pig 20 Febr. 2001
19ORF Exotic diseases (Bluetongue) Post-dipping
lameness Benign or virulent foot rot caused by
Dichelobacter nodosus Interdigital
dermatitis Vesicular stomatitis (VS) Swine
vesicular disease (SVD)
Ewe with extensive idiopathic ulceration of gum
Contagious ovine digital dermatitis Extensive
interdigital ulceration and inflammation due to
CODD
20Other examples ..
- Operation Waiheke 2005
- HPAI
- Varroa destructor 2000
- Echinococcus granulosus
- PMWS 2003-05
- Banjo frog 2000
- Brucella sp 2001
- MmmLC 2001
- Psittacine poxvirus 2001
- GMO maize 2001, 2004
- Didymophospenia geminata 2004-05
- Styela clava 2005
21The Waihake Story
- Response to a claimed deliberate release of FMD
virus on Waihake Island - TUE 10 May letter to PM
- WED 11 May
- 50 trading partner countries OIE informed
- 8 vets started surveillance
- 12 largest farms, check all 48h until 14d max
incub.period - Checkpoints at 2 ferry terminals
- Awareness campaign started
22Considerations
- Primary case
- Perhaps only one single animal
- Cattle and/or sheep
- Secondary wave (sheep)
- Start contact 1st case min. latent prd.
contact 2nd case min. incub.prd. 0d 2d 0d
3d 5d - End 2d 4d 4d 6d 16d
- 73 infected sheep develop lesions
- 20 lesions as single vesicles, mostly in feet
- Sensitivity of detection 80 assuming individual
restrained examination
Cattle Sheep 2d 2d
4d 4d 6d 4d 6d
3d
Latent period of in-contact animals Incubation
period Shedding period Clinical period (lesions
23Question
- Sample size n 40-70 per herd/flock
- To detect 5 prev. of animals with clinical signs
in a herd/flock with 95 confidence - HSe 1 (1 AP)n
- AP TPSe (1-TP)(1-Sp)
- Se sensitivity of detecting clinical signs 80
- Sp specificity of detecting clinical signs
100 - ? TP of detectable clinical signs??
- TP of infection 0.73 clinical signsinfected
24Low virulence, herdsize 400
Low virulence, herdsize 50
High virulence, herdsize 50
High virulence, herdsize 400
25Conclusions
- Surveillance unlikely to detect index case(s)
- Need to
- target small herds earlier than large herds
- start with cattle earlier than sheep
- focus surveillance on 5 20 days post primary
exposure - close individual, clinical examination required
- Modelling informed the surveillance system in an
acute epidemic