Title: Transition: Objectives and Experiences
1Transition Objectives and Experiences
- Objectives
- Markets
- Improving allocative efficiency by introducing
market institution and competition - Firms
- Providing better incentives by restructuring
corporate governance arrangements and creating
private ownership - Governments
- Creating government institutions adequate for a
market economy
2Transition Objectives and Experiences
- Approaches
- Big Bang versus Gradual Reform
- Sequencing in economic reforms
- Sequencing between economic reform and political
reform
3Transition Objectives and Experiences
- Washington Consensus Beliefs
- Political economy
- Breaking existing communist state structure,
replacing with efficient legal structure - Using window opportunity to generate
irreversibility in reform - Private owners will become major support for
reform - Resource reallocation
- Markets will take care of spontaneously
- Close down inefficient state enterprises
- Corporate governance
- Mass privatization
- Role of government
- Diminish and prevent it from intervening the
market
4Transition Objectives and Experiences
- Washington Consensus Advocacy
- Macro stabilization
- Wholesale liberalization
- Quick privatization
- Weaken and shrink government
5Transition Objectives and Experiences
- Two Worlds of Experience
- Output fall for most and slow recovering for some
- Abysmal performance of privatization
- Organized crime
- Breakup of nations
- Fall of Communist and electoral backlash
- China
6Transition Objectives and Experiences
- The Growth Pattern of Russia and Central Europe
- (source Blanchard (1997), GDP, value in the year
before transition 1)
7Transition Objectives and Experiences
8Introduction
- How to Get There The Divergent Transition
Experience
9Transition Objectives and Experiences
- Constraints in Transition
- Knowledge Constraints
- Uncertainty
- Institutional Constraints
- Complementarities and interactions between
reforms - Political constraints
- Politics is endogenous
- Resource Constraints
10Market Liberalization
- Partial versus wholesale liberalization (Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishny) - Partial reform can result in a substantial
diversion of resources into inefficient uses - Result may be a reduction of total output
11Partial v.s Wholesale Liberalization
- Benchmark the case of planning
P
P
Qb
Qh
Industry b
Industry h
Aggregate
12Partial v.s Wholesale Liberalization
- Liberalizing the housing sector
Welfare loss
P
P
Qb
Qh
Industry b
Industry h
Aggregate
13Partial v.s Wholesale Liberalization
P
P
Qb
Qh
Industry b
Industry h
Aggregate
14Partial v.s Wholesale Liberalization
P
P
Qb
Qh
Industry b
Industry h
Aggregate
15Partial v.s Wholesale Liberalization
- The case of inefficient rationing favoring the
boxcar sector - Planning
P
P
Qb
Qh
Industry b
Industry h
Aggregate
16Partial v.s Wholesale Liberalization
- The case of inefficient rationing favoring the
boxcar sector - Liberalizing the housing sector
Change in welfare
P
P
Qb
Qh
Industry b
Industry h
Aggregate
17Partial v.s Wholesale Liberalization
- Quota with state enforcement welfare gain and
yet still inefficient
P
Qh
Qb
Industry b
Industry h
Aggregate
18Price Dual Track
- Demand and supply under random allocation
Q
Q
Market (efficient allocation of producers and
users)
Planning (with random allocation of producers and
users)
19Price Dual Track
Buy from market for delivery
Sell at market
PP
Pm
Supply 4 Demand 3
Q
Resell delivery to market
Buy at market
20Price Dual Track
Buy from market for delivery
Sell at market
PP
Supply 4 Demand 4
Pm
Q
Resell delivery to market
Buy at market
21Price Dual Track
Buy from market for delivery
Sell at market
Pm
Supply 4 Demand 4
PP
Q
Resell delivery to market
Buy at market
22Price Dual Track
- Using Standard Demand and Supply
Market Track Buy at Pm
S
Plan Track Buy at Pm and sell at PP
Pm
Plan Track Buy at PP
Plan Track Buy at PP and sell at Pm
PP
Plan Track Sell at PP
D
Q
Market Track Sell at Pm
23Price Dual Track
- Price dual track restores market equilibrium
S
Pm
PP
D
Q