Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy

1
Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy

• Institutional Innovation at the
  Domestic-International Frontier

2
Who is this person?

• Richard Sherman
• Assistant Professor of Political Science
• Leiden University, Faculty of Social Sciences,
  2004-now
• Syracuse University, Maxwell School of
  Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1996-2004
• Ph.D., University of Washington, 1996

• What I do
• International Relations
• Political Economy
• Empirical Political Science
• Comparative Politics
• Where I publish
• The World Economy
• Comparative Political Studies
• Journal of Conflict Resolution
• International Interactions
• Economics Letters
• Social Science Quarterly
• International Politics
• Current Politics and Economics of Europe

3
My research

• Intersection of domestic politics and
  international relations
• International trade politics, related economic
  regulatory issues

• Connections
• The liberal-realist debate (how) does domestic
  politics matter?
• The two-level game idea (Putnam, Milner,
  Moravcsik)
• International regimes organizations
• Political markets vs. political contests

4
Privatizing commercial diplomacy

• Institutional mechanisms that let private-sector
  actors
• petition for the initiation of trade disputes
• consult formally with government on
  trade-negotiation agenda issues
• attend WTO talks with government officials
• negotiate privately (industry-to-industry) on
  regulatory reform

• EU Trade Barriers Regulation
• US Section 301
• US Private Sector Advisory CommitteesEU UNICE,
  WWF, civil-society dialogues
• Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, related
  organizations

5
Institutional innovation

• Nihil nove sub sole?
• Industry influence on government
• Petition processes for trade complaints
  (anti-dumping, etc.)
• Government organizing industry (corporatism)
• But...

• Formal avenues for industry to influence
  government on trade negotiations
• Market-opening pressure is institutionalized, not
  only protectionist pressure
• International industry groups are being organized
  by states
• Civil-society groups, as well as industry, are
  given formal access

6
Why is this interesting?

• The state as a literal agent of interest groups
  at the international level
• Alternative sequencing of actions in two-level
  games
• An open question can government organize
  interest groups internationally?
• Growing immediacy between domestic politics and
  international institutions
• Normative issues

7
Research questions

• Positive
• What are the factors giving rise to privatized
  commercial diplomacy?
• Which industries groups are most active,
  influential?
• What explains the pattern of activity access
  across groups?
• What are the differences across institutions and
  polities?
• Normative
• Is the cart leading the horse?
• Does the government grant of access exclude some
  important voices ?
• Can privatized diplomacy be accommodated within
  the existing global trade regime?
• Do these institutional innovations add legitimacy
  to the process, or do they lend ammunition to its
  critics?

8
Research strategy
Quantitative analysis
Qualitative analysis
9
Research strategy
Quantitative analysis
Qualitative analysis
Data set annual data at industry level, EU and
US Political-economy analysis --use
industry-level and economy-level factors to
explain industry use of TBR and Section
301 --compare to corresponding patterns in
industry use of protectionist measures
(anti-dumping) Institutional analysis --compar
e to broader pattern of WTO disputes Cross-polit
y analysis --compare patterns in US with those
in EU
10
Research strategy
Quantitative analysis
Qualitative analysis
Data set annual data at industry level, EU and
US Political-economy analysis --use
industry-level and economy-level factors to
explain industry use of TBR and Section
301 --compare to corresponding patterns in
industry use of protectionist measures
(anti-dumping) Institutional analysis --compar
e to broader pattern of WTO disputes Cross-polit
y analysis --compare patterns in US with those
in EU
Interviews and analysis of documents Informati
on / opinion from industry, government, and
civil-society groups Emphases --implementatio
n and politics / process --extent of
business-government cooperation --connection to
global trade regime --normative questions
11
Conclusions

• The petition processes are relatively successful
• still, government might be more enthusiastic than
  industry
• International corporatism has proved difficult
• Civil-society groups are reluctant to become
  involved in state-organized consultation
• The petition processes are likely to attract
  difficult cases
• It is more striking, then, that they are
  relatively successful
• Explaining origins
• institutional causes
• political/electoral causes
• hegemony/state-power causes
• Normative issues
• nuisance disputes are perhaps less likely under
  privatized diplomacy
• petition processes provide a relatively immediate
  path to disputes against unauthorized retaliatory
  measures
• Privatized diplomacy provides a documented record
  of state-industry interaction