Peace of Civil Societies

1
International Studies Association National
Conference, Chicago, Illinois February
2001 Panel Perspectives on the Democratic
Peace. Paper Title Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace. by R. M. Bittick,
Ph.D. Assistant Professor of Public
Administration California State University
Dominguez Hills
2
The Democratic Peace

• The proposition that Democracies rarely, if ever,
  go to war with each other.
• But why?

R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
3
Norms

• Peaceful resolution of disputes (Russett 1993)
• Compromise, persuasion, and cooperation (Maoz and
  Russett 1992)
• Live and let live approach to disagreements
  (Maoz and Russett 1993)
• Value negotiation and compromise (Oneal, Maoz,
  and Russett 1996).
• Protection of majority rule and minority rights
  (Russett 1993)
• Respect for each others rights (Oneal, Maoz, and
  Russett 1996).

R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
4
Norms

• Social diversity (Russett, 1993)
• Personal freedom to follow ones preferences
  without harming others (Owen 1994).
• Limited government (Russett 1993).
• Toleration of dissent (Owen 1994 Russett 1993).
• Regulated political competition (Russett 1993).
• Peaceful transfer of power (Russett 1993).
• Universal, cosmopolitan interest in
  self-preservation and material well-being (Owen
  1994).

R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
5
Structures

• Division of powers (Russett 1993)
• Shared decision-making powers (Oneal, Maoz, and
  Russett 1996)
• Separation of executive and legislative powers
  (Owen 1994)
• Sharing decision-making power to go to war
  (Morgan and Campbell 1991).
• Checks and balances (Russett 1993).

R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
6
Structures

• Freedoms of speech, the press, assembly,
  religion to petition the government for
  grievances free discussion public debate (Owen
  1994, Russett 1993).
• Constitutional and legal restraints on executive
  action (Maoz and Russett 1993)
• Popular election of the executive who is
  accountable to some selection body (Morgan
  Campbell 1991)
• Selection of the officials empowered to make war
  through regular competitive elections (Owen
  1994).

R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
7
Structures

• Pluralistic institutions such as a legislature,
  political bureaucracies, interest groups (Maoz
  and Russett 1993)
• Institutionalized political competition (Morgan
  Campbell 1991)
• Meaningful political competition (Owen 1994).
• Prohibition against unreasonable searches and
  seizures (Owen 1994).
• Equality of all men before the law due process
  fair trial (Owen 1994).

R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
8
Structures

• The usual institutional arrangements in
  democracies (Oneal, Maoz, and Russett 1996, 12).

R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
9
Conclusion

• A more rigorous theoretical explanation is needed
  for this phenomenon...
• in other words...
• The Democratic Peace proposition is an idea in
  search of a theory

R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
10
Heuristic Model
Philosophy - human nature - human
relationships - physical biological
world - among other things
Theory - application of Phil. to an area
of concern
Policy - apply theory to problems
opportunities
Practice - Administration of policies
R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
11
Lockes Philosophy
Anarchy
State of Nature
State of War
Liberal Principles Govern Cooperation founded on
property rights - imperfect
Realist Principles Govern Cooperation founded on
common security interests
R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
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Theory Douglass North

• Institutions
• the rules of the game in a society
• in other words...
• the humanly devised constraints that shape human
  interaction

- from Institutions, Institutional Change and
Economic Performance
R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
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Theory North
Political Rules
Economic Rules
Property Rights
Formal Political and Economic Rules
Informal Political and Economic Rules
Institutional Environment
Civil Societies
Property Rights the right to life, liberty, and
possessions according to the rule of law
R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
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Theory Lewis W. Snider

• Institutional Credibility
• The convergence of the functional with the
  constitutional
• Formality of institutions refers to the degree
  to which operations actually converge with what
  is constitutionally prescribed and defined,
  whereas credibility implies a belief of judgment
  that there is sufficient convergence between the
  two domains.

- from Growth, Debt, and Politics
R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
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Institutional Credibility
Functional
Constitutional

Constitutions, Laws, Regulations, etc., that
establishes at a minimum - rule of law -
property rights

• Practice of
• public agencies
• in implementing
• public policies
• - impartial effective
• public administration
• including the
• enforcement of contracts

R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
16
Property Rights Elections
Is necessary for a
Institutional Credibility where property rights
are effectively and impartially protected, and
contracts impartially enforced
Safe Political Environment Freedom to express
dissenting opinions
Which allows for the existence of
Competitive Election Processes
R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
17
Peace of Civil Societies
International State of Nature
Civil Societies
Nation A
Cooperative Behavior Domestically
Formal Constraints
Informal Constraints

Institutional Environment
Interaction of domestic institutional
frameworks
Dampening effect on international conflict
Nation B
Cooperative Behavior Domestically
Formal Constraints
Informal Constraints

Institutional Environment
R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
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Model
Institutional Credibility of both nations
Difference in Wealth Conflict Issue Type
Conflict Intensity prior year Neighbor
(Contiguity) error
Conflict Intensity between two nations

R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
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R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
20
R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace
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So what?

• Property Rights matter
• Domestic Institutions matter
• Public Agencies matter

R. M. Bittick, Ph.D. Paper Property Rights, Not
Elections Institutional Credibility and the
Democratic Peace