Institutions 1

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Institutions (1)

• Laws, Rules, Internalized Norms, Beliefs,
  Dispositions? (North ? Greif ? Bourdieu)
• Self-reinforcing beliefs that shape behavior
  (Greif)
• Internalized norms of reciprocity and cooperation
  inter-cultural variation (Bowles, Fehr
  Gintis)
• Political institutions and their interaction with
  economics (North, Wallis Weingast / Acemoglu
  Robinson)

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Institutions (2)

• Institutional change? ? Evolutionism
• Functionalism (adaptation to)
• Structuralism (structure persistence and path
  dependence)
• Exogenous shocks (colonization, globalisation,
  charismatic leader, religious innovation)
• Endogenous evolution (beneficial reciprocity and
  cooperation norms, learning by doing)

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Inequality and politics (1)

• Political inequality and economic inequality
• Acemoglu et al. on Colombia
• Bates on Kenya vs. Ghana
• Influential economic groups (e.g. landowners) may
  compensate for the detrimental impact of
  political rapacity/nepotism (e.g. biased against
  agriculture)
• But difficult to disentangle economic and
  political influence should be very much
  correlated, if only due to the effect of
  political power on economic advantage
• Ex. of elite capture in Ecuador Decentralized
  choice of pro-poor (latrines) vs other
  (pro-elite) projects

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Inequality and politics (2)

• Caste, religious and ethnic fragmentation and
  public goods (this sessions papers)
• However
• Fragmentation is not exogenous
• Identification to varies with political and
  economic context and also with individual
  position (peoples opium?)
• Top ? Bottom policies may counteract segregation
  or fragmentation effects, as well as political
  mobilization

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Micro data and national institutions

• Comparisons at borders
• Ex. Miguel (presented in this session)
• Forthcoming work of Posner on Côte dIvoire vs.
  Burkina-Faso
• Ex. Cogneau et al. work on West Africa To what
  extent do national averages reflect national
  idiosyncrasies?

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National idiosyncrasies in West-AfricaWest
African borders Pre-colonial setting
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Teachers per inhabitants, 1910-1930
averageHuillery, 2006
Colonial districts 1925 map of Afrique
Occidentale Française
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Post-colonial national borders
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Border regions of Côte dIvoire
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100 kilometers band
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Border sample sizes
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Border averages 100 km bandXConstant ? D
100 km
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National idiosyncrasiesCounterfactual
experiments (1)

• Outcome Y (1-C) Y0 C Y1
• ATE E(Y1 -Y0)
• (i) Unconfoundedness
• C independent from (Y0,Y1) conditional on Xx
  for all x ? ?
• (ii) Overlap
• 0 lt Pr(C1 Xx) lt 1 for all x ? ?
• LATE E(Y1 -Y0 x ? ? )

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National idiosyncrasies at bordersCounterfactual
experiments (2)

• ? D 100 km
• (i) C is independent from (Y0, Y1) for D 100 km
• (ii) 0 lt Pr(C1) lt 1 for D 100 km
• E(Y1 -Y0 D 100 )
• E(Y C1, D 100) - E(Y C0, D 100)
• Heterosketastic clustering of surveys
• Controls E(Y C, X) m0 (m1- m0) C X a
• National and international migration bias

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Linear regression discontinuity
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Geographical controls
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Adding migrants
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Education (1) Côte dIvoire vs Ghana
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Education (1)
Education(2) NorthernBorders
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Children education and health
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Living standards Utilities
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The British and the French (1)

• 5 countries Ghana Uganda / Côte dIvoire,
  Guinea Madagascar
• Bossuroy Cogneau 2 former British colonies
  display lower level of educational and
  occupational mobility (both inter- and intra-
  generational)
• A large part of the ? can be traced back to the
  colonial legacy of spatial structures
• ? more migration, increased access to education

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Occupational Mobility
Occupational mobility in the life cycle
(intra-generational)
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Occupational Mobility
Intergenerational mobility between agriculture
and other sectors
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The British and the French (2)

• Cogneau Mesplé-Somps ? in social mobility
  partially translate in inequality of opportunity
  in income
• But earnings structures (income dualism) also
  carry a large weight ? politico-economic dualism
  (with also some colonial connections)

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