Wednesday, March 1, 2006 PHL105Y

1
Wednesday, March 1, 2006PHL105Y

• For Monday, finish reading Richard Taylors A
  Defense of Libertarian Freedom of the Will
  (339-345 in the Pojman) and start reading Derek
  Parfits Personal Identity (395-400)
• For Fridays tutorial, answer one of these
  questions
• 1. What is soft determinism, and how does Taylor
  criticize it?
• 2. Taylor argues that free action involves a kind
  of causation not found elsewhere in nature.
  Explain this special kind of causation.

2
Announcements

• The Research Opportunity Fair will be held
  tomorrow (March 2nd, 12 noon - 2 p.m.) in the
  Student Centre Presentation Room. There are 21
  different projects presenting opportunities
  across various disciplines at UTM first-year
  students are strongly encouraged to apply (for
  work starting next year).
• Spots are currently available at the new UTM
  Child Care Centre. More information available at
  the open house Monday, March 6, 2006, Student
  Centre, Upstairs in the Meeting Room, 6pm, or
  email adele_at_sac.utoronto.ca

3
Harry Frankfurt

• Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person

4
First- and second-order desires

• First-order desires are just desires to do (or
  not do) something (I want to drink some milk I
  dont want to swim)
• Second-order desires are desires to have or not
  have certain first-order desires (I want to stop
  desiring cigarettes I want to have the desire to
  exercise)

5
Wanting and willing

• Some desires do end up having a special relation
  with action, however.
• To identify an agents will is either to
  identify the desire (or desires) by which he is
  motivated in some action he performs or to
  identify the desire (or desires) by which he will
  or would be motivated when or if he acts. (331)

6
Wanting and willing

• Your will is one (or more) of your first-order
  desires.
• It is the desire (or set of desires) that is
  effective. (The ones that actually move you, or
  would move you if it werent for those darn
  handcuffs well call the other ones background
  desires.)
• Background desires are things you want that dont
  happen to cause you to act (right now, anyway).

7
What is a person?

• When you want a certain desire to be your will,
  you have a second-order VOLITION.
• Having second-order volitions is essential to
  being a person.
• A person is someone who cares which of his
  desires is strongest.

8
Persons and wantons

• A person is someone who wants to will certain
  things, who identifies with some of her desires
  and struggles against others.
• The wanton is the character who has desires, and
  maybe even desires for desires, but doesnt care
  what he wills he doesnt care which of his
  inclinations ends up having power over his acts.

9
Persons and wantons

• A person is someone who wants to will certain
  things, who identifies with some of her desires
  and struggles against others. (And therefore
  could have a free will, although she might not
  always act freely.)
• The wanton is the character who has desires, and
  maybe even desires for desires, but doesnt care
  what he wills he doesnt care which of his
  inclinations ends up having power over his acts.
  (The wanton like animals or very small children
  lacks free will.)

10
The two addicts

• The wanton and the unwilling addict both desire
  the drug.
• The unwilling addict has a second-order volition
  to quit. (So if he uses, its against his will.)
• The wanton doesnt even consider the question of
  what his will should be he might have some
  desires to quit and some desires to go on using,
  but he has no preference of his own as to which
  desire should win out in the end.

11
Freedom to will vs.Freedom to act

• I can have free will even in a situation in which
  I am not able to act on the desires I want to
  have.
• Freedom of action being able to do what I want
  to do
• Freedom of will having the will I want to have

12
Frankfurt on Freedom

• A persons will is free only if he is free to
  have the will he wants. This means that, with
  regard to any of his first-order desires, he is
  free either to make that desire his will or to
  make some other first-order desire his will
  instead. (337)
• So the unwilling addict has a will that is not
  free (the desire that leads to action isnt the
  one he wants to lead to action)

13
Freedom and determinism

• Chisholm thinks that a free act must be an act
  that isnt determined by the laws of nature (a
  little miracle)
• Frankfurt argues that this doesnt explain why
  freedom of the will is specially human couldnt
  rabbits be enjoying these little miracles too?
• And furthermore, why is it better for me to have
  little miracles going on when I walk around?

14
Could I have done otherwise?

• In order to be morally responsible, is it
  essential that I could have done otherwise?
• Frankfurt thinks not there are cases in which
  someone could not have done otherwise but is
  still responsible

15
Responsibility and freedom

• Imagine a third drug addict who is so addicted
  that he cant help acting on the basis of his
  desire for the drug, but who likes his addiction
  and wouldnt have it any other way (so he has a
  second-order volition to desire the drug)
• His will is outside his control, but with his
  second-order volition he has made this
  out-of-control will his own
• His will is not free, although he takes the drug
  freely
• He is morally responsible for taking the drug
  even though he couldnt do otherwise

16
Freedom and determinism

• Frankfurts position is compatible with
  determinism it might be causally determined
  whether you are free to want what you want to
  want (or not)
• Freedom is a condition that can happen to you (or
  be denied to you) for reasons independent of your
  will

17
Freedom and moral responsibility

• When you choose certain desires to be your will,
  you are morally responsible for this choice (even
  if you couldnt have chosen otherwise)
• It could be a matter of chance whether you are
  free to have the will you want some human beings
  are lucky to be free, some might be unlucky.
  (337)

18
Richard Taylor

• A Defense of Libertarian Freedom of the Will

19
Soft determinism

• Soft determinism says
• 1. determinism is true human behaviour always
  arises from antecedent causes
• 2. voluntary behaviour is still free as long as
  it is not externally constrained
• 3. when there arent external constraints,
  voluntary behaviour is caused by our own inner
  states, volitions, decisions, etc.

20
Whats wrong with soft determinism?
21
Whats wrong with soft determinism?

• Appealing to inner states, desires, volitions,
  etc., to explain actions will only make those
  actions free if the inner states themselves
  arent all fated, or caused, or beyond our
  control
• Imagine a person who has been hypnotized into
  desiring certain things, and then acts on the
  basis of these planted desires is she free?

22
Freedom and soft determinism

• Doing what I want isnt enough for me to be free
  what if circumstances beyond my control lead me
  to want something? (e.g. someone poisons my food
  over a period of time and leaves me addicted to
  morphine)

23
Indeterminism is no better

• Indeterminism says some human behaviour is not
  caused it just happens, out of the blue
• This isnt a satisfying conception of freedom
  its a scary picture in which we fly out of
  control from time to time for no reason

24
Indeterminism is no better

• You could apply the indeterminist story to
  desires or inner states rather than actions, so
  that we just find ourselves desiring certain
  things at certain times, for no reason
  whatsoever, and then we are free to act on those
  random desires
• But thats still not what we want from freedom

25
Data?

• Some data that Taylor considersincompatible with
  determinism and indeterminism
• (1) my behaviour is sometimes the outcome of my
  deliberation
• (2) it is sometimes up to me what I do

26
Deliberation and prediction

• If determinism were true, we could at best
  struggle to predict what we are fated to do we
  couldnt engage in genuine deliberation over the
  best course of action
• Is that true? Why or why not?

27
Taylors theory of agency

• If you are to be free, you must be able to act in
  a way that is not determined by any prior
  conditions
• To be an agent, to be one who really acts, I must
  be the cause of my actions (I myself, not just
  something in me, like one of my desires, or nerve
  impulses etc.)

28
Taylors theory of agency

• Its only my action if its caused by me (not by
  something external to me, not by some part of me
  or event within me)
• Question What is this me?

29
Taylors theory of agency

• Its only my action if its caused by me (not by
  something external to me, not by some part of me
  or event within me)
• Question What is this me?
• Taylors answer a self or person is a substance,
  a self-moving being (not just a collection of
  things or events)

30
Taylor on the self

• Do we know that the self is not just a bunch of
  processes? (Cells, neurons firings, etc.)
• Taylor thinks that it is only because the theory
  of agency requires that we see ourselves as
  selves, as substances rather than collections,
  that we are justified in seeing ourselves that way

31
The causation of agency

• Usually, causes happen as parts of causal chains
  so, the dripping water causes the soil to erode
  away, where the melting snow has caused the water
  to drip, and the heat of the sun on the snow
  causes the snow to melt, and the nuclear fusion
  in the sun has caused its heat, and so on (back
  to the Big Bang if you like)

32
The causation of agency

• When I as an agent cause an action of mine,
  however, there are no antecedent causal chains
  I am beginning a brand new chain
• Its also an unusual, special causal chain
  usually events cause other events in this case,
  however, a substance is causing an event

33
Substances causing events

• We are used to thinking of events causing events
  (the striking of the match caused the ignition
  the motion of my hand caused the pencil to make a
  mark)
• Its harder to think about a substance causing an
  event I caused my hand to go up (Why? Is Taylor
  in trouble here?)

34
Substances causing events

• Taylor thinks we may be more comfortable taking
  about ourselves as initiating or performing,
  rather than causing our acts (does that make it
  any better?)

35
Objections Taylor considers

• 1. this is a strange view of what we are
• 2. should we really be so confident of the
  data? Are we really free? Do our
  deliberations really matter?
• 3. Perhaps we are determined and we just cant
  tell.
• Taylor concludes that his theory can be doubted
  (but he still believes it himself, even if its
  not perfectly certain).

36
The two positions

• Taylor agent causation required for genuine
  freedom, determinism is incompatible with
  freedom, not all our behaviour is causally
  determined
• Frankfurt we must be free to will according to
  second-order volitions to be free determinism
  could still be true