The Status and Future of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty

1
The Status and Future of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty

• Rhianna Tyson
• Reaching Critical Will
• The Womens International League for Peace and
  Freedom
• February 26, 2005
• Stockholm, Sweden

2
The Bad News

• A loss of faith in the NPT as a result of
• Horizontal proliferation
• Vertical proliferation
• Decreasing prospects for universality
• Deteriorating faith from some NNWS
• Stalemate in multilateral machinery, including
• Conference on Disarmament (no agreement on a
  programme of work eight years and counting!)
• United Nations Disarmament Commission (no
  agreement on agenda)
• Third Preparatory Committee (no agreement on
  either procedural or substantive recommendations)

3
The Good News

• The Review Cycle has provided us with an
  abundance of proposals for strengthening both
  sides of the Treaty, including
• Additional Protocol elevation
• Tighter controls on the fuel cycle
• Fissile Materials Treaty
• Strengthened and harmonized export controls
• Greater adherence to principles of
  irreversibility, verification and transparency
• Codified NSAs
• Non-strategic weapons reductions (irreversible
  and verifiable)
• Strengthened Review Process (including withdrawal
  mechanisms)
• Global Inventory of fissile materials
• Increased NGO participation and access

4
Horizontal Proliferation Challenges

• DPRK
• Iran
• Syria
• Other NNWS Egypt, Brazil, South Korea

5
Progress on Disarmament?

• China
• Modernizing missile force including mobility,
  solid fuel, improved accuracy, lighter warheads
• France
• Chirac our security is now and will be
  guaranteed above all by our nuclear
  deterrent(this) is our best guarantee against
  threats born of the proliferation, whatever their
  means of delivery.
• UK
• Completed Trident modernization program actively
  upgrading and expanding its facility at
  Aldermaston
• Russia
• Continued Topol-M production, including MARV
  capabilities
• Retaining SS-19s with multiple warheads, contrary
  to START II agreement
• Putin the SS-19s could be deployed until 2030.
• US
• RNEP moves from design to development 2005-2006
• Plans for new bomb factory, (Modern Pit Facility)
  new bomb plant at Los Alamos 200-500 new bomb
  per year

6
Horizontal Vertical Proliferation

• De-linkage of disarmament from non-proliferation
• Stalemated multilateral disarmament machinery
• Unattainable disarmament
• Impossible non-proliferation

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Additional Protocol (universalization)

• Proposal
• New standard of verification
• Provisionally apply until EIF
• Condition of supply

• Supporters
• Belgium, Netherlands, Norway (PC.III/WP.25)
• SG High Level Panel Report
• Germany (PC.III/WP.16)
• New Zealand (MC I)
• UK, Australia (General Debate, PC.III)
• Luxembourg (PC.III/34)
• Austria (PC.III/36)
• Turkey (GA First Committee)
• US (PC.III/WP.19)

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Additional Protocol

• concerns
• Unnecessary when coupled with restrictions on
  enrichment and reprocessing transfers

• Voiced by
• Argentina, Brazil, Russia?

9
Fuel Cycle

• Supporters
• IAEA DG ElBaradei
• US
• G8
• IAEA DG ElBaradei

• Proposal
• Multilateral controls
• Halt all new transfers
• 1 year transfer moratorium
• 5 year moratorium of construction of new
  facilities

10
Fuel Cycle

• Concerns
• Exacerbating the nuclear divide
• Threats to State sovereignty and energy sector
  control
• Increased proliferation risk

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Possibilities for an FMT

• US announces in 2004 that an FMT cannot be
  effectively verifiable, undermining the
  possibilities of commencing negotiations based on
  an already-agreed upon mandate
• An FMT cannot be left to the CD in the absence of
  a program of work
• Alternate venues for negotiation?

12
Export Controls

• ProposalS
• Global nuclear export control system, based on
  Zangger principles
• IAEA-defined minimum standard for nuclear export
  controls
• Security Council-developed model legislation on
  export controls

• supporters
• France(PC.III/WP.22)
• Germany(PC.III/WP.14)
• SG High-Level Panel report

13
Export Controls

• concerns
• Hinder inalienable right
• Exacerbate nuclear divide
• Over-reliance on informal, non-binding agreements

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Disarmament Measures

• 13 Practical Steps (including, inter alia)
• Non-strategic reductions
• Concretizing principles of disarmament
• De-alerting, global stand down by 2010
• Subsidiary body in CD on disarmament
• Reduced role in security policies
• Negative Security Assurances (NSAs)

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Review Process

• Canadas proposal (PC.III/WP.1)
• Replacing PrepComs with General Conferences,
  endowed with decision-making powers
• Standing bureau to convene emergency meeting

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Withdrawal
Germanys recommendations (PC.III/WP.15)

• Written withdrawal notice
• Prior consultations with NPT States parties
• Pre-defined list of criteria defining
  extraordinary event
• Blocking withdrawal request in cases of
  non-compliance

• Stipulation in nuclear trade agreements for
  supplied items to remain under IAEA safeguards,
  even after withdrawal
• Establishing the right to restitute
• Affirming that a withdrawing State still
  accountable for breaches committed while still a
  party

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Global Inventory of Fissile Materials

• Germany proposal in 2002 (PC.I/WP.4)
• US proposal under Global Threat Reduction
  Initiative
• WILPFs contribution- The NGO Shadow Report
  Accountability is Democracy, Transparency is
  Security

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Increased NGO access and participation

• New Zealand the tireless and often unpaid work
  (of NGOs) in keeping information and debate
  flowing about these issues, and for keeping up
  the pressure on governments to take practical
  steps toward disarmament.
• Secretary-General there is a need for a more
  organized and sustained dialogue with the NGO
  communitymore effective engagement with
  NGOsincreases the likelihood that United Nations
  decisions will be better understood and supported
  by a broad and diverse public.
• Croatia there is a growing beneficial role that
  civil society plays in the field of
  disarmament(which) may give additional impetus
  to initiatives to break the deadlock and finally
  move the multilateral disarmament agenda
  forward.

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The Future Three Possibilities

• Continued polarization the NWS wanting only
  strengthened non-proliferation measures, not
  committing to further disarmament measures ? NNWS
  reject strengthening non-proliferation measures ?
  stalemated RevCon
• Lip service, empty rhetoric, watered-down Final
  Document lacking concrete, accountable and
  verifiable measures to strengthen the NPT as a
  whole
• Reinforced commitment to study proposals on the
  table, engaging with civil society, high-level
  governmental representatives to find common
  ground ? a strong Final Document that reinstates
  the global communitys faith in the cornerstone
  of disarmament

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reaching for a critical mass of political will
for nuclear disarmament

• www.reachingcriticalwill.org
• www.wilpf.int.ch