the afterlife, cont.

1
the afterlife, cont.

• 6.22.06

2
4 args for the afterlife

• Platonic arg (Plato)
• moral arg (Kant)
• scientific (a posteriori) arg
• theistic arg (Aquinas)

3
taking stock

• we looked at the 4 main args for the afterlife,
  and their problems.
• we also saw that its not clear that the notion
  of the afterlife makes sense its also not clear
  that it doesnt.
• these considerations arent decisive, but they do
  suggest that the belief that there is an
  afterlife is not justified.
• of course, it does not follow that belief that
  there is not an afterlife is justified.
• perhaps were not justified believing either
  wayagnosticism may be the only justified view.

4
recall a potential problem

• p1. there is no afterlife.
• p2. our lives can be meaningful only if there is
  an afterlife.
• c. so, our lives cannot be meaningful.
• yesterday is p1 true?
• do we have reason to believe that there is an
  afterlife?

5
evaluation of p1

• p1. there is no afterlife.
• args for the afterlife inconclusive at best
• Platonic arg (Plato)
• moral arg (Kant)
• scientific (a posteriori) arg
• theistic arg (Aquinas)
• objections render belief in the afterlife
  problematic
• major problems with args for the afterlife
• vs. the meaningfulness of belief in the afterlife
• persons and their bodies
• personal identity

6
a potential problem, again

• p1. there is no afterlife.
• p2. our lives can be meaningful only if there is
  an afterlife.
• c. so, our lives cannot be meaningful.
• today is p2 true?
• could the afterlife be a necessary condition for
  life being meaningful?

7
the claim

• pure soul-centered (afterlife) theories
• PSCT Ss life is meaningful if and only if Ss
  soul is in a certain condition
• recall what PSCT entails
• it follows from PSCT that ones life can be
  meaningful only if one has a soul
• if one has a soul, then there is an (eternal)
  afterlife
• so, it follows from PSCT that ones life can be
  meaningful only if there is an afterlife.

8
what PSCT does not say

• although PSCT says that ones soul being in a
  certain condition is sufficient for a meaningful
  life, it does not say that an afterlife alone is
  sufficient for a meaningful life.
• to see why it would be pretty implausible to say
  that an afterlife alone is sufficient for life
  being meaningful, think of an example in which
  there is an afterlife but life is still not
  meaningful.
• also, theres the worry that if a finite life
  could not be meaningful, then neither could a
  merely infinite life (Nagel)

9
two questions

• is an afterlife necessary for life to be
  meaningful?
• many, many people yes
• is an afterlife inconsistent with a meaningful
  life?
• Williams yes
• Fischer no

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is an afterlife necessary for a meaningful life?

• Nozick (1981, 582 595)
• A significant life is, in some sense,
  permanent it makes a permanent difference to the
  worldit leaves traces. To be wiped out
  completely, traces and all, goes a long way
  toward destroying the meaning of ones life. To
  be puzzled about why death seems to undercut
  meaning is to fail to see the temporal limit as a
  limit.

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arg from ultimate consequence

• p1. a meaningful life requires having an infinite
  effect, or making a permanent difference.
• p2. having an infinite effect, or making a
  permanent difference, requires an afterlife.
• c. so, a meaningful life requires an afterlife.

12
support for p1

• p1a. a meaningful life is a life worth living.
• p1b. a life worth living is a choice-worthy life.
• p1c. a choice-worthy life requires having an
  infinite effect, or making a permanent
  difference.
• so,
• p1. a meaningful life requires having an infinite
  effect, or making a permanent difference.

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vs. p1c

• p1c. a choice-worthy life requires having an
  infinite effect, or making a permanent
  difference.
• why believe that?
• recall Nagels aspirin example aspirin need not
  have an infinite effect, or make a permanent
  difference, to make it rational to choose to take
  aspirin when I have a headache.
• or, consider Mother Theresas life surely what
  she did was choice-worthy, though theres a
  chance it wont have an infinite effect (whatever
  that might mean) or make a permanent difference.

14
vs. p2

• p2. having an infinite effect, or making a
  permanent difference, requires an afterlife.
• even if one must make a permanent difference to
  avoid having a meaningless life, there need not
  be an afterlife to have this effect.
• for example, angels could eternally sing ones
  praises. (metz)
• or, one could blow up the earth.

15
is an afterlife inconsistent with a meaningful
life?

• Williams (338)
• an endless life would be a meaningless one we
  could have no reason for living eternally a human
  life. There is no desirable or significant
  property a life could have more of, or have more
  unqualifiedly, if we lasted forever.

16
being-towards-death (heidegger, wollheim)

• our choices, cares, and concerns are genuinely
  valuable because we will permanently and
  irreversibly cease to exist.
• in other words, death provides the pressure
  necessary to figure out what is most important
  and then to act on it.
• since an afterlife removes this pressure, it
  would upset the value of our choices, cares, and
  concerns.

17
two criteria (williams)

• I shallpursue the idea that from facts about
  human desire and happiness and what a human life
  is, it followsthat immortality would
  beintolerable.
• in order to ground lifes meaning
• the future person must be genuinely identical to
  the individual in question.
• the life of the future person must be attractive
  (in a certain way) to that individualthe life of
  the future person must be suitably related to
  the goals and projects of that individual.

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arg for inconsistency (williams)

• p1. a persons life can be meaningful only if
  she remains genuinely identical throughout that
  life AND that future life is attractive (in a
  certain way) to her.
• p2. if there is an afterlife, then EITHER the
  future person is not genuinely identical to the
  individual in question OR the life of the future
  person is not attractive (in the right way) to
  that individual.
• c. so, a persons life can be meaningful only
  if there is no afterlife.

19
support for p2

• p2a. in the afterlife, either certain important
  aspects of the persons character (her basic
  goals, projects, dispositions and interests)
  remain the same over time, or they change.
• p2b. if they remain the same, then boredom
  ensues.
• p2c. if they change, then the future person is
  not genuinely identical to the individual in
  question.
• p2d. boredom is not attractive (in the right
  way).
• so,
• p2. if there is an afterlife, then EITHER the
  future person is not genuinely identical to the
  individual in question OR the life of the future
  person is not attractive (in the right way) to
  that individual.

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vs. p2c (fischer)

• p2c. if certain important aspects of the
  persons character change, then the future person
  is not genuinely identical to the individual in
  question.
• first, Ones attitude toward future changes of
  character depend on how and why the changes take
  place (360).
• e.g., is there some continuity? was the change
  motivated?
• second, I may welcome future changes
• currently I value excitement and challenge, so I
  live in Laramie I may envisage a time in the
  future when I value peace/quiet, in which case I
  move to New York City.
• third, surely death is not preferable to most
  changes of character (excepting reincarnation,
  which looks like destruction, not change).

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vs. p2b (fischer)

• p2b. if certain important aspects of the persons
  character remain the same, then boredom ensues.
• first, we think of certain mortal lives which
  include considerable stretches of boredom and
  even pain nevertheless worth living and even very
  appealing (354).
• second, the afterlife may include a balanced mix
  of a wide range of new and interesting
  experiences.
• third, while an eternity of self-exhausting
  pleasures may induce boredom, an eternity of
  appropriately distributed repeatable pleasures
  may be found immensely satisfying.

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vs. p2d (metz)

• p2d. boredom is not attractive (in the right
  way).
• first, boredom isnt always so bad.
• surely its not bad enough to make death
  preferable.
• third, at the very least, the burden is on the
  defender of p2d to show that the boredom would
  make constructive action or thought impossible.
  for so long as that remains possible, then one is
  not bored to death, as it were.

23
meaning as intrinsic value

• presumably, what is at issue is the meaning of
  the life we know our life on earth.
• intuitively, a meaningful life is one that has
  intrinsic value.
• that is, if life is valuable only because it is a
  means to an end, then it isnt genuinely
  meaningful cf. a tool.

24
meaning as intrinsic value

• for instance, if life is valuable only because it
  provides one the opportunity to achieve an
  afterlife, and an afterlife is what is really
  valuable, then life is a mere means to an end.
• in such a case, life is like a tool.
• but, again, tools arent intrinsically valuable.
• so, if life gets its value from an afterlife,
  then life isnt intrinsically valuable.
• so, PSCT degrades life it denies that life is
  genuinely meaningful.
• if this is correct, PSCT is a form of nihilism.

25
today

• is an afterlife necessary for meaning?
• arg from ultimate consequence
• is an afterlife inconsistent with meaning?
• being-towards-death (heidegger, wollheim)
• arg for inconsistency (williams)
• meaning as intrinsic value

26
a potential problem, yet again

• p1. there is no afterlife.
• p2. our lives can be meaningful only if there is
  an afterlife.
• c. so, our lives cannot be meaningful.
• yesterday p1 doesnt look great.
• today p2 doesnt look great.

27
for monday

• read
• (CP) Conee Sider, God in Riddles of Existence
• (CP) Wiesel, excerpt from Night
• Dont worry so much about
• (CP) Rowe, The Problem of Evil in Philosophy of
  Religion
• Study for Mondays quiz.