Mapping the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict

1
Mapping the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Solution

• The question of borders

Part 2 Land Swaps
Presented by S. Daniel Abrahams Center for
Middle East Peace Prepared by Dan Rothem In
collaboration with Lara Friedman
2
Review Elements of the Classic Palestinian
Approach to Borders

• Since the Peel Commission, each historical
  development has diminished the land under
  Palestinian control and increased the land under
  Jewish/Israeli control.
• Recognition of the 1967 line as the legitimate
  border and the basis of negotiations in
  essence, Palestinian acceptance of Israel on 78
  of the land of historic Palestine constitutes
  an historic concession to Israel.
• All Israeli settlement activity beyond the 1967
  line violates international law, including in
  East Jerusalem.
• The West Bank and Gaza Strip must be considered a
  single territorial unit and a safe passage must
  be established to allow unimpeded movement
  between them.

3
Expected Palestinian Positions in Negotiations

• Any agreement must be based on the 1967 lines and
  must refer explicitly to these lines.
• The starting point of any agreement must be
  recognition of the Palestinian claim to 100 of
  the land of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, based
  on the 1967 lines and constituting 22 of
  historic Palestine.
• The Palestinian concession regarding the
  remaining 78 of historic Palestine represents
  the final Palestinian position regarding the
  amount of territory it will concede.
• Any deviations from the 1967 lines must be
  mutually agreed on and compensated by land swaps
  that are equal in quantity and quality.
• Such land swaps should be minimal (2 or less of
  the total land area).
• A safe passage route between the West Bank and
  Gaza Strip must be established.

4
Review Classic Israeli borders approach

• The 1967 lines have no legal standing and are not
  sacred.
• The fate of the territories will be resolved in
  negotiations, without regard to prior claims by
  the Palestinians.
• Israeli interests require the annexation of
  large, expanded settlement blocks and areas
  around Jerusalem.
• Israeli security requires a long-term presence in
  all or part of the Jordan Valley.

5
Expected Israeli Position in Negotiations

• Israel may accept the legitimacy of the 1967
  lines, as mentioned in the Bush speech of 2002
  and as referenced in the 2004 Israeli-US exchange
  of letters (referred to as the 1949 Armistice
  Line).
• Israel will be prepared to make painful
  compromises and evacuate many West Bank
  settlements (with the route of the barrier as the
  likely starting point), but will not compromise
  on some land that it views as strategically vital
  or that is home to large settler populations.
• Land swaps will be considered, but not according
  to a 11 ratio.
• Safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza Strip
  will not be viewed as a Palestinian entitlement
  but rather as an Israeli concession that will be
  used as negotiating leverage.

6
Review Possible points of agreement on borders
A model formula Borders will be based on the
1967 lines with agreed-upon modifications that
will include land swaps equal in size (11) and
will take into consideration the parties
security and demographic interests while
maintaining territorial contiguity.

• Includes explicit reference to 1967 (as demanded
  by the Palestinians)
• Includes idea of modifications to 1967 borders
  (as demanded by the Israelis)
• Includes concept of 11 land swaps (as demanded
  by the Palestinians)
• Places no limitation on size of modifications and
  swaps (as demanded by the Israelis)

7
Focus on Land Swaps

• It is clear that Israel will seek to retain large
  areas of the West Bank to accommodate settlement
  blocs and for security purposes.
• It is also clear that Palestinians will demand
  that any land annexed by Israel must be agreed to
  by the Palestinians and offset by land from
  inside Israel, on the basis of 11 land swaps.
• There is a rather finite and definable bank of
  Israeli land available for such swaps,
  representing a de facto limit on the percentage
  of land that Israel can annex and swap.
• This bank comprising land of varying quality,
  is equal to approximately 8 of the West Bank.

8
Basic Criteria for Land Swaps

• From an Israeli perspective, the land in question
  should be
• Not located near Israels narrow waist
• Free of Israeli vital infrastructure
• Not located west of settlement blocks that Israel
  plans to annex
• From a Palestinian perspective, the land in
  question should be
• In close proximity to the Green Line
• Of equal value (in terms of location, potential
  for use) to the land for which it is being
  swapped
• Unresolved issues
• How do the sides determine exact value of land?
  (this analysis measures value in terms of basic
  agricultural use, but this is not the only
  measure)
• Can/should Israel include populated areas in land
  swaps?
• Can/should Israel include a West Bank-Gaza safe
  passage in land swaps?

9
Israels realistic land swap options

• The Basic Map, showing
• Just the 1967 lines (other details removed for
  clarity)

10
Israels realistic land swap options

• The basic map, showing
• Israeli localities located near the Green Line
  (which act as a de facto limit on land that can
  be swapped)

11
Israels realistic land swap options

• The basic map, showing
• High- and medium-quality land available for swaps
  (in light and dark green) totaling about 4.5
  of land
• Israeli localities located near the Green Line
  (in blue)

12
Israels realistic land swap options

• The basic map, showing
• High- and medium-quality land available for swaps
  (in light and dark green) totaling about 4.5
• low-quality land available for swaps (in tan)
  adding up to 3.5 (but land that the Palestinians
  will likely not accept)
• Israeli localities located near the Green Line
  (in blue)

13
Examining possible borders scenarios

• What could borders look like if the sides agree
  to the model formula (1967 as basis, 11 swaps)?
• The following three scenarios depict the room for
  maneuver available to current negotiators, under
  this formula
• the Geneva Initiative (an unofficial
  Israeli-Palestinian model peace agreement, which
  assumes a 2.2 Israeli annexation)
• the Israeli West Bank security barrier (the
  actual route of the barrier on the ground and
  approved by the Government of Israel, which
  involves a de facto 8.7 Israeli annexation)
• a barrier proposal by the Council for Peace and
  Security (a highly-regarded non-governmental
  organization which submitted its own proposal for
  a unilateral barrier route that prescribes a de
  facto 5.7 Israeli annexation)
• While these maps are accurate, they are not
  authoritative and are for illustrative purpose
  only. In the latter two maps, land swaps have
  been added for the sake of the analysis, based on
  a good faith effort to represent the likely
  demands and options of each side)

14
Borders options under the100 percent concept
The Geneva Initiative Providing for a 2.2
Israeli annexation of the West Bank (settlement
blocks along the Green Line and around
Jerusalem), and 11 land swaps comprised of high-
and medium- value lands
15
Borders options under the100 percent concept
The Geneva Initiative Providing for a 2.2
Israeli annexation of the West Bank (settlement
blocs along the Green Line and around Jerusalem),
and 11 land swaps comprised of high- and medium-
value land (shown here in the context of the full
map of Israel, to illustrate what this formula
would mean to both sides)
16
Borders options under the100 percent concept
The Israeli Barrier Involving a de facto 8.7
Israeli annexation of the West Bank 11 land
swaps would require the Palestinians to accept a
large area of very low quality land (something
they are unlikely to accept)
17
Borders options under the100 percent concept
The Israeli Barrier Involving a de facto 8.7
Israeli annexation of the West Bank11 land
swaps would require the Palestinians to accept a
large area of very low quality land (something
they are unlikely to accept) (shown here in the
context of the full map of Israel, to illustrate
what this formula would mean to both sides)
18
Borders options under the100 percent concept
The Council for Peace and Security Barrier
Proposal Providing for a 5.7 Israeli annexation
of the West Bank 11 land swaps could be
achieved using mainly high- and medium-quality
land
19
Borders options under the100 percent concept
The Council for Peace and Security Barrier
Proposal Providing for a 5.7 Israeli annexation
of the West Bank 11 land swaps could be achieved
using mainly high- and medium-quality land (shown
here in the context of the full map of Israel, to
illustrate what this formula would mean to both
sides)
20
Some boring but important data
21
Populated Land Swaps?

• There has been a great deal of debate in Israel
  surrounding suggestions that Israel should
  include areas inhabited by Israeli-Arabs
  (Israelis citizens who are ethnically
  Palestinian) in land swaps, with proponents
  arguing that inclusion of populated land would
  permit Israel to annex significantly more of the
  West Bank, and that such land swaps would
  significantly improve Israels demographic
  balance (i.e., increase the ratio of Jewish to
  non-Jewish citizens).
• Setting aside the very serious legal and moral
  aspects of this issue, it is possible to analyze
  Israels realistic options with respect to
  populated land swaps.
• Such an analysis shows that the inclusion of
  populated land would add at most 2.5 to the bank
  of land available for swaps.
• Such an analysis also shows that populated land
  swaps would have a very limited impact on
  Israels demography, effecting at most around
  110,000-140,000 Israeli-Arabs or, in other
  words, about 10 of the 1.2 million
  Israeli-Arabs.
• For a thorough analysis of the proposal,
  including legal aspects, visit http//www.fips.org
  .il/Fips/Site/System/UpLoadFiles/DGallery/Injustic
  e.pdf

22
Populated Land Swaps?

• The Basic Map, showing
• Israeli localities located near the Green Line
  (in blue)

23
Populated Land Swaps?

• Where are we talking about?
• Map of the northern border area of the West Bank,
  including the area inside Israel generally
  discussed in the context of populated land swaps.
  
• Israeli localities located in close proximity to
  the Green Line (in blue)

24
Populated Land Swaps?

• Who lives in the area?
• The same map, this time distinguishing between
  Israeli-Jewish towns (blue) and Israeli-Arab
  towns (green).
• Israel would not swap land that is home to Jewish
  Israelis, meaning that much of this area is not
  available for swaps.

25
Populated Land Swaps?

• What else is there on the ground that limits
  swap options?
• The same map, this time superimposing key
  Israeli infrastructure, in particular the
  Trans-Israel Road (in purple).
• Israeli would not swap land that in any way
  impacts this vital transportation route, further
  limiting land available for swaps.

26
Populated Land Swaps?

• What is there in the West Bank that limits swap
  options?
• The same map, this time including settlement
  blocks (in bright blue) that Israel wants to keep
• Israeli would not swap land that in located west
  of these blocks, further limiting swap options.

27
Populated Land Swaps?

• What populated land is actually available for
  swaps?
• Map showing (in red) the Arab-populated land
  inside Israel realistically available for swaps,
  taking into account the location of
  Israeli-Jewish localities inside Israel, key
  infrastructure, and settlement blocks.
• In total, this area amount to at most 2.5 and
  140,000 people.

28
Conclusions

• The territorial aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian
  conflict, like the other core issues, is
  resolvable.
• As demonstrated, the sides could agree on a
  principle that will embody a fair and realistic
  arrangement, embodying
• A core Palestinian need of establishing a
  state of an equivalent of 100 of pre-1967 areas
  (or 22 of Historic Palestine), and
• Border modifications that on the one hand will
  allow the majority (about 75) of Israelis
  residing in the West Bank and East Jerusalem to
  remain in place, and on the other hand will
  include land swaps equal in size to an Israeli
  annexations.