Euthyphro

1
Euthyphro

• Philosophy 21
• Fall, 2004
• G. J. Mattey

2
Socrates

• Born 469 BC
• Lived in Athens
• Married to Xanthippi
• Clashed with the Sophists
• Convicted of impiety and corrupting youth
• Died 399 BC

3
Socratess Contributions

• Turned philosophy to study of virtue
• Engaged in public philosophical debate rather
  than solitary contemplation
• Demanded a clear understanding of the concepts
  under discussion
• Persistently questioned every view, leading him
  to skepticism

4
Virtue

• The concept of virtue (arete, excellence) was
  used extensively in Greek culture
• Socrates was the first to examine virtue in
  detail
• He equated virtue with knowledge no one does
  wrong willingly
• Piety is one of the virtues

5
Piety and the Pious Act

• Euthyphro claims to be acting piously in
  prosecuting his father
• He must defend this claim, since the act appears
  to be impious
• Euthyphro claims to know better than others what
  piety is
• If his act falls under the correct conception of
  piety, then it is a pious act

6
The Form

• Many acts are considered to be pious
• Each pious act is pious because there is
  something the same and alike in every pious
  action
• This unifying something is called a form
• The form makes all pious actions pious
• The correct conception of piety therefore must
  describe this form

7
The First Account of Piety

• To be pious is to prosecute the wrongdoer, no
  matter who it is
• But there are other pious acts that do not
  involve the prosecution of the wrongdoer
• So this account violates the condition that there
  be one form unifying all pious acts
• Socrates demands a form as a model that can be
  used to distinguish any pious act

8
The Second Account of Piety

• To be pious is to be loved by the gods
• This meets the requirement of a single form
• But nothing meets this condition
• An act is loved by the gods insofar as it is
  considered just (or good, or beautiful)
• The gods disagree over whether acts are just
• The same act would then have to be both pious and
  impiousloved by some and not by others

9
The Third Account of Piety

• To be pious is to be loved by all the gods
• It is questionable whether Euthyphros act meets
  this condition
• But this does not show the account to be
  incorrect, since there is reason to believe that
  prosecuting ones father is impious
• There is a more fundamental objection

10
The -ing/-ed Distinction

• A thing is carried because of the act of carrying
• But the act of carrying is not an act of carrying
  simply because of the thing carried
• A thing is not being affected because it is
  something affected, but it is something affected
  because it is being affected
• This holds for love a thing is loved because of
  the act of loving, and not vice-versa

11
Refutation of the Third Account

• So something is loved by all the gods because of
  their act of loving it, and not because it is
  loved
• Suppose piety being loved by all the gods
• Then something is pious because of the act of the
  gods loving it, and not because it is pious
• But the gods love what is pious because it is
  pious
• Thus, piety ? being loved by all the gods, by
  reductio ad absurdum

12
Avoiding the Refutation

• Socratess argument is supposed to show that
  piety is distinct from being loved by all the
  gods
• Euthyphro could avoid the conclusion by simply
  refusing Socratess claim that the gods love what
  is pious because it is pious
• He could embrace the conclusion that the pious
  would be pious because it was being loved by the
  gods

13
Form or Quality?

• If the pious is not the same as what is loved by
  all the gods, what is the relation between them?
• Being loved by all the gods is a quality of the
  pious
• To give a quality of a thing does not supply the
  form that makes it what it is
• But Euthyphro could say that this quality is what
  makes a pious act pious piety is relative to the
  actions of the gods

14
The Fourth Account of Piety

• Piety is that part of the just concerning the
  care of the gods
• But piety does not benefit the gods, since the
  gods cannot be made better
• Nor is it service to the gods, since it does not
  help them achieve an end
• But Socrates overlooks Euthyphros reply that
  doing what is pleasing to the gods is necessary
  to preserve order in private houses and public
  affairs

15
The Fifth Account of Piety

• Piety is a knowledge of how to give to, and beg
  from, the gods
• To give correctly is to satisfy needs
• But the gods have no needs to be satisfied
• So there is no correct giving, and hence no
  knowledge of how to give to the gods
• Euthyphro could deny either of the two claims
  leading to the conclusion

16
Moving Statues

• Euthyphro had stated that Socratess statements
  did not stay put, like the statues of his
  ancestor Daedelus
• Socrates responded that he could move others
  statements around
• He now notes that Euthyphro has returned to his
  earlier account of piety as what is dear to the
  gods
• He has made his account go in a circle

17
Conclusion

• Socrates controls the discussion, by making
  Euthyphro agree to statements that will get him
  into trouble
• Euthyphro could have denied any of several of
  these and saved several of his accounts
• His most obvious move is to allow that the pious
  is pious because all the gods love it
• This position undercuts the doctrine of forms,
  introducing a kind of relativism
• The conflict is re-played throughout the next
  2,400 years