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Defections from Parties:

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... voters: discussions and pre-election polls ... 2006 Israeli election ... both houses are held on the same day: voting for different parties for the two houses ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Defections from Parties:


1
  • Defections from Parties
  • Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting
  • Eva-Maria Otto

2
1. Definitions
  • Tactical Voting
  • Someone who votes for another party (or party
    candidate) other than their most preferred one if
    he or she expects to be more likely to influence
    the outcome of this election than by casting a
    sincere vote.

3
1. Definitions
  • Split Voting
  • In a electoral system in which voters have two
    votes, they can decide to cast a
  • Straight ticket giving both votes to the same
    party OR
  • Split ticket giving their votes to two different
    parties
  • Protest Voting
  • Voters reacting against specific policies or
    failures of their natural parties rather than
    being positively attracted to another party
    (Heath et al., 1985 113)

4
2. Tactical Voting
  • Assumptions
  • The literature on tactical voting agrees that
    institutional incentives are the driving force
    that spurs tactical voting
  • Duverger Political consequences of electoral
    systems
  • Mechanical effect how electoral systems affect
    the way votes are transformed into seats ? affect
    the outcome
  • Psychological effect how the electoral system
    affect voters choice ? affect the vote

5
2. Tactical Voting
  • Voters have rational expectations about electoral
    outcomes
  • Voters are servants of two masters
  • Their preferences and
  • Their expectations
  • Politicaly aware and informed voters discussions
    and pre-election polls
  • Voters who do not follow the campaign previous
    elections

6
2.1. Plurality system
  • Mechanical effect
  • Single Member Plurality systems
    under-representation of minor parties
  • Psycological effect
  • Voters reactions to this systematic
    under-representation

7
2.1. Plurality system
  • Wasted-vote hypothesis
  • Supporters of parties that are likely to come
    third (or worse) in a local constituency would do
    better to cast their vote for whichever of the
    top two parties they find more acceptable instead
    of wasting their vote if they vote for their
    preference
  • Especially when the race between the top two
    parties is close
  • Do you think this is only true for smaller party
  • supporters (e.g. Liberal Democrats supporters)?

8
2.2 Mixed electoral system
  • Germany
  • Two votes
  • Candidate Vote (Erststimme) the electorate vote
    for a candidate in single member districts and
    the victor is determined by a simply plurality ?
    casts the first half of MdBs
  • List Vote (Zweitstimme) vote for the list of a
    Land party and elects the other half of MdBs
    (Members of the Bundetag), which are elected in
    such a way that the total number of seats which a
    party receives including any constituency seat
    won is proportional to its percentage share of
    such list votes. This gives the system a
    proportional represention component.
  • Threshold 5
  • Parties and Coalitions
  • SPD (major party) and Greens (smaller party)
  • CDU (major party) and FDP (smaller party)

9
2.2 Mixed electoral system
  • Mechanical effect
  • Mixed electoral systems tendency to let more
    than two parties be represented in the Parliament
  • Psyciological effect
  • Voters reactions to possible coalition formations

10
2.2. Mixed electoral system
  • Influence of electoral rules on how voters behave
  • Wasted-vote hypothesis
  • The closer the district race, the more likely
    small party supporters are to cast a strategic
    candidate vote.
  • Coalitions-insurance hypothesis
  • If major party supporters are unsure about the
    expectations whether or not the smaller
    coalitions partner will be represented in
    parliament and the higher their tendency to
    desert their most preferred party, the more
    likely they are to cast a strategic list vote.
  • Under which system is tactical voting more
    likely the
  • plurality or mixed electoral system?

11
(No Transcript)
12
2.2. Mixed electoral system
  • Voters proclivity to vote strategically
  • Motivations hypothesis
  • The weaker the voters partisanship, the more
    strongly motivated they are to split their ticket
  • Capability Hypothesis
  • The higher the voters level of political
    sophistication, the more likely they are to cast
    a strategic vote
  • Does that mean that tactical voting will increase
  • in the future?

13
2.3. PR electoral system
  • Israel
  • One Vote The unicameral Knesset is elected via a
    single, nation-wide district under proportional
    representation
  • Threshold 2
  • 2006 Israeli election
  • It was quite clear that the major centre party
    Kadima would win a plurality of the seats and
    serve as a senior partner in a multi-member
    government
  • It was unclear which smaller party would join the
    coalition (unlike the German case)

14
2.3. PR electoral system
  • Coalition Hypothesis
  • When voters perceive membership in the coalition
    to be out of reach for their preferred small
    party they desert it and instead endorse the
    lesser of the evils among those parties
    (ideologically nearest party) they perceive as
    potential coalition members
  • Extension of Duvergerian logic not party entry
    into parliament, but party entry into government
  • Do you think that there will be a lot of tactical
    voting in
  • this case, because there are many small parties
    and the
  • outcome is difficult to predict?

15
3. Split Voting
  • Different meanings of split voting in different
    electoral systems
  • US selecting candidates of different parties for
    different types of offices (e. g. voting for a
    Democratic president and for a Republican senator
    and/or representative)
  • Bicameral parliamentary systems in which
    elections for both houses are held on the same
    day voting for different parties for the two
    houses
  • Mixed electoral systems split ticket for members
    of the same house

16
3. Split Voting
  • Reasons for split voting
  • Special preference for a viable
  • constituency candidates of
  • another party
  • Wasted vote hypothesis voters
  • may see no chance of winning
  • for their most preferred candidate
    tactical
  • Coalition Insurance strategy
    voting
  • support a particular coalition
  • Voters misunderstand the relative
  • importance of the respective votes

17
3. Split Voting
  • Difference between split voting and tactical
    voting
  • Tactical Voting Comparison of party preference
    and vote intention or decision
  • Split Voting Comparison of first and second vote
  • ? Two forms of tactical voting are sufficient
    conditions of split ticket voting, but there are
    other causes

18
3. Split Voting
  • Germany
  • Small party voters (according to second vote)
    desert their constituency candidates more in
    favour of large-party candidates than do
    large-party voters the other way around ?
    especially FDP voters
  • Random splitting other vote combinations than
    CDU/FDP or SPD/Greens
  • Attractive candidates this is only the case for
    the Left party , which won some Berlin
    constituencies
  • 1990 survey 50 were unable to answer the
    question which of the two votes is the party vote
  • ? Ticket splitting has increased in Germany
    over the
  • time In 2005 24.4 of the voters
    split their ticket

19
What do you think the main reason is for the
increasing split voting in Germany (e. g. weaker
partisanship, voters do not understand the system
etc.)?
20
4. Protest Voting
  • Dissatisfied voters have two options
  • Protest voting
  • Lack of a genuinely preferred alternative
    (especially in Plurality systems)
  • Signal their disaffection from their normal
    first-preference party
  • Abstention

21
4. Protest Voting
  • Theoretical backround
  • Rational Choice (Downs)
  • Protest voting is irrational
  • When voters are disaffected with their
    first-preference choice, they will be more likely
    to abstain considering the cost of voting
  • If voters no longer prefer party A but instead
    rank party B higher, then protest voting
    disappears in favour of a simple switch of
    alignments

22
4. Protest Voting
  • Alternative approch (Dunleavy and Margetts)
  • Individuals define an appropiate aspiration
    level against which to judge their involvement,
    continuing to participate if this level is
    achieved, and dropping out if it is not.
  • Do you think that decreasing in turnout in
    Western
  • countries and the formation of new extremist
  • parties like the Lefts in Germany or the New
  • Zealand First are signals for an increasing in
  • dissatisfied voters?

23
5. Conclusion
  • Tactical Voting
  • The character of tactical voting differs between
    different electoral systems and the circumstances
    of each individual election
  • The more proportional a system is the less
    motivation there is for voters to cast a
    strategic vote

24
5. Conclusion
  • Split Voting
  • The character of split voting also differs
    between different electoral systems
  • Tactical voting can be one reason for a voter to
    split their ticket, but there are other reasons
    too
  • The increasing in split voting in Germany is
    mostly due to easing behavioural norms of
    partisans, not partisan declinement in general

25
5. Conclusion
  • Protest Voting
  • The character of Protest Voting also differs
    between different electoral systems
  • Dissatisfied voters have the choice between
    protest voting (voting for extremist parties) and
    abstention (lowers the turnout)

26
The End
  • Thank you very much for your attention!
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