Title: 01.16.01
1Game Theory Applications Lecture 2
- Galina Albert Schwartz
- Department of Finance
- University of Michigan
- Business School
2How to find me
- My office D3270A (Davidson Hall)
- My e-mail galka_at_umich.edu
- My office hours
- Mon., 10am - 12pm
- Th., 1pm - 3pm,
- or by appointment
3Lecture 2 Terminology Examples of Basic Games
- Dixit, Chapters 1 2 (mostly 2)
- Definitions
- strategy
- outcome
- equilibrium
- payoff
- expectations
- rationality
4The Major Definition
- Dixit, p. 29 second paragraph from the bottom
- Our definition of the rules of the game
- list of players
- strategies available to each of them
- payoffs of each player for all possible
combinations of all player strategies - each player is a rational maximizer
5Definitions
- Strategy is a set of the choices available for
the players, (Dixit, p. 25) - Payoff is a number associated with each possible
outcome of the game (Dixit, p. 26) (and Expected
payoff) - Equilibrium - each players strategy is a best
response to the strategies of others, p. 30
6What Do We Assume about the Game?
- Rationality implies
- consistency in the ranking of the payoffs
- ability to calculate what is in his best interest
- Common knowledge of the rules of the game
7What is Rationality?
- Rationality does not imply
- the same values for everyone
- impossibility of altruismcould be incorporated
in payoff - short-term rationality irrational from immediate
perspective may be valuable as a long-term
strategy - example prices introductory prices predatory
prices. Interaction between the two
8Classification of the Games
- Dixit, Chapters 1 2 (mostly 2)
- constant-sum games ? zero-sum games
- bargaining games
- brinkmanship
- sequential moves games
- simultaneous moves games
- cooperative games (we will not address)
- i.e. games with a possibility of enforceable
joint-action agreements
9Classification of the Games (cont.)
- Dixit, Chapters 1 2 (mostly 2)
- non-cooperative games
- non-repeated games (one-shot games)
- repeated games
- repeated but with different opponents
- dynamic games (evolutionary games)
- or, are the rules fixed or permit
manipulation?
10What is more important How or Why?
- How (cases)
- Why (theory)
- Apply game theory to
- explain
- predict
- advise (prescribe)
- Why is needed to advice (prescribe)
11Lewis, Chapter 2 Never Mention Money. Game 1
- Never Mention Money Does it makes any sense?
- Yes, it does. The required answer actually makes
perfect sense. Emotions matter! I.e. - the people excitement by the high-caliber
people - the challenge
- the thrill of the deal
12Lewis, Chapter 2 Never Mention Money. Game 2
- Why analysts job has super-long hours?
- from a production point inefficient
- Prisoners dilemma? A small part of the
explanation - But a cutthroat business competition is a
Prisoners dilemma - Major purpose - to deter cheats time constraint
on physical implementation , and design of the
cheating mechanism
13Lewis, Chapter 2 Never Mention Money. Game 3
- Interviewing with Solomon Brothers.
- Why intellect is not checked sometimes?
- It is implied to be sufficient
- Why education (the knowledge) is irrelevant, but
still is required? - signals interests
- signals ability
- majoring in economics permit direct comparison
14Lewis, Chapter 2 Never Mention Money. Game 3
(cont)
- Why to intimidate?
- Speed (and quality) or responses in unfamiliar
situation are tested - Why no explicit offer?
- Nobody could turn it down
- Importantly impossible to state that you turned
Solomon down - No explicit salary offer. To underpay?
- No, to screen. A quest for the able ones (who do
not fear the risk confident in abilities)
15Summary of Today
- Definition of the Game p. 29
- The definition of Nash Equilibrium, p. 30
- Lewis, Chapter 2 examples of the games
16To Do your preparation to 01.18.01
- Read Dixit, chapter 2
- Read Lewis, chapters 2 3
- Next time we will explain what is the absolutely
necessary component of the Greenspans strategy
and any other Central Bankers strategy - Please, prepare your guesses of the
absolutely necessary component