Title: Homeland Security Issues and Solutions
1Homeland Security Issues and Solutions
Prof. Steven A. Demurjian, Sr. Director, CSE
Graduate Program Computer Science Engineering
Department The University of Connecticut Storrs,
CT 06269-3155
steve_at_engr.uconn.edu http//www.engr.uconn.edu/st
eve http//www.engr.uconn.edu/steve/DSEC/dsec.htm
l (860) 486 - 4818
Lt. Col. Charles E. Phillips, Jr. Dept. of
Electrical Engineering and Computer
Science United States Military Academy West
Point, NY
Charles.Phillips_at_usma.edu (845) 938 -
5564 (Instructor at USMA/Ph.D. Student at UConn)
2Dynamic Coalition for Homeland Security
- Crisis
- Any Situation Requiring National or International
Attention - Coalition
- Alliance of Organizations
- Military, Civilian, International or any
Combination - Dynamic Coalition
- Formed in a Crisis and Changes as Crisis Develops
- Key Concern Being the Most Effective way to Solve
the Crisis - Dynamic Coalition Problem (DCP)
- Security, Resource, and Information Sharing Risks
that Occur as a Result of Coalition Being Formed
Quickly
3DC for Military Deployment/Engagement
OBJECTIVES Securely Leverage Information in a
Fluid Environment Protect Information While
Simultaneously Promoting the Coalition Security
Infrastructure in Support of DCP
SICF France
LFCS Canada
HEROS Germany
SIACCON Italy
4DC for Medical Emergency
Transportation
Military Medics
Govt.
Local Health Care
CDC
ISSUES Privacy vs. Availability in Medical
Records Support Life-Threatening Situations via
Availability of Patient Data on Demand
5Security Issues Information Access and Flow
- What are the Security Requirements for Each User
in DC Information at What Times? - What Information Needs to Be Sent (Pushed) to
Which Users at What Time (Regular Intervals)? - Delivering Critical Data in Timely Fashion for DC
- Correct and Consistent Information at Right Time
- What Information Needs to Be Available On-demand
(Pulled) to Which Users at What Time? - Satisfying Dynamic Data Requirements for DC
- Exactly Enough Information and No More
- Can we Support User Privileges that Change Based
on the Context and State of DC?
6Security Issues System Considerations
- How Does Distribution of a DC Affect Security
Policy Definition and Enforcement? - Are Security Handlers/Enforcement Mechanisms of
DC Centralized and/or Distributed for Multiple
Policies? - Are there Reusable Security Components that Can
Be Composed on Demand to Support DC? - Support for RBAC, DAC, and/or MAC?
- What is the Impact of Legacy/COTs/GOTs of a DC on
Delivering the Information Securely? - At What Level, If Any, is Secure Access
Available? - How is Security Added If it is Not Present?
- What Techniques Are Needed to Control Access to
Legacy/COTS?
7Security Issues Different Approaches
- Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
- Restricts Access Based on Identity of
Group/Subject - Discretion Supports the Pass-on of Permissions
- Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
- Permissions Based on Responsibilities or Roles
- Users may Play Multiple Roles Each
- RBAC Flexible in both Management and Usage
- Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
- Restrict Access Based on Sensitivity Level (Top
Secret, Secret, Confidential, Unclassified) - If Clearance of User Dominates Classification of
Object, Access is Allowed - Homeland Security Likely Requires All Three at
Times!
8Security Issues Confidence in Security
- Assurance
- Are the Security Privileges for Each User of DC
Adequate (and Limited) to Support their Needs? - What Guarantees are Given by the Security
Infra-structure of DC in Order to Attain - Safety Nothing Bad Happens During Execution
- Liveness All Good Things can Happen During
Execution - Consistency
- Are the Defined Security Privileges for Each User
Internally Consistent? Least-Privilege Principle - Are the Defined Security Privileges for Related
Users Globally Consistent? Mutual-Exclusion
9Solution RBAC/MAC at Design Level
- Security as First Class Citizen in the Design
Process - Use Cases and Actors (Roles) Marked with Security
Levels - Dynamic Assurance Checks to Insure that
Connections Do Not ViolateMAC Rules
10Solution UML-Based RBAC/MAC
Other Possibilities Reverse Engineer Existing
Policy to Logic Based Definition UML Model with
Security Capture all Security Requirements!
11Solution Unifying RBAC/MAC
- Interacting Software Artifacts
- New/Existing Clients use APIs
- Control Access to APIs by
- Role (who)
- Classification (MAC)
- Time (when)
- Data (what)
- Delegation
NETWORK
Working Prototype Available using CORBA, JINI,
Java, Oracle
12Solution Unifying RBAC/MAC
- Security Model that Unifies RBAC/MAC with
Method-Level Approach - Constraints using Role, MAC, Time, and Data
- Customized Access to APIs of Artifacts
- Contrast with Object Level Approach
- Security Policy and Enforcement Assurance
- Design Time (During Security Policy Definition)
Security Assurance - Run Time (Executing Application) Security
Enforcement - RBAC/MAC for a Distributed Setting (Middleware)
- Flexible, Portable, Platform Independent
- Security with Minimal/Controlled Impact
13Concluding Remarks
- Dynamic Coalitions will play a Critical Role in
Homeland Security during Crisis Situations - Critical to Understand the Security Issues for
Users and System of Dynamic Coalitions - At UConn, Multi-Faceted Approach to Security
- Attaining Consistency and Assurance at Policy
Definition and Enforcement - Capturing Security Requirements at Early Stages
via UML Enhancements/Extensions - Providing a Security Infrastructure that Unifies
RBAC and MAC for Distributed Setting - http//www.engr.uconn.edu/steve/DSEC/dsec.html