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FSSC OPEN HOUSE

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Title: FSSC OPEN HOUSE


1
RESTRICTED COMPONENTS REGULATIONS
  • FSSC OPEN HOUSE
  • April 22, 2008 Regina, Sask.

2
RESTRICTED COMPONENTS REGULATIONS
  • Background-Objective-Program-International
    controls
  • Status
  • Summary of Regulations
  • Inspection Enforcement
  • Implementation
  • Final word
  • Contact Info

3
BACKGROUND
  • The Explosives Regulatory Division (ERD) of the
    Department of Natural Resources administers the
    Explosives Act and Regulations in Canada
  • The Act and Regulations control the importation,
    manufacture, storage and sale of commercial
    explosives, fireworks and other pyrotechnics.
  • Principal activities include
  • - Authorization and classification of explosives
  • - Issuing licences for importation, manufacture,
    storage and sale of explosives
  • - Inspections of factories and magazines

4
BACKGROUND (Contd)
  • Before 11 September 2001 ERDs mandate was Safety
    and Security in the explosives field
  • Terrorist attacks in the US led to a
    re-evaluation of explosives legislation and
    programs from a security viewpoint
  • Several areas for improvement were identified,
    some requiring new legislation
  • New legislative proposals are contained in the
    Public Safety Act which became law in May 2004

5
NEW SECURITY PROPOSALS
  • Six Main Areas
  • Explosives Possession Permit
  • Activities related to OAS Convention
  • Transportation
  • Storage
  • Precursors (Restricted Components)
  • New Penalties

6
BACKGROUND (Contd)
  • Canadian Regulation based on US study
  • US National Research Council studied illegal
    explosives following Oklahoma City bombing
  • Identified a long list of materials which could
    be used to manufacture bombs
  • Developed a short list of likely precursors
    (Restricted Components)

7
OBJECTIVE
  • Precursors are materials used to produce
    explosives, but which are not themselves
    classified or regulated as explosives
  • They are often used to manufacture home-made
    explosives for criminal or terrorist purposes
  • The objective of this program is to regulate
    these materials
  • to increase physical security
  • to place controls on consumer sales
  • with the aim of preventing criminal or terrorist
    acquisition, while not unnecessarily impeding
    bona fide sales

8
PROGRAM
  • Proposes controls on sales of common explosives
    precursors such as AN
  • Follows guidelines proposed by US National
    Research Council study following Oklahoma City
    bombing
  • The study identified many chemicals used to
    produce illegal explosives, and proposed a short
    list of key precursors for control

9
PROGRAM (Contd)Short List Criteria
  • The chemical should be an essential component in
    an explosive systemwith a potential for
    significant use as measured in deaths, injuries
    and property damage
  • The chemical should be reasonably adaptable and
    availablefor making large bombs
  • The chemical should be a critical precursor,
    i.e., one not easily replaced

10
PROGRAM (Contd)The 9 Chemicals for control
  • Explosive Chemicals
  • Ammonium Nitrate (solid 28 nitrogen content,
    80 AN)
  • Nitromethane
  • Oxidizers
  • Sodium nitrate
  • Potassium nitrate
  • Sodium chlorate
  • Potassium chlorate
  • Potassium perchlorate
  • Reactant Chemicals
  • Hydrogen peroxide (30) (Acetone)
  • Nitric acid (68) (Urea)

11
INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS
  • AN is widely recognized as an important
    fertilizer, but also as a favourite material for
    bomb-making
  • The IRA bombing campaign in the seventies, the
    Oklahoma City bombing and the Bali nightclub
    bombing all used AN/fuel mixtures
  • All countries we have contacted already have
    controls on the sale of AN, or are contemplating
    introducing them
  • Canadas proposed controls are among the less
    restrictive

12
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
  • Australia Material containing more than 45 AN
    is classed as Security Sensitive AN and
    requires a licence to purchase and possess
  • USA Possession of material containing more than
    X AN will require registration and a background
    check
  • China AN is only available for explosives
    manufacture
  • EU Recommending improved regulation and control
    of transactions involving AN, fertilizer and
    technical
  • Singapore Licence required to possess material
    containing more than 80 AN

13
STATUS
  • Public Safety Act received Royal Assent on 5 May
    2004
  • Regulation making could then start
  • Extensive consultations 2002 to present
  • Industry, other government departments,
    Provinces, US and other stakeholders involved
  • Good cooperation from all industry groups
    involved with precursor materials (e.g. Canadian
    Fertilizer Institute)
  • Working with Industry in the preparing of these
    Regulations has been extremely useful
  • Security Code of Practice CFI 2005-2006-2008

14
STATUS (Contd)
  • Proposed Restricted Components Regulations RIAS
    posted in Canada Gazette Part I August 12th,
    2006 for a 90 day comment period
  • Comments have been analyzed

15
STATUS (Contd)
  • Redrafting addressed appropriate
    comments/concerns such as
  • Eliminated duplication with other regulations
  • Added some exemptions/thresholds
  • Added export feasibility
  • Added more ID verification options
  • Added UN numbers
  • Reduced retention time for documents, etc
  • Restricted Components Regulations RIAS posted
    in CGII on March 19, 2008.

16
SUMMARY OF REGULATIONS
  • Performance-based written
  • All sellers need to enroll with ERD
  • Valid for 5 years
  • Amend for changes
  • All sellers need to abide with the five criteria
    for control
  • Secure chemical Investigate/Report tampering
    theft
  • Control access to Chemical Records
  • Track inventory Investigate/Report tampering
    theft
  • Know your customer
  • Keep records of sale

17
SUMMARY (Contd)
  • Provisions of secure storage
  • Maintenance of a list of employees who have
    access to Restricted Components
  • Reconciliation of incoming and outgoing
    quantities
  • Weekly inspection of stock for theft
  • Examination of purchaser identification prior to
    sale
  • Denial of sale for suspicious purposes
  • Maintenance securing of detailed sales records
  • Maintenance of all records-documents for min 2
    years
  • Reporting of suspicious activities theft,
    tampering or from sales.

18
SUMMARY (Contd)
  • Extra control for Ammonium Nitrate
  • Further provisions of secure storage
  • Informing local police on locations
  • Informing transporters purchasers of security
    and reporting requirements
  • Inspection of shipments for tampering or loss
  • Tracking arrival of shipments
  • Performing annual inventory audits
  • Providing annually inventory reports
  • Further provision for order verification

19
ENROLMENT
  • Enrolment Application Form
  • Annual Report Form (for AN only)
  • Note The application-submission forms are
    available electronically

20
INSPECTION INFORCEMENT
  • Inspections
  • By CFIA Inspectors at AN blending facilities
  • By ERD Inspectors at ports explosive licensed
    facilities
  • Enforcement
  • By ERD
  • as follow-up on CFIA inspections
  • as follow-up through whistle-blowers
  • as required

21
IMPLEMENTATION
  • March 19, 2008 Publication of the Restricted
    Components Regulations in Canada Gazette 2
  • Industry have been allowed a grace period for
    compliance
  • June 1, 2008 Full compliance of all sellers of
    AN
  • March 1, 2009 Full compliance of all sellers of
    the other 8 chemicals
  • Workshops and outreach products can be set up and
    prepared jointly with CFI and ERD Please come
    forward with your inquiries

22
FINAL WORD
  • Sales of precursors must be controlled, as
    terrorists have acquired bomb-making materials by
    this route
  • The control measures are the minimum required to
    achieve an adequate increase in security
  • Security measures can be increased in the future
    if the situation requires it, and products can be
    added to or removed from the list as needed

23
  • QUESTIONS?

24
CONTACT INFORMATION
  • EXPLOSIVES REGULATORY DIVISION
  • Tel 613-948-5183
  • Fax 613-948-5195
  • Email vdewyse_at_nrcan.gc.ca
  • Website www.nrcan.gc.ca/mms/explosif/
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