SelfProtecting Mobile Agents - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 18
About This Presentation
Title:

SelfProtecting Mobile Agents

Description:

Self-Protecting Mobile Agents. Lee Badger. Brian Matt. Steven Kiernan. Funded by both ITS and Active Networks Programs. NAI Labs, Network Associates, Inc. ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:57
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 19
Provided by: leeba5
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: SelfProtecting Mobile Agents


1
Self-Protecting Mobile Agents
  • Lee Badger
  • Brian Matt
  • Steven Kiernan

Funded by both ITS and Active Networks
Programs NAI Labs, Network Associates, Inc. 17
July 2000
2
Trusted Bases and Itinerant Programs
  • Protect the host enforce least privilege
  • Type-safety, SFI, access control, Wrappers, IRM,
    PCC.
  • (BTW policy definition is the hardest part)
  • Protect the mobile program

3
Malicious Hosts Problem
  • Mobile agents will need to execute on unfriendly
    hosts, but a host may
  • non-randomly modify an agents behavior
  • steal an agents secrets (if any)
  • deny execution
  • execute improperly
  • crash the agent
  • lie to an agent

4
Technical Objectives
  • Protect software agents from tampering while
    allowing
  • High mobility.
  • Detached operation.
  • Extended deployment periods.
  • Realistic infrastructure requirements.

5
Existing Practice
  • Limit Mobility to Trusted Places
  • hardware peripherals, trusted hosts
  • Detect Malicious Execution After it Happens
  • state appraisal (Farmer), detection objects
    (Meadows), cryptographic traces (Vigna) , partial
    result authentication codes (Yee),
    fault-tolerance techniques (Schneider)
  • Prevent Malicious Execution
  • encrypted functions (Sander, Bazzi), code/data
    obfuscation (Collberg, Low, Hohl)

6
Technical Approach (in a Nutshell)
  • Spread agents across multiple, unrelated hosts.
  • Force hosts to collude for their attacks to be
    effective.

7
Applications of Obfuscation
  • Security through obscurity. NOT!
  • Long-lived resistance to analysis. NOT!
  • 1999 DVD copy protection break.
  • Protection of algorithms from theft.
  • DashO-Pro (www.preemptive.com)
  • Jcloak (www.force5.com)
  • Elixir (www.elixirtech.com)
  • RetroGuard (www.retrologic.com)
  • Temporary resistance to analysis.
  • E.g., IA experiment 9907 (dynamic IP numbers)

8
Obfuscation (trivial to not-so-trivial)
Kinds of Obfuscation
Layout Obfuscation
Data Obfuscation
Preventive Obfuscation
Control Obfuscation
Language- Breaking Obfuscation
9
Obfuscation
  • Data Obfuscation
  • variable splitting
  • scalar/object conversion
  • static data to procedure
  • change variable lifetime
  • add variable distance
  • split/fold/merge arrays
  • change encoding
  • merge scalar variables
  • Control Obfuscation
  • break basic blocks
  • inline methods
  • outline statements
  • unroll loops
  • reorder statements
  • reorder loops
  • reducible to non-reducible flow graphs
  • table interpretation

10
Opaque Predicates
  • Opaque predicate A fact about a programs state
    known at obfuscation time that is hard to
    determine from the code.
  • Two basic manufacture techniques
  • Exploit difficulty in alias analysis.
  • E.g., embed graph operations
  • Exploit difficulty in concurrency.
  • E.g., embed threading

11
Obfuscation Strength
  • Potency Difficulty for a human to reverse
    engineer. !(software engineering practices)
  • Resilience Difficulty of writing a tool to
    reverse the obfuscation.
  • Cost Space/time costs.
  • Stealth Ease of spotting obfuscation
    mechanisms. Ease of spying out the policy.

From Douglas Lows thesis.
12
Time-limited Black Box
Hohl, Fritz, An Approach to Solve the Problem of
Malicious Hosts
  • A host can deny execution, or lie, but it cant
    disrupt the programs internal consistency for n
    seconds.
  • Can this temporary protection be leveraged into
    ongoing protection?

13
Our Approach
14
What Policy Means Here
  • Obfuscation potency, resilience, stealth, cost.
  • Self-monitoring granularity.
  • Replication level.
  • Non-collusion itinerary rules.
  • Obfuscation refresh rate.
  • Distribution of sensitive state.
  • Phone-home flee-home thresholds.
  • And More!

15
Threats (Evaluation, too)
  • (Quickly) defeat obfuscation.
  • Track down sibling agents and implement
    coordinated attack.
  • Black-box testing revealing secrets.
  • Deny execution.
  • Inject bogus agents.
  • Analysis of long-lived agents.
  • Prohibitive cost.

16
What Weve Done So Far
  • Surveyed obfuscation tools.
  • Surveyed agent systems.
  • Choose a system (Kaariboga, ANTS)
  • Weak mobility
  • Java
  • Multi-hop
  • Open source
  • Created a build environment.
  • Formulated a technology transfer strategy.

17
Task Schedule
01
02
03
Architecture Report Distributed Agents Prototype
Obfuscation Agents Report Obfuscation Prototype
Self-healing Agents Prototype Final Report
18
Technology Transfer
  • Active Networks, systems such as ALP.
  • Open Source distribution.
  • Java.
  • Tool-based approach.
  • Start with Kaariboga, move to other systems.
  • Explore application to NAI products that employ
    agents.
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com