ORIENTATION

1
OVERVIEW OF THE ELECTRIC GRID
VEGETATION MANAGEMENT WORKSHOP
2
BLACKOUT MITIGATION
A JOINT MANAGEMENT OF TREES AND POWER LINES
Forestry
Electric Utilities
3
Q if a tree TOUCHES A POWER LINE in a
deserted forest, does it make a sound?
4
A Who knows... but the lights go out
in Albuquerque
GOT BATTERIES
THIS SLIDE WAS IN THE REPORT OF THE 1996 WESTERN
OUTAGE
5
A QUICK STORY OF THREE RECENT BLACKOUTS AND THEIR
COMMON DENOMINATOR
6
JULY 2, 1996 1424 MOUNTAIN TIME
7
July 2 Total
INITIATING EVENT WAS A TREE / POWER LINE CONTACT
Firm Load 9,962 MW Int. Load 1,888
MW Total Load 11,850 MW MW Minutes
903,854 Customers 2,250,012 Generation
10,182 MW
8
Letter to President, August 2, 1996 .......corr
ective actions have substantially reduced the
possibility that a similar sequence of events
could occur in the region.
9
NOT
10
AUGUST 10, 1996 1548 PACIFIC TIME
11
August 10 Total
INITIATING EVENT WAS A TREE / POWER LINE CONTACT
Firm Load 29,085 MW Int. Load 1,404
MW Total Load 30,489 MW MW Minutes
2,483,844 Customers 7,490,000 Generation
27,269 MW
12
Extent of August 14, 2003 Blackout
INITIATING EVENT WAS AGAIN A TREE / POWER LINE
CONTACT

• Customers Affected 50 million people
• Load Affected 61,800 MW
• Cost 4.5 8.2B
• Region affected Eight states and
  Ontario
• Outage period Up to two days
• Rolling Blackouts More than a week in
  some parts of Ontario

13
THIS PRESENTATION IS INTENDED TO SHARE
INFORMATION THAT THE UTILITY SIDE HOPES WILL BE
HELPFUL TO THE FORESTRY SIDE IN OUR JOINT
PARTNERSHIP OF BLACKOUT MITIGATION
14
THE WESTERN INTERCONNECTION
15
North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)
NPCC
MAPP
MAAC
WECC
ECAR
MAIN
SPP
SERC
ERCOT
FRCC
WECC
16
The 3 Interconnections
Western Interconnection
17
WECC Control Areas
AESO
BCTC
AVA
PSE
SCL
NWE
TPWR
WAUM
DOPD
WECC 14 Western states, 2 Canadian provinces, 1
Mexican state (portion) 153 member systems 34
Control Areas 71 million people
CHPD
BPA
GCPD
PGE
PACW
IPC
PACE
SPP
PSC
CISO
SMUD
NEVP
LDWP
WALC
PNM
SRP
APS
IID
TEP
CFE
EPE
Generation Only Control Areas
Duke Energy, Arlington Valley
Gila River Maricopa Arizona
Harquahla, L.L.C.
18
(No Transcript)
19
Peace River
Skeena
Canada
Williston
British
Alberta
Kelly Lake
Columbia
Nicola
Ingledow
Langdon
Selkirk
Seattle
Taft
Washington
Portland
Area
Montana
Allston
Celilo
Oregon
Pacific
Colstrip
Ocean
Idaho
Malin
Wyoming
Midpoint
Borah
Round
Mountain
Laramie
Jim
Nevada
Salt Lake
Bridger
River
City Area
San Francisco
Tesla
Area
Denver
Utah
Area
Las
Vegas
Four
Area
Colorado
Corners
California
Market
New
Place
Los
Angeles
Mexico
Albuquerque
Area
Phoenix
Area
Arizona
Tucson
Area
El Paso
Mexico
20
A
CUSTOMER LOAD
B
GENERATOR

• Power flowing from the generator to load can flow
  on either line A or line B
• Will flow on both lines, in amounts inversely
  proportional to their relative impedance

21
(No Transcript)
22
Peace River
Canada
British
Alberta
Columbia
Seattle
Washington
Portland
Area
Montana
Celilo
Pacific
Colstrip
Oregon
Ocean
Idaho
Malin
Wyoming
Midpoint
Borah
Round
Mountain
Laramie
Jim
Nevada
Bridger
Salt Lake
River
City Area
San Francisco
Area
Denver
Utah
Area
Las
Vegas
Four
Area
Colorado
Corners
California
Market
New
Place
Los
Mexico
Angeles
Area
Albuquerque
Phoenix
Area
Arizona
San Diego
Tucson
Area
Mexico
El Paso
23
TRANSMISSION LINES
24
TRANSMISSION LINES
25
TRANSMISSION LINES
26
TRANSMISSION LINES
27
Effects of Ambient Conditions on Ratings
Vegetation Growth Compromised Line Clearances
28
Cause 2 Inadequate Tree Trimming
Overgrown trees, as opposed to excessive
conductor sag, caused each of these faults. While
sag may have contributed to these events, these
incidents occurred because the trees grew too
tall and encroached into the space below the line
which is intended to be clear of any objects, not
because the lines sagged into short trees.
Because the trees were so tall (as discussed
below), each of these lines faulted under system
conditions well within specified operating
parameters.
U.S. Canada Power System Outage Task Force
Interim Report 11/03
29
(No Transcript)
30
Chamberlin-Harding (30541)
31
A short-circuit occurred on the
Harding-Chamberlin 345-kV line due to a contact
between the line conductor and a tree. This line
failed with power flow at only 43.5 of its
normal and emergency line rating. Incremental
line current and temperature increases, escalated
by the loss of Harding-Chamberlin, caused enough
sag on the Hanna-Juniper line that it contacted a
tree and faulted with power flow at 87.5 of its
normal and emergency line rating. Star-South
Canton contacted a tree three times between
142715 EDT and 154133 EDT, opening and
reclosing each time before finally locking out
while loaded at 93.2 of its emergency rating at
154235 EDT.
U.S. Canada Power System Outage Task Force
Interim Report 11/03
32
Hanna-Juniper (33203)
(30541)
33
The 3 Interconnections
Western Interconnection
34
Power System Overview
35
MANUFACTURING/DISTRIBUTION CHAIN
Widgets
MANUFACTURER
WHOLESALER
RAW MATERIAL
RETAILER
CONSUMER
PACKAGING
PACKAGING
PACKAGING
36
MANUFACTURING/DISTRIBUTION CHAIN
Electricity
DISTRIBUTION
Widgets
GENERATOR
MANUFACTURER
TRANSMISSION
WHOLESALER
RAW MATERIAL
RETAILER
CONSUMER
PACKAGING
PACKAGING
PACKAGING
37
MANUFACTURING/DISTRIBUTION CHAIN
Electricity
DISTRIBUTION
GENERATOR
TRANSMISSION
RAW MATERIAL
TRANSFORMER
TRANSFORMER
TRANSFORMER
CONSUMER
PACKAGING
PACKAGING
PACKAGING
HIGH VOLTS
MEDIUM VOLTS
LOW VOLTS
38
MANUFACTURING/DISTRIBUTION CHAIN
Electricity
DISTRIBUTION
GENERATOR
MANUFACTURER
TRANSMISSION
RAW MATERIAL
ELECTRONS
TRANSFORMER
TRANSFORMER
TRANSFORMER
RETAILER
CONSUMER
PACKAGING
PACKAGING
PACKAGING
HIGH VOLTS
MEDIUM VOLTS
LOW VOLTS
39
MANUFACTURING/DISTRIBUTION CHAIN
Electricity
DISTRIBUTION
GENERATOR
ELECTRON PUMP
TRANSMISSION
RAW MATERIAL
ELECTRONS
TRANSFORMER
TRANSFORMER
TRANSFORMER
CONSUMER
PACKAGING
PACKAGING
PACKAGING
Electro-Magnetically Linked Together
HIGH VOLTS
MEDIUM VOLTS
LOW VOLTS
40
Power Manufacturing Process

• The only industry in the world where the product
  is
• Ordered
• Manufactured
• Transported
• Delivered and
• Consumed
• All in the same instant

41
Frequency
60
Includes power lines
Load
Generation
InstantaneousChanges
Relatively Slow
42
Frequency
SMALL, ROUTINE UNBALANCE IS OK
LARGE, SUDDEN UNBALANCE IS NOT OK
43
EASTERN INTERCONNECTION MORE ROBUST. (THERMALLY
RATED LINES)
WESTERN INTERCONNECTION MORE FRAGILE. (STABILITY
RATED LINES)
WHAT CAN HAPPEN AND HOW FAST WHEN A LINE SHORTS
OUT THROUGH A TREE
44
Overloads on PJM NY Ties 41039 PM
45
PJM NY Separating 41044 PM
46
Cleveland Toledo Island 41039 - 41046
PMCleveland Blacks Out
47
Northeast Completes Separation from Eastern
Interconnection 41043 41045 PM
48
Island Breaks Up 41046 413 PM
49
End of the Cascade
50
ECONOMIC MPACT TO PUBLIC DUE TO TRANSMISSION
LINE INTERRUPTIONS
FERC ORDERS 888 889
FIRM -vs- NON-FIRM TRANSMISSION USE RIGHTS
CONGESTION
LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICING
ACRONYMS GALORE
CBM, TLR, USF, TRM, MD2, ETC,
ATC, TTC, OASIS
? WHO PAYS, WINS, LOSES ?
51
TRANSMISSION LINE DESIGN
SURVIVE WORST CONTINGENCY
SAFETY NETS (RMS)
52
Abundant Generation
High voltage transmission paths
High voltage transmission paths
Load Centers
53
WECC 1 Page V140
North / South separation scheme
54
Questions ?