The State

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The State

• Origin, Transformation, and Collapse

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I. Defining the State

• Definition based on politics community or
  institution with a monopoly on the legitimate use
  of physical force over people in its territory
  
• Definition based on language The totality of a
  countrys governmental institutions and
  officials, together with the laws procedures
  that structure their activities
• Key feature Sovereignty (sole legal authority
  over people and territory)

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II. Theories of the State

• Formalism (a.k.a. the Old Institutionalism)
  Constitutions and laws determine resource
  allocation and political outcomes
  
• Look at successful states to copy design features
  (success attributed to formal laws). Freedom
  preserved by Bill of Rights, etc.
  
• Problems
• Same constitutions different outcomes (Swiss,
  Filipinos, Liberians all modeled US
  Constitution)
  
• People sometimes obey states but other times
  overthrow them
  
• Difficult to predict which mechanisms will be
  effective because no theory about why some work
  while others fail

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B. Functionalism The state serves functions for
society

• Assumptions
• Every society must perform certain functions in
  order to survive (reproduction, education,
  defense, etc.)
  
• Both formal and informal rules needed to preserve
  social stability
  
• Existing customs and laws serve certain universal
  functions. Which ones?
  
• State failure explained as disequilibrium
  some parts failed to fulfill functions
  
• Problems
• Theory is tautological What predictions can we
  make?
  
• Treats status quo as normal state of affairs
  but some institutions seem to have negative
  effects (ag agencies decreasing ag production)

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C. Social Forces The state is an object of
struggle

• Assumption Political outcomes are the result of
  interest groups fighting over the control of
  resources
  
• Method Examine group strength and position, then
  calculate sum of forces to arrive at result
  
• Problems
• Similar group alignments produce different
  outcomes in different states
  
• Some groups appear to have influence out of
  proportion to objective power (resources)
  
• States intervene to alter group power

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D. Rational Choice The state is composed of
rational individuals

• Focuses on individuals.
• Rationality
• Connected preferences People know what they want
  (although they might not know whats really good
  for them)
  
• Transitory preferences People are consistent
  about what they want
  
• Method Given preferences, how can individuals
  get what they want? Private enterprise,
  collective action, or politics?
  
• Problem Rules of the game differ in different
  countries ? incentives to behave differently

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E. The New Institutionalism Institutions as
Rules of the Game

• Assumes social forces or rational choice Actors
  pursuing interests do construct or alter states,
  often to solve collective action problems or
  security dilemmas
• Argues that state institutions in turn structure
  group/individual decision-making by changing
  incentives (indeed, this was their purpose)
  
• Implication Different group relations produce
  different institutions (Example Presidentialism
  inappropriate for competition between
  ethnically-based parties)
• Problem Still no theory of preferences. Why do
  people have different desires?

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III. Evolution of the State

• State formation
• Early polities Socially-stratified groups in
  which people specialize, with some specializing
  in administration or governance.
  
• Large polities become empires through conquest
  and relaxing criteria for inclusion (beyond the
  family or tribe)
  
• States become territorial Clovis is King of the
  Franks in late 5th Century but Capetians are
  Kings of France in 6th Century. Laws of people
  (wherever they might be) replaced by laws of
  territories.
• Loyalty still personal To the person, not the
  position.
  
• Capstone governments States are composed of
  different groups ruled by their own customs and
  only occasionally interacting with government.
  Early states ran wide but not deep.

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B. Transition to the Supremacy of States

• Centralization Technology, economic growth,
  trade, better defense enable rulers to centralize
  authority and deepen ties to the state through
  taxation and policing
• Rule of Law Formal law is enforced, contracts
  become written, etc.
  
• Sovereignty Clash between sources of authority
  (Church and state) produces huge wars and leads
  to development of sovereignty norm (only the
  state has control over its people and territory)

Note From here on, everything is disputed
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C. Colonialism and Institution-Building

• European states ignored sovereignty of
  non-Europeans, imposed new institutions
  
• Institutions selected for benefit of colonial
  powers or colonists
  
• Densely populated areas (tropics) Native labor
  exploited through slavery and feudalism
  
• Sparsely populated areas Institutions set up to
  encourage further colonization by Europeans
  (representation, autonomy)

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3. The Institution-Based Reversal Colonial
Development and Population
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D. The Constitutional State

• Why would rulers limit their own power?
• Increased trade enriches merchant class ? able to
  finance rebellion (stick) or Crown (carrot)
  
• Absolutism restrains trade (no secure property
  rights) only Crown enriched

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Voyages Per Year Mediterranean (Pink) vs.
Atlantic (Blue) Trade
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D. The Constitutional State

• Why would rulers limit their own power?
• Increased trade enriches merchant class ? able to
  finance rebellion (stick) or Crown (carrot)
  
• Absolutism restrains trade (no secure property
  rights) only Crown enriched
  
• Result Bifurcation of Europe into constitutional
  (England, Netherlands) and absolutist (Spain,
  Portugal) regimes
  
• Expansion of franchise Threat of revolution when
  industrialization empowers poor (unskilled labor)

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E. Post-Colonial States

• Most born with institutions designed for
  benefit of others
  
• Pre-independence institutions enriched some local
  elites and impoverished others (divide and rule
  -- or mobilization of revolutionary armies)
  
• Existing elites use economic power to preserve
  political power (institutions designed to
  perpetuate rule)

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IV. Future of the State Threats to Legitimacy
and Power

• A New World Order? Undermining the legitimacy of
  state sovereignty
  
• International Relations Sovereign states
  sometimes have to bargain with other sovereign
  states to solve common problems
  
• Problem Treaties should be unenforceable
• Solution Create self-enforcing agreements like
  multilateral treaties that sanction violators
  
• Alternative solution Create common
  decision-making entity (UN, EU, IMF, etc.)
  
• Either solution constrains the state, eroding
  sovereignty in practice (3) or law (4)

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B. State failure Sovereignty without authority

• Routes to state failure
• Catastrophe Something overwhelms states ability
  to provide even minimal protection or enforce
  law.
  
• Sovereignty without institutionalization State
  is created which lacks de-personalized
  institutions or capacity to extract taxes and
  monopolize force (de-colonization in Congo)
• Poverty trap State is so poor than virtually no
  surplus exists to support political institutions
  (like catastrophe, but long-standing)

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2. Civil War Sovereignty under siege

• Causes of civil war Weak states and opportunism
• Weak States
• Recent civil war (security dilemma)
• Low GDP!
• Anocracy (weak semi-autocracy)

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Anocracy and State Failure
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2. Civil War Sovereignty under seige

• Causes of civil war Weak states and opportunism
• Weak States
• Recent civil war (Security Dilemma)
• Low GDP!
• Anocracy (weak semi-autocracy)
• Opportunism
• Lootable resources drugs, diamonds, even oil!
• Diasporas from Previous Conflicts Money,
  Supplies, Agenda-Setting
  
• Rough terrain Mountainous areas
• Threatened Dominance Single ethnic group 45-90
  of population

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b. Non-causes of civil war

• Inequality No statistical evidence of
  relationship
  
• Personal poverty
• Easier to recruit but for both sides!
• Rich regions with key commodities frequently
  rebel
  
• Ethnic diversity
• Low and High levels are safe middle is danger
  zone in non-democracies

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Relationship Diversity and Freedom
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C. Predicting State Failure
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1. Predicting the catastrophic route to failure

• Capacity to absorb catastrophe essentially
  determined by wealth and efficient governance
  (GDP, Corruption)
  
• Predicting catastrophe
• Civil war Recent civil war is best predictor,
  followed by Low GDP, then other factors
  
• Disease Compare disease prevalence with health
  care resources

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TB Incidence per 100,000
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Per-Capita Health Spending
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1. Predicting the catastrophic route to failure

• Capacity to absorb catastrophe essentially
  determined by wealth and efficient governance
  (GDP, Corruption)
  
• Predicting catastrophe
• Civil war Recent civil war is best predictor,
  followed by Low GDP, then other factors
  
• Disease Compare disease prevalence with health
  care resources
  
• Natural disasters Analysis by the UN

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2. Predicting the de-institutionalization route
to state failure

• Recent decolonization/independence -- New
  states at risk
  

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b. State birth type and institutional strength

• Hypothesis States born in revolution, secession,
  or nonviolent struggle for independence should be
  stronger than those granted independence without
  struggle (examples Congo, Uzbekistan)
• IV Better birth experience (requiring
  organization and solution of collective action
  problems)
  
• Tests using both GDP and Rotbergs (2004) index
  of state failure as DVs reveal

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iv. The puzzle of state birth

• Good births increase later GDP and decrease odds
  of state failure but
  
• Relationship disappears when war participation is
  also included as a (control) IV. Why?
  
• Theory War produces state strength.
• Interstate war increases later growth!
• Civil war decreases later growth
• Another finding States with imposed borders
  different from pre-colonization ones have lower
  growth, higher rates of failure

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c. Personalized regimes Difficult to measure

• One indicator unconstrained executives (very
  similar to autocracy measures). Test Results
  

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Estimated risk of genocide it goes up when
unconstrained executives have a powerful Army
Index of Military Personnel
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c. Personalized regimes Difficult to measure

• One indicator unconstrained executives (very
  similar to autocracy measures). Test Results
  unconstrained executive large military
  danger
• Alternative experiment Compare personalist
  post-Soviet regimes to institutionalized or
  previously-independent regimes. DV violent
  deaths
• Everyone agrees Turkmenistan is personalized.
  Why?

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Welcome to Turkmenistan

• A statue of our glorious leader,
  President-for-Life Turkmenbashi (meaning Great
  Leader of All Turkmen).
  
• This is one of a half-dozen statues of him we
  made out of gold. (Really, it was the least we
  could do.)

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Youll be hearing a lot about Turkmenbashi here

• This one revolves so he may always face the sun!

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Hes everywhere!
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Turkmenbashi the Spiritual Guide

• Ruhnama is the combination autobiography,
  historical fiction, and spiritual guidebook
  written by Turkmenbashi himself
  
• Must be prominently displayed in bookstores and
  government offices
  
• Required to be displayed next to and equal to the
  Islamic Qur'an in mosques
  
• Main component of education from primary school
  to university. Ability to exactly recite passages
  from it is required for state employment and
  even a drivers license
• Ruhnama was sent into space in 2006

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Every night this enormous mechanical Ruhnama
opens and passages are recited with video
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More interesting construction projects

• In Niyazov's home village of Kipchak, a complex
  has been built to the memory of his mother,
  including a mosque (est. at US100 million)
  conceived as a symbol of the rebirth of the
  Turkmen people. The walls of this edifice display
  precepts from the Ruhnama along with Qur'an
  suras.
• August 2004 Turkmenbashi orders an ice palace to
  be built in the desert. This wonder of the
  world ends up being an ice skating rink.

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But wait, theres more

• Recent decrees
• Turkmenbashi ordered the closure of all rural
  libraries because village Turkmen do not read
  
• Ban on opera and ballet they are unnecessary
• Young people may not get gold tooth caps/teeth,
  but rather should chew on bones
  
• Closure of all hospitals outside Ashgabat, saying
  that sick people could just come to the capital
  
• Ordering that physicians swear an oath to him
  instead of the Hippocratic Oath
  
• All recorded music is banned
• The city of Krasnovodsk is now the city
  ofTurkmenbashi

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In case youre not convinced

• In 1991 he introduced a new Turkmen alphabet,
  which all are required to use
  
• He renamed the days of the week
• Then he renamed the months of the year
• January is now Turkmenbashi
• February is now Flag (Flag Day is celebrated
  on Turkmenbashis birthday)
  
• April is Gurbansoltan Eje, the name of
  Turkmenbashis mother
  
• September is Ruhnama
• And so forth

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Is Turkmenistan headed for failure?
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Turkmenistans Path

• Exports natural gas and cotton
• 1990s Depression (Russia cut off trans-shipment
  of gas)
  
• 2000s Recovery as non-Russia pipelines began
  operation
  
• Government follows free trade policy, received
  MFN status from Europe and WTO
  
• January 2006 Government eliminates pensions to
  one third of elderly, cuts pensions of remaining
  two-thirds and then orders elderly to repay the
  pensions received in the past two years back to
  the State. Reports indicate that this may be
  killing old people, whose 10 - 90 pensions were
  their sole sources of support

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3. The Poverty Trapa. Official data
Concentration in Africa
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b. Satellite estimates (areas with lots of people
but few lights are assumed to be poor)
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c. Combined National Poverty Estimates
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D. What do we know about state failure?

• Multiple paths to state failure exist no single
  cause of collapse
  
• History matters Method of independence and
  original institutions help determine later
  institutions
  
• Economics matters Common element in most routes
  to state failure is poverty
  
• Greatest risk is sub-Saharan Africa recently
  de-colonized, poor, vulnerable to disasters,
  patterns of civil conflict, lootable resources,
  etc.

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IV. Historical Case Study The Great Lakes Crisis

• Congo/Zaire Anatomy of a weak state
• Pre-colonization Strong Luba Kingdom in Katanga
  area other areas attached to other kingdoms or
  occupied by smaller tribes
  
• Colonialism
• 1885 Belgium awarded the territory
• King Leopold builds railways and rubber
  plantations using slave labor 5-15 million dead
  (about half of population dies)
  
• Force Publique established to maintain control
  over laborers
  
• 1908 Belgian Parliament takes over colony
• Hospitals, schools, etc built improvement.
  But
  
• No native administration developed. No local
  rule allowed.

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3. Decolonization

• Lack of preparation
• 1958 Kongo ethnic groups form ABAKO, occupy
  areas
  
• 1959 Belgium bans ABAKO, promises independence.
• May 1960 Elections ? Anti-Belgian party defeats
  pro-Belgian party and regional parties. Coalition
  government formed by Lumumba, Kasa-Vubu, and
  allies such as Mobutu.
• Independence declared on June 30, 1960
  Congolese Parliament has only existed for a month!

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4. Mutiny, Civil War, and Fragmentation

• Yellow govt
• Red rival govt
• Green Katanga secessionists, aided by Belgium
• Blue Kasai Mining State
• secessionists

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4. Mutiny, Civil War, and Fragmentation

• Mutiny and Secession (July 5, 1960)
• Force Publique recruits mutiny against Belgian
  officers
  
• Belgium sends troops to suppress mutiny, even
  though government has not requested aid
  
• Belgium assists Katangan secessionists
• Luba tribes then revolt against Katanga
  (secession within secession!)
  
• Political Maneuvers
• Col. Mobutu gains control of foreign aid as Chief
  of Staff, distributes it to units loyal to
  himself.
  
• UN peacekeepers deployed, but not empowered to
  fight. Lumumba asks Soviets for aid, uses Soviet
  airlift to suppress Kasai secessionists
  
• Coup CIA then assists Lumumba rivals Mobutu and
  Kasa-Vubu, who assemble anti-Lumumba coalition in
  Parliament and dismiss him from office.
  
• Only 67 days have passed since independence!

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4. Mutiny, Civil War, and Fragmentation

• New rebellions rise as old ones fail
• Lumumba arrested by Kasa-Vubu but his V-P sets up
  a Lumumbist government in the Northeast (red area
  on map)
  
• Jan 1961 At Belgian urging, Mobutu executes
  Lumumba
  
• Feb 1961 UN Security Council authorizes use of
  force (only time between Korea and Persian Gulf
  War)
  
• 1961-1962 UN forces attack Katanga. Secretary
  General of the UN killed when plane crashes in
  Congo (cause undetermined)

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Mutiny, Civil War, and Fragmentation

• Yellow govt
• Red rival govt
• Green Katanga secessionists, aided by Belgium
• Blue Kasai Mining State
• secessionists

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d. 1964-1965 The fourth round of rebellions

• 1964 New revolts in eastern provinces by
  Simbas (Swahili for lion)
  
• Simbas seize European hostages ? military rescue
  operation succeeds
  
• Simbas defeated by government of Kasa-Vubu
• 1965 CIA assists Mobutu in coup against
  Kasa-Vubu. Mobutu bans all other political
  parties and establishes personal dictatorship
  with title of "Father of the Nation."

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5. Mobutu and Mobutism

• From Congo to Zaire
• 1967 Mobutu creates new, obligatory national
  party (MPR). State becomes extension of party
  The MPR must be considered as a Church and its
  Founder as its Messiah.
• Constitution gives President power to dismiss
  governors and judges, issue decrees
  
• 1971-2 Africanization -- Congo renamed Zaire,
  citizens ordered to take African names
  
• 1973 Salongo -- obligatory civic work
  introduced (like colonial labor requirement)

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Mobutus own Africanization

• Joseph Desire Mobutu becomes
• Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu waza Banga
• Usual translation The all-conquering warrior
  who, because of his endurance and inflexible will
  to win, will go from conquest to conquest leaving
  fire in his wake."

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5. Mobutu and Mobutism

• From Congo to Zaire
• 1967 Mobutu creates new, obligatory national
  party (MPR). State becomes extension of party
  The MPR must be considered as a Church and its
  Founder as its Messiah.
• Constitution gives President power to dismiss
  governors and judges, issue decrees
  
• 1971-2 Africanization -- Congo renamed Zaire,
  citizens ordered to take African names
  
• 1973 Salongo -- obligatory civic work
  introduced (like colonial labor requirement)

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For weeks at a time, Zaire's official press was
forbidden to mention the name of any other
Zairian than the president himself.
-- NYT
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b. Zaires troubles State weakness

• Mobutu and political allies funnel billions of
  dollars into Swiss and other offshore accounts
  
• Early 1970s World Bank refuses to fund grandiose
  development program. US agrees to lend the
  money. Huge public debt accumulates.
  
• 1973 Zairianization -- expropriation of
  foreign-owned businesses for the benefit of
  political allies. Massive business failures
  follow.
• 1977, 1978 Invasions by Katangan exiles. French
  and Moroccans defeat invasion with US transport.
  
• 1980s Zaire used by US/allies as staging ground
  for rebels in neighboring countries
  
• 1991 Paratrooper mutiny over unpaid wages

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B. Regional Background A History of Slaughter
Zaire
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1. Historical Overview Hutu vs. Tutsi in the
Great Lakes Region

• 1950s-1970s Hutu vs. Tutsi in Rwanda and
  Burundi Tutsi refugees to Uganda, Congo/Zaire
  
• 1980s Civil war in Uganda Tutsi exiles aid
  Ugandan rebels ? victory
  
• Early 1990s Tutsi exile army invades Rwanda with
  help from Uganda
  
• 1993 Arusha Accords Agreement to share power
  between Hutu and Tutsi
  
• 1993 Massacres in Burundi Hutu rebellion begins

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2. Genocide in Rwanda, 1994
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1994 Genocide in Rwanda

• April 1994
• Assassination of Rwanda and Burundi presidents
  (probably by Hutu extremists)
  
• Hutu extremists kill moderate Hutus in Rwanda,
  seize power, and systematically exterminate 80
  of Tutsis (about 800,000 people)
  
• Tutsi rebels immediately restart civil war, take
  control of country
  
• Hutu militants, 2 million Hutu civilians flee to
  camps in Zaire
  

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3. Flight of the Interahamwe
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4. Security Issues Rwanda looks to Zaire

• Interahamwe threaten Rwandan Tutsis Control camp
  resources
  
• Zaires Tutsis (Banyamulenge) fear the
  Interahamwe
  
• Burundi Hutu rebels ally with Interahamwe

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C. From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo

• Mobutu decides to preserve power by using
  Interahamwe against enemies ? classifies
  Banyamulenge (Zairian Tutsis) as refugees and
  revokes citizenship
• September 1996 South Kivu province orders all
  Banyamulenge / Tutsi to leave or be sent to
  camps
  
• Rwanda sees opportunity defend Tutsi in Zaire
  AND eliminate Interahamwe
  
• October 1996 Anti-Mobutu ADFL revolt sponsored
  by Rwanda, led by Kabila (fought Mobutu in the
  1960s!)

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4. 1996-1997 The Zaire War

• Rebels attack Hutu camps, force refugees back to
  Rwanda. Zaire army melts away.
  
• All of Mobutus regional enemies aid the ADFL.
• May 1997 ADFL seizes power factional
  infighting begins
  
• ADFL renames Zaire the DRC

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D. Africas World War

• Origins of the DRC War
• 1997 Kabila wins power struggle within ADFL
• Early 1998 Kabila seeks independence from
  sponsors (Rwanda, Uganda)
  
• Kabila expels Rwandan forces / Banyamulenge ?
  Rebellion in Kivu (again)
  
• The Maelstrom The war goes regional
• Pro-rebel intervention Uganda, Rwanda, and later
  Burundi (pro-Tutsi)
  
• Pro-government intervention Angola, Zimbabwe,
  Namibia, Sudan, Chad, Hutu rebels in Burundi,
  Interahamwe
  
• Other involvement Both sides in neighboring
  Congo Republic war, Ethiopia and Eritrea (Sudan ?
  Ethiopia ? Eritrea)

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Africas World War
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3. Fragmentation
Military Stalemate Rwanda-Ugandaconflict Rebel
organizations fragment About 2-4 million die, mos
tly civilians
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E. An uncertain peace

• War formally ended by negotiation in 2003 after
  Kabila assassinated (son takes power)
  
• Death toll still 1000/day in 2004 many small
  militias carry out massacres, but majority dies
  of starvation and disease due to ongoing anarchy
  
• July 2006 Elections finally held by transitional
  government. Kabila fails to win majority ? his
  forces then attack the forces of his competitor
  in the upcoming runoff
• Will Octobers runoff bring peace and stability
  to the Congo?