New HFC/HFB

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HUMAN FACTORS COUNCILS AND BOARDS in Naval
Aviation
CAPT James Fraser MC USN Naval Safety Center
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Naval AviationMishap Rate
FY50-97
60
Angled decks Aviation Safety Center Naval
Aviation Maintenance Program established in
1959 (NAMP) RAG concept initiated NATOPS
Program initiated 1961 Squadron Safety
program System Safety Designated
Aircraft ACT ORM
50
40
30
20
10
0
50
60
70
80
90
Fiscal Year
3
All Navy/Marine Corps Mishaps CY 1977-92
16
14
12
Human
10
Class A, B, C Mishaps/100,000 Flight Hours
8
6
4
Mechanical
2
0
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
Year
4
Human Factors CouncilsHuman Factors Boards
WHY DO WE NEED HFC/HFB?

• Aircrew error is the leading cause of mishaps
• In many instances, mishap causal factors were
  previously known to supervisors or peers, but
  unknown to the CO
• The insidious nature of human factors requires
  that they be reviewed on a regular basis

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Human Factors CouncilsHuman Factors Boards
WHAT ARE WE LOOKING FOR?

• Performance trends, training currency and
  proficiency
• Psychological, physiological, social and
  professional factors
• Medical conditions, emotional and interpersonal
  stressors

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Human Factors CouncilsHuman Factors Boards
PURPOSE

• To provide a formal mechanism of human factors
  feedback to the CO
• To provide the CO with the information necessary
  to make decisions regarding the mishap potential
  of personnel

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Human Factors CouncilsHuman Factors Boards

• GOALS
• Identify potentially hazardous factors before
  they become causal factors in a mishap.
• Assist aviators in the recognition and successful
  elimination of these safety hazards.

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Human Factors Councils

• Informal and quarterly (USN) or monthly (USMC)
  review of all aircrew
• Chaired by the CO
• Recommended composition CO, ASO,
• Flight Surgeon, Operations/Training Officer,
  Junior Officer, Leading Chief/MCPOC or enlisted
  aircrew
• No unrelated business shall be discussed

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Human Factors Councils

• Strictly confidential and not to be used in
  disciplinary action
• CO may defer discussion of detailed sensitive,
  personal, or professional matters to a more
  appropriate forum

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HFC Assessment Process

• Operations Provide flight data for
  documentation as needed
• OPTEMPO
• Individual flight time summaries
• Training Provide data to assess
• Aircrew qualifications and professional progress
• NATOPS/instrument/physiology survival swims
  quals/upgrades

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HFC Assessment Process

• All members should discuss the following as
  related to each individual
• Skills and Qualifications
• Systems Knowledge
• Aircrew Coordination Performance
• Professional Discipline
• Risk-taking Behavior
• Career Development

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HFC Assessment Process

• Critical Assessment Process
• Declining performance failure to meet required
  standards or qualifications process
• Known violations or instances of poor flight
  discipline
• Presence of major job or life stressors
• Recommended Action - shall not be disciplinary
  in nature

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Human Factors Boards

• Convened for cause by the CO
• Focused reviews of an individual
• Shall provide a plan of action
• Composed of the Executive Officer (chairman),
  Flight Surgeon, ASO School graduate, and another
  experienced officer

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Human Factors Boards

• If enlisted member is subject, a senior enlisted
  shall be a member
• Members from outside command may be used

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HFB Assessment Process

• Notify individual that HFB will be convened
• Identify specific problem areas to be considered
• Presence of aircrew under review is required
• Document performance deficiencies and recommend
  to CO an appropriate course of action

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THE FNAEB/FNFOEB

• Administrative Boards convened to evaluate
  performance, potential and motivation
• Convened by superior in command
• Faulty judgement in flight situations
• Lack of general skill
• Habits, traits, tendencies that make his/her
  flight status questionable
• Minimum flying requirements not met
• Questionable AA
• FNAEB Three pilots and FS
• FNFOEB Three NFOs and FS

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FNAEB/FNFOEB Outcomes

• Type A Continuation in flight status
• A1 Retain in present duty assignment
• A3 Transfer to another activity not within same
  command operating same or different aircraft
• A4 Probationary flight status (with appropriate
  Type B associated)
• Type B Termination of flight status
• B1Retention of right to wear insignia
• B2Revocation of insignia

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THE AT RISK AVIATOR

• Below average nugget or
• New transition aviator

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THE AT RISK AVIATOR

• Below average nugget or
• New transition aviator
• Overconfident senior aviator

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THE AT RISK AVIATOR

• Below average nugget or
• New transition aviator
• Overconfident senior aviator
• Best pilot

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THE AT RISK AVIATOR

• Below average nugget or
• New transition aviator
• Overconfident senior aviator
• Best pilot
• Persistent poor performer

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THE AT RISK AVIATOR

• Below average nugget or
• New transition aviator
• Overconfident senior aviator
• Best pilot
• Persistent poor performer
• Overstressed aviator

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Whenever we talk about a pilot who has been
killed in a flying accident, we should all keep
one thing in mind. He...made a judgment. He
believed in it so strongly that he knowingly bet
his life on it. That his judgment was faulty is
a tragedy,... Every instructor, supervisor, and
contemporary who ever spoke to him had the
opportunity to influence his judgement, so a
little bit of all of us goes with every pilot we
lose. Anonymous
USMC Rotary Wing, 1997