Spacepower’s Role in Addressing Earthly Security Challenges

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Spacepowers Role in Addressing Earthly Security
Challenges Pete Hays, SAIC
The Future of Space Exploration Solutions to
Earthly Problems? Boston University
12-14 April 2007
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National Defense University Spacepower Theory
Study

• Originated during 2005 QDR
• Feb 06 OSD Letter with TOR to NDU
• Study Design
• Yearlong effort due Summer 07
• Seminars, Workshops, Conferences
• Product Two Books
• Volume I Concise Spacepower Theory
• Volume II Comprehensive Spacepower Theory

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Edited Volume Comprehensive Spacepower Theory

• VOLUME II CHAPTERS AND AUTHORS
• Foreword Implications of Spacepower for
  Geopolitics and Grand Strategy
• Section I Introduction to Spacepower Theory
• Chapter 1 On the Nature of Theory Harold R.
  Winton
• Chapter 2 International Relations Theory and
  Spacepower Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
• Chapter 3 Landpower, Seapower, and Spacepower
  Jon T. Sumida
• Chapter 4 Airpower, Cyberpower, and Spacepower
  Benjamin S. Lambeth
• Section II Spacepower and Geopolitics
• Chapter 5 Orbital Terrain and Space Physics
  Martin E.B. France Jerry Jon Sellers
• Chapter 6 Space Law and Governance Structures
  Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz
• Chapter 7 Building on Previous Spacepower
  Theory Colin S. Gray John B. Sheldon
• Section III Commercial Space Perspectives
• Chapter 8 History of Commercial Space Activity
  and Spacepower Henry R. Hertzfeld
• Chapter 9 Commercial Space Industry and Markets
  Joseph Fuller, Jr.
• Chapter 10 Merchants and Guardians Scott Pace
• Chapter 11 Innovative Approaches to Commercial
  Space Ivan Bekey
• Section IV Civil Space Perspectives
• Chapter 12 History of Civil Space Activity and
  Spacepower Roger D. Launius
• Chapter 13 Affordable and Responsive Space
  Systems Sir Martin Sweeting

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Edited Volume (cont.)

• Section V Security Space Perspectives
• Chapter 16 History of Security Space Activity
  and Spacepower James Lewis
• Chapter 17 Increasing the Military Uses of
  Space Henry F. Cooper, Jr. Everett C. Dolman
• Chapter 18 Preserving Freedom of Action in
  Space Michael Krepon, Theresa Hitchens Michael
  Katz-Hyman
• Chapter 19 Balancing Security Interests Michael
  E. OHanlon
• Section VI International Perspectives
• Chapter 20 Russia James E. Oberg
• Chapter 21 China Dean Cheng
• Chapter 22 Europe Xavier Pasco
• Chapter 23 Emerging Actors Randall R. Correll
• Section VII Evolving Futures for Spacepower
• Chapter 24 Evolving U.S. Structures John M.
  Logsdon
• Chapter 25 Organizational Drivers for
  Spacepower John M. Collins
• Chapter 26 Technological Drivers for Spacepower
  Taylor Dinerman
• Chapter 27 Building Human Capital for
  Spacepower S. Peter Worden
• Afterword The Future of Spacepower
• Appendixes
• Space Law Outer Space Treaty, Registration
  Convention, Rescue and Return Agreement,
  Liability Convention, Moon Treaty, PAROS
  Proposals, IADC
• Orbits and Orbital Mechanics

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Requirements for Concise Spacepower Theory

• Account for the structure of the field
• the divergent world views of each sector and
• the dynamics of their interactions
• Define the boundary conditions of the theory
• Cis-Lunar space as opposed to all of space
• International perceptions of spacepower and their
  effect on US policy
• Ask the key, fundamental questions regarding the
  uses and purposes of space to extract underlying
  principles.
• Question hypotheses and present conditions.
• Test counterfactuals
• Construct a framework that integrates divergent
  points of view and takes into account potential
  future scenarios.
• Roles of Theory Define Construct Explain
  Connect Anticipate

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Upcoming Conference

• Capstone Symposium 25-26 April 07, National
  Defense University, Washington, D.C.
• Initial presentation of Concise Spacepower Theory
• For more info or to sign up www.ndu.edu
  haysp_at_ndu.edu
• Community of Practice Website
• http//groups-beta.google.com/group/spacepower-the
  ory

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Soviet Space Systems and Co-Orbital ASAT
RORSAT
Co-Orbital ASAT
EORSAT
Energia carrying Skif DM (Polus) prototype
battle station
DS-P1-M Target Satellite
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Soviet Space Systems and Co-Orbital ASAT

• Many details about this system remain classified
  or are lost to history. The system used two
  types of satellites co-orbital active killers
  (Istrebitel or killer) and passive targets
• The first tests, Polyot-1 and Polyot-2, were
  conducted in 1963 and 1964. There were
  subsequently 19 target satellite tests and 22
  killer satellite tests. The system reached full
  operational capability in 1972. The last test
  was on 18 Jun 1982
• Killer satellites tested in the 1970s were ready
  for launch within 90 minutes (using a Tsiklon
  booster) and could close within less than one
  kilometer of target satellites within 40-50
  minutes
• On 23 Mar 1983 Yuri Andropov announced a
  moratorium on design, construction, and testing
  of the system the moratorium ended in Sep 1986
• In May 1987 Michael Gorbachev visited Baikonur
  and saw the co-orbital killer satellite and the
  prototype of the anti-satellite and anti-missile
  platform called Narvad (Guard). General
  Zavalishin, who escorted Gorbachev, used the
  opportunity to advocate resumption of testing.
  Zavalishin pointed at similar developments in the
  US and promised to cover up ASAT launches so no
  one would suspect tests were taking place. As
  Zavalishin recalls, ...Gorbachev issued
  incoherent and wordy explanations, which
  concluded with a polite, but resolute refusal.
• Ironically, only few days after this
  conversation, on 15 May 1987, the first
  heavy-lift Energia rocket blasted off from
  Baikonur, carrying Skif DM (Polus) spacecraft,
  which was later described as a prototype battle
  station in space. Due to a software glitch, the
  90-ton-class spacecraft never made it into orbit

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US ASAT Systems and Residual Capabilities
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US ASAT Testing and Systems

• Bold Orion air-launched, nuclear-tipped ASAT
  tested in late 1950s worlds first known test 19
  Oct 1959
• Programs 505 and 437 ground-launched,
  nuclear-tipped ASATs operationally deployed
  1963-70
• NSDM 345 in Jan 77 called for development of
  air-launched KEW ASAT
• MHV ASAT successfully tested on 13 Sep 1985
  Congressional restrictions led to cancellation in
  1989 KEASAT was follow-on system
• MIRACL tests in Oct 1997 highlighted satellite
  vulnerability to DEW
• ASAT potential of BMD systems BP and ABL

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ASAT Arms Control Efforts

• Development and testing of ASAT capabilities not
  covered by OST or other space agreements
• Two-Track Diplomacy with three rounds of US-USSR
  ASAT negotiations 1978-79
• USSR testing moratorium 1982-86 Congressional
  restrictions on MHV ASAT testing
• DST was only bucket of AC that did not lead to
  agreements during 1980s-90s
• PAROS efforts at CD and UNGA Resolutions

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Growth in SATCOM Demand
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Military Satellite Communications Grids
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Major Military Space Program Investments
(Millions of 2006 dollars)
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Gain or Maintain Space Control
Provide Freedom of Action in Space for Friendly
Forces
Deny Freedom of Action in Space to Enemy Forces
PROTECTION Employ active and Passive
defensive measures to ensure US and friendly
space systems operate as Planned
SURVEILLANCE Detect, identify, assess, and track
space objects and events
PREVENTION Employ measures to prevent adversary
use of data or services from US and friendly
space systems for purposes hostile to the US
NEGATION Disrupt, deny, degrade, deceive, or
destroy adversary space capabilities
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Attributes of Military Space Doctrines


Primary Value and
Space System
Conflict Missions
Appropriate
Functions of Military
Characteristics and
of Space Forces

Military
Space Forces

Employment Strategies

Organization for
Operations and
Advocacy

Sanctuary







NRO

Limited Numbers

Limited

Enhance Strategic
Stability



Fragile Systems



Facilitate Arms


Vulnerable Orbits

Control



Optimize for NTMV



Survivability

Above functions plus



Force
Major Command or

Terrestrial Backups


Distributed


Force
Enhancement

Unified Command

Architectures

Enhancement



Degrade


Autonomous Control

Gracefully




Hardening


Control



Control Space



Control Space

Unified Command


Redundancy



Significant Force


Significant Force
or Space Force




On
-
Orbit Spares
Enhancement

Enhancement




Crosslinks


Surveillance,


Offensive, and

Maneuver



Less Vulnerable Orbits
Defensive


Counterspace



Stealth

High Ground

Above functions plus

Above functions plus

Space Force



Attack Warning Sensors





Decisive Space
-
Decisive Impact on



5 Ds Deception,
Terrestrial Conflict

to
-
Space and
Disruption, Denial,


BMD

Space
-
to
-
Earth
Degradation,
Force
Destruction

Application



Reconstitution


BMD

Capability



Defense



Convoy


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Backup Slides
36
Missile Defense Share of Total DoD Budget and RD
Budget
37
Three Major Objectives of Current U.S. Missile
Defense Program

• 1) Maintain and sustain an initial capability to
  defend the U.S., allies, and our deployed forces
  against rogue attacks. MDA plans by 2013 to
• Complete fielding of Ground-Based Interceptors
  (GBI) in Alaska and California
• Enhance Early Warning Radars in Alaska,
  California, and United Kingdom
• Field Sea-Based X-Band Radar in the Pacific
• Field a forward-transportable radar in Japan
• Expand command and control, battle management,
  and communications capabilities
• Augment GBI midcourse defense capability by
  deploying Aegis BMD interceptors and engagement
  ships
• 2) close the gaps and improve this initial
  capability MDA plans by 2013 to
• Add more Aegis BMD sea-based interceptors
• Field four transportable Terminal High Altitude
  Area Defense (THAAD) units
• Introduce land and sea variants of the Multiple
  Kill Vehicle program
• Upgrade the early warning radar in Greenland
• Establish a GBI site and corresponding radar
  capability in Europe
• 3) develop options for the future MDA plans
  to
• Continue development of the Space Tracking and
  Surveillance System (STSS)
• Maintain two programs, the Kinetic Energy
  Interceptor (KEI) and the Airborne Laser (ABL),
  one of which is to be selected as the boost-phase
  missile defense element by 2010
• Develop a Space Test Bed to examine space-based
  options for expanding the coverage and
  effectiveness for future BMD systems

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U.S. Missile DefenseProgrammatic Issues and
Challenges

• European third site for GBI and associated radar
• 206M requested for FY08 but Congress cut funding
  last year political issues in host nations
  objections raised by Russians
• Airborne Laser
• Fully funded at 632M in FY07 FY08 request is
  549M. Initial airborne attempt to intercept
  boosting missile pushed back to last quarter of
  FY09
• Kinetic Energy Interceptor
• Congress cut FY07 request of 406M by 48M
  program restructured and scheduled for FY08
  flight test but may not offer a significant new
  capability such as boost phase intercept
  capability or a mobile launcher
• Multiple Kill Vehicle
• FY07 funding request of 165M was cut by 20M
  271M requested for FY08 program refocused on
  developing two separate payload configurations
• Testing
• 597M appropriated in FY07 and 586M requested
  for FY08 but concerns remain about breadth and
  scope of testing
• Space
• Request for Space Test Bed for FY08 is 10M and
  is projected to grow to 15M for FY09

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Balancing Issues and Challengesfor Space and
Missile Defense

• Desire for constantly deployed, global boost
  phase missile intercept capabilities via space
  basing of kinetic and/or directed energy weapons
  versus concerns over weaponization of space
• Desire for robust global capability to dissuade,
  deter, and defend against rogue actors versus
  concerns with undercutting strategic stability
  with Russia and China
• Desire to test base-based missile defense
  components versus concerns with weaponization of
  space and space debris
• Development of non-space based boost phase
  missile intercept capabilities (e.g. ground-based
  interceptors, ground-based lasers, and Airborne
  Laser) versus their significant anti-satellite
  capabilities