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Field Project 3:

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Markets in the Arabian Peninsula. Sheep infected with RVF. x. BOYCOTT ... Designing systems that take advantage of inter/intra group credibility effects ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Field Project 3:


1
Field Project 3 Surveillance and control of
Rift Valley Fever in the Greater Horn of Africa
and the Middle East
www.tomuphoto.com/gallery/ Landscapes/rift_valley
2
What is Rift Valley Fever?
  • Febrile disease that affects sheep, cattle,
    goats, humans, primates, camels
  • Vector
  • Most human cases are mild and involve fever,
    myaglia, vomiting, diarrhea, and/or hepatitis
  • Can become severe in small of human cases
  • Eye disease 0.5-2
  • Meningoencephalitis lt1
  • Hemorrhagic fever lt1

Aedes (Neomelaniconion) and Aedes (Stegomyia),
Culex, Mansonia, Anopheles and Eretmapodites,
have all been shown to transmit the virus.
Photo news.bbc.co.uk/.../ newsid_934000/934032.st
m
3
RVF Epizootics
  • Humans infected from
  • Mosquitoes
  • Contact with blood/body fluids/organs of infected
    animals
  • First isolated in 1930 among sheep on a farm in
    the Rift Valley of Kenya
  • Recent Outbreaks
  • Egypt 1993, 1997
  • Kenya, Somalia 1997-98
  • First cases outside African Continent not until
    2000 in Saudi Arabia Yemen

4
Economic Impacts of RVF
Pastoralists in the Horn of Africa
Markets in the Arabian Peninsula
BOYCOTT
Photos, clockwise from top left www.uni-mainz.de,
www.asergeev.com, www.fao.org
Sheep infected with RVF
5
RVF Management Group Decision Problem
  • Monitoring and forecasting system depends on
    cooperation between producers and consumers
  • If benefits of monitoring/forecasting are not
    spread across each group, essential players may
    not want to participate
  • Groups span across production, export,
    consumption, continents, religions,
    nationalities, and ethnicities.

6
How to overcome trade constraints?
  • Development of a model that could
  • Identify areas that are RVF enzootic with
    epizootic potential
  • Identify periods of high risk of RVF
  • Determine lead time in which high risk areas
    periods can be identified
  • Establish linkages between model outputs
    decision-making options at multiple levels

7
Developing a Monitoring Forecasting System
  • Identify areas that are RVF enzootic with
    epizootic potential
  • Using historical data from Kenya, assemble a set
    of environmental layers to identify the areas
    where RVF is enzootic with epizootic potential
  • Apply them to the entire Horn of Africa Middle
    East

(Completed)
(In progress)
8
Developing a Monitoring Forecasting System
  • Identify periods of high risk of RVF (almost
    completed)
  • Determine lead time in which high risk areas
    periods can be identified
  • Identify threshold values of rainfall, soil
    moisture, vegetation greenness, inundation
    associated with historical outbreaks
  • Assess ability to predict exceedance of these
    thresholds at different times using global
    climate models

(In progress)
(In progress)
9
Developing a Monitoring Forecasting System
  • 4. Establish linkages between model outputs
    decision-making options at multiple levels
  • Barriers to group cooperation must be identified,
    understood, and addressed in development of the
    system if cooperation is important
  • It may be necessary to design group cooperation
    mechanisms into reporting components of the
    monitoring and forecasting system

10
Reputation and Vulnerability
  • Reporting information on RVF outbreaks may hurt a
    producers credibility and reputation
  • A reputation of being a producer with high risk
    for RVF may make a vulnerable producer more
    vulnerable
  • Are there ways to address these problems?

11
RVF Decision Making
  • Potential areas to explore
  • Incentives for voluntary monitoring
  • Sharing risk through sales contracts
  • Compensation schemes producers who provide
    sensitive information
  • Designing systems that take advantage of
    inter/intra group credibility effects
  • Incentives for vaccination of animals
  • Temporary restriction of trade from affected areas

12
Mechanism Design
  • Buyers in Middle East could compensate
    pastoralists for reporting sick sheep, making
    monitoring and auditing costs less prohibitive
  • Questions
  • Would buyers blacklist pastoralists because they
    shared information about the presence of the
    virus, can a contract be designed to overcome
    this?
  • Do pastoralists report differently as
    individuals, as groups, across ethnic groups?

13
Groups and Contract Design
  • When making contracts, does the cost of revealing
    private information differ between individuals
    and groups?
  • We will build on existing research by developing
    tools to explore
  • What constitutes a group and what are the
    premiums that group dynamics bring?
  • Experimental game in lab (Summer 2005) possibly
    at conference in the field

14
QUESTIONS?
Photo www.freshtracks.ca/group_incentive.shtml
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