The Federal Aviation Administration:

1
The Federal Aviation Administration

• An Agency Compromised

2
The Federal Aviation Agency

• Prior to 1958, two separate federal agencies
  regulated commercial aviation
• The Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA)
  responsible for air traffic control, airman and
  aircraft certification, airway development.
• The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) safety rule
  making, accident investigation, and economic
  regulation of the airlines.
• In 1958, The Federal Aviation Act transferred
  consolidated the two agencies into the Federal
  Aviation Agency.
• With this Act, Congress gave the new agency an
  additional mandate of advancing the expansion of
  the civil aviation industry.

3
Conflict of Interest

• This new mandate has resulted in serious
  conflicts of interest of the course of time for
  the FAA.
• It has become known as an agency torn by two
  competing and divergent goals How can it nurture
  both market forces and public safety at the same
  time?
• Asking a federal agency to regulate an industry
  it is also charged with promoting creates a basic
  conflict of interest and raises more questions
  than answers.

4
Market Forces Dominate

• In the late 1960s, the FAA was moved from the
  Commerce Department to Department of
  Transportation and became officially known as the
  Federal Aviation Administration.
• Market forces ran rampant throughout the agency
  for decades and eventually marginalized the FAA
  and its security functions.
• Repeatedly, policy decisions and solutions that
  should have been made by the FAA were deferred by
  the agency to the airlines or to Congress.

5
Theoretical Roles Responsibilities of the Pre
9/11 Aviation Security System
6
The Dual Mandate

• Congress had made a grievous error in charging
  the FAA with the job of commercially promoting
  the same industry it was charged with regulating.
• The FAA Reauthorization Act. In 1996, in response
  to the obvious long-term negative results,
  Congress created new legislation that eliminated
  some of the language from the original 1958 bill.
• The word promotion was eliminated and replaced
  by assigning, maintaining, and enhancing safety
  and security as the highest priorities in air
  commerce.

7
Lobbying

• Despite the change in the mission of the FAA, the
  dysfunctional culture remained. The airlines
  continued to press their interests and the FAA,
  for the most part, deferred.
• Part of this was the cadre of lobbyists working
  for major U.S. airlines. Many had worked at the
  highest levels of government and were Washington
  insiders.

8
Sample of Airline Lobbyists
9
Lobbying, cont.
10
Lobbying 2000 Election Cycle Donations
11
The Gore Commission

• On July 25, 1996 after the crash of TWA Flight
  800, a commission chaired by Vice President Al
  Gore was convened to study improving air
  transportation safety and security.
• Known as the White House Commission on Aviation
  Safety and Security, it conducted an in-depth
  analysis of U.S. commercial airlines safeguards
  against terrorist attacks.
• Found that security measures used by U.S.
  airlines needed to be drastically improved, just
  like the previous federal commission had found 6
  years earlier.
• However, of the 50 recommendations made by the
  Commission, nearly all were eventually watered
  down, delayed, or simply never considered by the
  FAA.

12
Industry Control of Agency Advisory Committees

• Over time industry representatives came to
  dominate FAA advisory committees.
• When one examines the members of the Aviation
  Security Advisory Committee in 2000
• Of the 9 non-governmental representatives
• 4 represented airlines
• 2 represented airports
• 1 representative for airline employees
• 1 representative for law enforcement
• 1 representative for passengers
• In any debate, working group, or action
  undertaken by the committee, the airlines and
  allies in the FAA and other federal agencies,
  held an automatic majority.
• As a result, FAA security policy was treated more
  as a political issue than a mandated
  responsibility.

13
Organizations represented on the 2000 Aviation
Security Advisory Committee

• Cargo Airline Association
• American Association of Airport Executives
  Airports Council International
• Airline Pilots Association
• Victims of Pan AM 103
• Airports Law Enforcement Agencies Network
• U.S. Postal Service
• INS
• FBI

• FAA, Committee Chair
• FAA, Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and
  Planning
• Department of Transportation
• Regional Airline Association
• Air Transport Association
• National Air Carriers Organization

14
The Red Teams Whistle Blower

• The FAAs Red Team was created after the bombing
  of Pan AM flight 103 in 1988. Its primary mission
  was to conduct covert security penetration
  testing for the purpose of identifying both
  localized and systemic vulnerabilities and to
  help strengthen the FAAs regulatory inspection
  capabilities.
• Following 9/11, a former air marshal and member
  of the Red Team, who was at that time employed by
  the TSA, brought up several allegations regarding
  gross dereliction of duty by top FAA security
  officials.

15
The Allegations

• Allegations included that FAA associate
  Administrator for Civil Aviation Security Admiral
  Cathal Flynn suppressed testing results and
  directed the Red Team to not conduct follow-up
  inspections of airports that yielded especially
  poor testing results.
• At Frankfurt Airport in Germany, where the bomb
  that destroyed Pan AM 103 was placed onboard via
  a piece of checked luggage, all Red Team testing
  in 199, eight years later, resulted in failures.
  Because of the failures, FAA senior management
  ordered the Red Team testing at Frankfurt halted

16
Bostons Logan International A Case Study in
Compromise

• For years prior to 9/11 Logan was known
  throughout the industry as one of the least
  secure airports in the nation.
• From 1991 to 2000, Logan had the 5th highest
  number of security breaches.
• In one dramatic example, a local teenager in 1999
  was able to climb over an airport security fence,
  walk two miles across the tarmac, get through a
  jetway door that should have been locked, and
  travel as a stowaway on a British Airways 747 to
  London.

17
Logan, cont.

• In 1998, the FAA hired an admittedly
  inexperienced manager to supervise the Boston
  Civil Aviation Security Field Office.
• Mary Carol Turano had little or no experience in
  airport security.
• She had not yet begun the basic training that all
  FAA special agents must undergo
• Previous experience within the FAA was as a
  budget analyst and national director of the
  agencys canine unit
• After 9/11 it was revealed that she did not have
  a security badge that would have permitted her
  access to secure areas of the airport that she
  was overseeing.

18
Logan and 9/11

• The problem of the airlines unwillingness to
  securely run the checkpoints at Logan and to
  inspect checked baggage, and the FAAs reluctance
  to do anything about it, was raised before 9/11
  by several important people.
• The public safety director for Massport, wrote a
  memo 4 months before the bombings urging Massport
  to prepare for a possible attack, citing reports
  that terrorists were operating in Boston.
• The memo specifically warned that law enforcement
  in the Boston area had uncovered suspected
  terrorists, including some with links to the
  airport.

19
Logan cont.

• A retired U.S. Army Military Police Lt. Colonel
  and former FAA Civilian Aviation Security
  Specialist for the New England regions left the
  FAA in 2001 with the intent to expose what he
  called The façade of aviation security that
  existed at Logan prior to the terrorist
  attacks.
• He helped an investigative reporter conduct
  undercover tests of Logans screening
  checkpoints. The broadcast revealed that
  reporters were able to get items that should have
  been detected and resolved past screeners at
  Logan 11 out of 12 times. They were also able to
  glean combinations to airport terminal doors,
  which gave them unfettered access to parked
  aircraft and cargo.

20
Logan, cont.

• After the broadcast, the former FAA agent wrote a
  letter to Senator John Kerry, dated May 7, 2001
• With the concept of Jihad, do you think it would
  be difficult for a determined terrorist to get on
  a polane and destroy himself and all other
  passengers? Think what the result would be of a
  coordinated attack which took down several
  domestic flights on the same day. Considering
  the current threats, it is almost likely.

21
Logan, cont.

• In August, 2001, the former agent emailed FAA
  Security Chief Michael Canavan, elaborating again
  upon the continuing situation at Logan and the
  façade of aviation security that exited there.
  The FAA Chief responded admitting that security
  at Logan wasnt up to standards, but that he was
  taking action to fix things.
• 20 days later, two flights departing from Logan
  airport slammed into the World Trade Center.