Module Two Food Defense

1
Module TwoFood Defense the Psychology of
Terrorism
National Center for Food Protection
Defense Risk Communicator Training
2
Food Defense the Psychology of Terrorism

• Topic 1
• Psychology of Fear Trust
• Topic 2
• The Food System as a Target of Attack
• Topic 3
• Natural Disasters, Terrorism Catastrophic
  Events

3
Module 2 Learner Outcomes

• Compare and contrast fear and trust as adaptive
  survival processes.
• Describe the positive and negative consequences
  of fear, denial and panic as adaptive responses
  to heightened risk.
• Identify the factors that make the food system
  vulnerable to intentional attack.

4
Learner Outcomes - continued

• Compare and contrast characteristics of a natural
  or traditional disaster and an intentional
  terrorist attack.
• Describe the psychological consequences of
  natural disasters and terrorism within the
  context of fear and trust.

5
module two Food Defense the Psychology of
Terrorism

• topic one
• The Psychology of Fear Trust

6
Fear Trust

• Fear trust are two adaptive survival processes

• TRUST
• Slowly acquired
• Readily extinguished
• Difficult to re-establish

• FEAR
• Rapidly acquired
• Slow to extinguish
• Easily re-established

7
Adjustment to risk
Reactions change as risk increases.
SOURCE Peter Sandman, 2005
8
We accept most risks well
Humans usually adapt well to risk.
Acceptance
Fear
Denial
Panic
SOURCE Peter Sandman, 2005
9
FEAR as a adjustment reaction

• Fear is our natural reaction in a crisis.
• It is automatic
• It comes early
• It is temporary
• It is a small over-reaction
• It may need guidance
• It serves as a rehearsal
• It reduces later over-reaction

Fear is a useful response. Let it happen!
10
Reactions to perceived risk

• Over-reaction is our initial reaction to a new,
  potentially serious risk.
• We pause
• We become hyper-vigilant
• We personalize the risk
• We take extra precautions that are probably
  unnecessary, or at least premature.

SOURCE Peter Sandman
11
Heightened Fear Leads to Denial

• Less common than fear
• More dangerous than fear
• More common response than panic
• Denial is reduced when
• Legitimize the fear
• Action do something
• Decision given range of actions

12
What is panic?

• A sudden strong feeling of fear that prevents
  reasonable thought or action.
• While panicky feelings are common panic is
  rare.

13
Response to the 2001 anthrax scare

• In the 3 impacted cities
• 1 - purchased gas masks
• 5 - purchased antibiotic prescriptions (80 of
  these did not take prescriptions)
• 98 opened mail as usual
• 3 consulted doctor about anxiety

14
Fear Fear Panic Panic

• Do NOT Fear Fear or Panic Panic
• Most people can cope manage their fear
• To Fear Fear Panic Panic can result in
  unwise strategies
• Withhold information
• Over assure

15
Applying the concepts
Publics Reaction to Spinach E.coli Outbreak
August-September, 2006
16
module two Food Defense the Psychology of
Terrorism

• topic two
• The Food System
• as a Potential Target of Attack

17

• I, for the life of me, cannot understand why
• the terrorists have not attacked our food supply
  because it is so easy to do.

AP Photo
Tommy Thompson, former HHS Secretary December 3,
2004
18
Food Safety Security Defense
Food Safety
Food Defense
Food Security
Naturally occurring or unintentional contaminatio
n
Intentional attack on the food system
Access to adequate food supply
19
Food system vulnerabilities

• Exposed crops
• High concentrations of livestock and poultry
• Vulnerability points along the farm-to-fork chain
• Large batch sizes in processing
• Imported foods from a complex and global supply
  chain
• Growth in niche and foreign markets

20
Strategic vulnerabilities

• Ease in obtaining crop and animal pathogens
• Mass contamination could yield huge consequences
  with minimal effort
• Low risk in being detected, caught, or
  accidentally contaminated
• Substantial economic and psychological impact
  even in the case of a threat or hoax

21
Beyond the Terrorist Who are the perpetrators?

• Usual suspects
• Criminals
• Extortionists
• Subversives
• - political ideologists
• Terrorists

• The not so obvious
• Disgruntled employees
• Competitors
• Mentally ill

22
Weapons of Attack Bioterrorism Diseases/Agents

• Category A examples
• Anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, tularemia,
  viral hemorrhagic
• Category B examples
• Brucellosis, E.coli, salmonella, ricin,
  Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB)
• Category C
• Emerging pathogens that could be engineered

Source CDC
23
Foodborne disease costs

• CONSUMER
• Pain suffering
• Medical costs
• Loss of income
• Loss of leisure
• enjoyment
• Increased insurance
• Physical rehab
• Long term care
• Death expenses

• PUBLIC
• Health care
• Legislation
• Plant inspection
• Medical
• investigation
• surveillance
• Prosecution costs
• Education costs
• Clean-up
• disinfection

• INDUSTRY
• Product recall
• Poor publicity
• Loss of reputation
• Legal liability
• costs
• Increased insur-
• ance costs
• Loss of business
• Closure

SOURCE Food Alert
24
Recent FOOD DEFENSE events

• 1984
• 751 people became ill after members of a
  religious cult contaminated salad bars in 10
  restaurants in Oregon with Salmonella typhimurium

AP Photo
Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh
First came the stomach cramps and nausea. Next
came dizziness and disorientation. It was the
chills, fever, diarrhea and vomiting that finally
sent them to their doctors. Nearly a thousand of
them
25
Recent FOOD DEFENSE events
Chilean Fruit Pulled From Shelves as U.S. Widens
Inquiry on Poison By PHILIP SHENON, SPECIAL TO
THE NEW YORK TIMES Published March 15, 1989

• 1989
• Terrorists phoned the U.S. embassy in Santiago
  and claimed to have laced all Chilean grapes with
  cyanide

26
Post Sept. 11, 2001 events

• 2002
• Three Israeli-Arabs were arrested in Jerusalem
  for allegedly planning a mass poisoning of
  Israeli patrons at a local café.

27
Post Sept. 11, 2001 events

• Last updated at (Beijing Time) Monday,
  September 30, 2002
• China Sentences Rat Poison Killer to Death

• Fall, 2002
• A China restaurateur added a chemical (rat
  poisoning) to a competitors food. 38 people died
  and hundreds were sent to hospitals.

28
New Zealand FMD Hoax

• May, 2005
• New Zealand Prime Minister received letter
  claiming Food and Mouth Disease (FMD) was
  introduction on Waiheke Island. Was eventually
  determined to be a hoax. Cost was 1.5-2 million
  in compensation costs to dairy farmers on island.

Rural community near urban center (Auckland)
29
False claims hoaxes

• Can seriously disrupt political, economic or
  psychological well-being
• Copy cats are common can interfere with actual
  response efforts
• Internet is easy effective tool for spreading
  false rumors

30
Consumer attitudes expectations about food
defense

• Goal Learn consumers priorities on spending
  for terrorism defense food relative to other
  targets
• Conducted by The Food Industry Center,
  University of Minnesota sponsored by the
  National Center for Food Protection and Defense
  in April, 2005
• Sample 4000 adult Americans internet responses
  weighted to represent population

31
Highlights of survey findings

• Over 90 of people believe there will be another
  terrorist attack in this country in the next four
  years.
• There is less likely to be a terrorist attack on
  the food system than on other economic sectors.
• Government and food processors are held the most
  responsible for both food safety food defense,
  but government bears more responsibility for food
  defense.

32
Survey highlights - continued

• Retailers bear more responsibility should bear
  more cost for food safety than food defense
• Consequences of an attack on the food system are
  more serious than on other sectors.
• Consumers would spend more to protect against a
  terrorist attack on the food system or against a
  chemical or biological release than they would
  for protecting airlines.

33
module two Food Defense the Psychology of
Terrorism

• topic three
• Natural Disasters, Terrorism
• and Catastrophic Incidents

34
Natural and traditional disasters

• Types of natural or traditional disasters
• Fire, floods, earthquakes, drought, hurricanes,
  tsunamis, mechanical failures, explosions, etc.
• Disasters due to acts of human error (accident)
  or neglect
• Airplane crash, fire, building collapse,
  mislabeled product, etc.

35
Characteristics of natural events

• Well-defined time frame in terms of beginning and
  ending
• Sensory cues are readily available
• Where is the danger?
• Where is safety?

36
Terrorist events

• Types of terrorist events
• CBRNE categories chemical, biological,
  radiological, nuclear, explosive
• Food defense focuses on chemical biological
• Goal of terrorism is primarily psychological
  eroding sense of security safety

37
Characteristics of terrorist events

• Intentional criminal acts directed toward others
• Mysterious agents and/or source of symptoms
• Random and outside of our control
• Potential permanent catastrophic
  harm loss
• No well-defined beginning or end
• May not provide routine sensory cues

38
Response to terrorist event
These characteristics create a different and
unique emotional charge than a natural or
traditional disaster.
39
Food terrorism challenges

• Contamination may not be discovered for days or
  even weeks after the event
• Even a threat or hoax involving the food supply
  can trigger mass anxiety and significant economic
  loss
• May be significant number of unknowns
  (mystery)

40
Factors associated with increased public concern
(fear)

• Catastrophic potential
• Unfamiliar
• Decision processes not understood
• Lack of personal control
• Involuntary exposure
• Delayed effects
• Children at risk
• Risk to future generations

• Lack of trust in relevant institutions
• Much media attention
• Previous history
• Unclear benefits
• Potentially irreversible effects
• Origins caused by human actions (vs. act of
  nature)

- Covello, in NRC, 1989
41
Risk Communication

• Goal of terrorism is to create contextual fear
  and to eliminate trust in the various critical US
  infrastructures
• In response, Risk Communication can
• Reduces the mystery of the agents OR
• Help tolerate the mystery/uncertainty when faced
  significant unknowns

Less mystery yields less fear which yields more
trust
42
Take Aways

• Dont fear fear or experience panic panic
• Most people can cope manage their fear
• If we fear fear official reactions to terrorist
  attacks may provoke unnecessary unwise steps
• Withholding information
• Over assurance

43
Take Aways continued

• Food defense addresses an intentional attack on
  the food system food safety pertains to natural
  or accidental contamination.
• The dynamic nature of the food system makes it
  particularly vulnerable to attack.

44
Best Practices
For Effective Food Defense

• Listen to publics concerns understand audience